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AMERICA'S 
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FAR EAST 



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Charles Uaxvey Fahs 



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WORLD PROBLEM DISCUSSION SERIES 



AMERICA'S STAKE IN 
THE FAR EAST 



733 S' 



CHARLES HARVEY FAHS 




ASSOCIATION PRESS 

New York : 347' Madison Avenub 
1920 



1i^, 






Copyright, 1920, by 

The International Committee of 

Young Men's Christian Associations 



©Gl,A570530 
JUL -2 19^0 



PREFACE 

Many who are alert to the present world situation feel that the 
Far East constitutes at this time one of the areas of extraordinary 
strain and that the whole group of issues which make up the com- 
plexus often designated as the Far Eastern problem requires a wide- 
spread, dispassionate, and understanding discussion in America. 

It is not easy, amid the engrossing interests and duties that are 
close at hand, for us to see clearly the various issues involved in such 
a problem, and especially to see those issues in their interlocking 
aspects. Whatever thinking we might be able to do about the 
problem, moreover, is discouraged by propaganda which tends to 
confuse us. Consequently, many assume that such questions must 
be left entirely to the experts, in the belief that there is no chance for 
the formation of an intelligent and effective public opinion with 
respect to the larger world problems. America's attitude on inter- 
national affairs, however, should be the concern of every citizen, and 
it must be possible to present these subjects in ways which will lead 
to illuminating and profitable discussion and ultimately to trust- 
worthy social judgments. 

As will be discovered on examination, this book is not a treatise 
on the Far Eastern problem. It consists simply of questions to 
open up those issues involved which are likely to be of most inter- 
est to the American public, the questions in each chapter being 
followed by reference quotations setting forth the essential facts and 
the principal viewpoints held with reference to the major questions 
raised. To read through the questions and reference material 
would provide some basis for the personal opinion of an individual. 
If such thinking can be still further clarified by discussion and com- 
parison of personal viewpoints in a group or forum with other 
individuals who are also trying to find their way, more progress can 
be made. 

Two chapters might well have been added to the book : one on 
the Japanese problem in Hawaii, and the other on the interrelation 
of American interests in the Far East and those of other predomi- 
nantly Anglo-Saxon national groups, such as Canada, New Zealand, 
and Australia, self-governing commonwealths of the British Empire 
whose territories border on or are in the Pacific. 

Every day's newspaper brings to notice new or shifting aspects 
of the Far Eastern situation, and it is probable that a few questions 
and quotations will be out of date before the volume is long in print. 
It is believed, however, that for the most part both questions and 

iii 



IV 



PREFACE 



reference selections bear on the more permanent features of the 
problem. 

An effort has been made to avoid implying answers expected to 
questions asked. The major question as to whether the Christian 
ideals and dynamic will in the end provide a way out of the most 
baffling difficulties in the situation has been raised repeatedly, now in 
one, now in another form, in these pages. Confessedly special 
emphasis has been laid on this issue. If the answer of Christian 
idealism, with its implied summons to life purpose and life service, 
be not found acceptable, then some more promising solution must be 
suggested. In this respect the book reflects an issue which has been 
inescapably drawn for us by recent world tendencies and events. 

The forming and ordering of the questions have been done with 
the skilled cooperation of Mr, Harrison S. Elliott, whose wide ex- 
perience in guiding discussion groups and whose resultant sense of 
need for the production of effective tools for the use of such classes 
led in the first instance to the preparation of the book. 

There may fairly be claimed for the work the advantages accru- 
ing from months of careful research, for the most part amid the 
resources of the Missionary Research Library of New York City, 
and from such insight as has been gained from a lifelong interest 
in the Far East. Two journeys, each all too short, to Japan, Korea, 
and China, one made shortly before the beginning of the World 
War and one just before its close, have also been of high value. 

Charles Harvey Fahs. 



CONTENTS 

PAGE 

Preface iii 

I. Is Japan Becoming a Menace to the Peace of the 

World ? i 

II. How Far Has Japan Become the Dominating Force 

IN the Far East ? 12 

III. Should Japan Be Allowed Increasingly to Domi- 

nate THE Far East? 24 

IV. How Can America Safeguard Her Trade Relations 

WITH THE Orient ? 36 

V. What Hope Is There That China Can Be Saved as 

A Nation? 48 

VI. How Much Has China a Right to Expect of 

America? 60 

VII. Is Japan's Sovereignty in Korea a Benefit or a 

Menace to the Orient? 72 

VIII. What Attitude Should America Take toward Ko- 
rea's Desire for Independence? 84 

IX. What Bearing Has American Control of the Phil- 
ippines UPON THE Destiny of the Far East ? 96 

X. How Far Does the Numerical Strength of the 
Yellow Race Constitute a Problem in the Pa- 
cific Basin ? 108 

XI. What Chance Is There that the Yellow Race Will 
Equal or Surpass the White Race in Leadership 

in the World? 120 

XII, What Attitude Should America Take toward the 

Yellow Race ? 132 

XIII. Who Will Control the Pacific Basin? 144 

XIV. What Is the Solution of the Far Eastern Problem? 156 
Most Useful Books and Periodicals 169 



CHAPTER I 

IS JAPAN BECOMING A MENACE TO THE 
PEACE OF THE WORLD? 

I. What does the world think of Japan? Why? 

1. In various parts of the world the traveler not infrequently 
hears : "I don't trust the Japanese" ; or, "I hate the Japanese." 
Why are the Japanese so disliked and distrusted ? How far is 
this dislike due to prejudice ; how far is it well founded ? 

2. Which of the following would you consider the chief causes of 
this feeling: Japanese racial peculiarities; jealousy over Japan's 
rapid rise in power; faulty ethical practices in business or in 
other ways on the part of the Japanese; an overweening Jap- 
anese sense of international destiny? 

3. To what extent are you led to believe that international 
opinion of Japan is being formulated on the basis of her pro- 
cedure in China, Korea, and Siberia? 

4. What evidence is there that the people in America have 
experienced this same uneasy attitude of mind towards the 
Japanese ? How did they come by it ? To what extent do you 
feel that opinion in other parts of the United States reflects that 
in California ? 

II. What danger is there, if any, that Japan will become a 
menace to the United States and to the welfare of the 
Far East? 

1. What evidence is there that the military and imperialistic party 
has been shaping the policy of Japan ? How far has Japan's 
policy thus far tended to Prussianize the Far East ? 

2. To what extent has democracy obtained a foothold in Japan ? 
What likelihood is there that the group in Japan working 
against militarism and autocracy and for a more liberal policy 
will win? 

3. What are the imperial ambitions of Japan ? In what ways, if 
any, are these likely to clash with those of other powers and to 
threaten the peace of the world ? 

4. Where and on what issues would Japan and the United States 
be most likely to clash ? What is the hkelihood of such a clash ? 

I 



2 AMERICA'S STAKE IN THE FAR EAST 

5. In what ways would the triumph of military and imperialistic 
policy jeopardize the largest and noblest future for Japan? 

6. In what ways would a militaristic policy in Japan pave the 
way for another world war ? 

III. How have America and the other nations hindcicd and 
how helped the liberalization of Japan? 

1. What occasion, if any, has Japan had to fear the United 
States ? 

2. In her modernization what nations have had the most influ- 
ence? In what ways has each influenced Japan? 

3. How can the liberal movement in Japan be helped by other 
countries? Take into consideration the effect of sentiment in 
America, the impact of travelers and traders from the west, 
the influence of educational and other missionary work. 

REFERENCE MATERIAL 
Estimates of the Japanese People 

The Japanese, like yourselves, are human beings — subject to all 
the wants and frailties of our common humanity — bloving and courting 
love — aspiring and falling — sinning and being sinned against — ^but knit 
together by a few underlying principles of far-reaching worth, among 
which are loyalty, the capacity for self-sacrifice, and the enthronement of 
knightly honor as the supreme rule of life. . . . The Japanese people of 
this day and generation have inherited from their sires these ethical 
standards, and in their relations to the outside world, they are doing what 
is humanly possible to realize them. . . . 

Japan has not escaped the fire of doubt and denunciation with which 
the world resounds. Her motives are questioned, her policies criticized, 
and her purest aspirations scouted as criminal and sordid. She has been 
branded as the Yellow Peril, the Robber of China, the despoiler of 
Korea, the standing menace to the peace and well-being of her neighbors. 
And yet I . . . solemnly declare — in no spirit of either bravado or apology 
— that Japan is conscious of rectitude in her attitude towards the nations 
and peoples of all the world. She has been scrupulously faithful in the 
observance of all international engagements, whether in the form of 
treaty, covenant, or understanding. She has borne insult and humiliation 
in order to make good her plighted word. — Viscount Kikujiro Ishii, 
Japan Review, November, 1919, pp. 9, 10. 

Is it not a fact that not only in Chosen [Korea], but in China, in 
America, in Australia, everywhere, this selfish imperialism of Japan 
has as its shadow the so-called anti-Japanese sentiment ? Before we hate 



JAPAN A MENACE TO PEACE OF WORLD? 3 

the shadow it is necessary to look at ourselves. The ideals and prin- 
ciples under which Japan has gone forward are expressed in the familiar 
phrases, "Shed the national glory abroad"; "greatly extend our terri- 
tory"; "rule the world"; and other such expressions. The result is that 
our neighbors have become anti-Japanese and today on all sides barriers, 
invited by ourselves, are being raised against us. — Takashi Suzuki, 
Missionary Review of the World, September, 19 19, p. 661. 

The Japanese is not worse than other men. We may dismiss at 
once the charges of trickiness and untrustworthiness which we have un- 
consciously trumped up against him in defense of our race-exclusive- 
ness. Such charges have the usual, and no more than the usual, justifica- 
tion. The salient facts are that the Japanese are in the ascending phase 
of race assertion, that they are led with singular sagacity, that they have 
certainly no more and possibly somewhat less scruple about race-en- 
croachment than other civilized races of our day, and finally that there is 
between us no cushion of kinship or common culture to lessen the shock 
of race collision. — ^Harry H. Powers, "America among the Nations," 
p. 213. 

While not blind to the faults of the Japanese, I deplore . . . indis- 
criminate condemnation of them. If they are not the lovely fairies that 
Lafcadio Hearn pictures them, neither are they the "varnished savages" 
that Price Collier called them. From the huge mass of available data it is 
not difficult to make a selection that will apparently support almost any 
preconceived idea. But conclusions obtained in that way are one-sided. 
They leave some facts out of account, and state others in ways which 
make them appear more unfavorable than they really are. If one is to 
err at all, it is better to do so on the side of charity, to magnify good 
qualities rather than to minimize them. It is unreasonable to expect 
an Asiatic people to exemplify within sixty years standards of Christian 
character and conduct which Europe and America but imperfectly 
exemplify after fifteen hundred years. The Japanese have many fine 
qualities. They also have some grave defects. So have we. It is easy 
to pick out flaws in any people under heaven, including our own. After 
all, the Japanese are human beings like ourselves, and in thinking of 
them we may well remember the words of the poet Bailey: "Men might 
be better if we better deemed of them." — ^Arthur J. Brown, "The Mastery 
of the Far East," pp. 242, 243. 

The old belief that the Japanese are a race of diminutive supermen 
dies hard, but dying it is. The Japanese are an extremely brave and 
brainy nation. . . . They have in a very short space of time adopted the 
habits and customs of the Occident, and tacked them on to their own. 
They are . . . just humans with human faults and human virtues. They 
have a high code of military ethics, and a supreme but painfully modern 



4 AMERICA'S STAKE IN THE FAR EAST 

sense of patriotism. Their moral sense is low, they are not industrious, 
their intelligence is imitative but not initiative, whilst their ambition is 
blended with an unfortunate aggressiveness and a deplorable sensitive- 
ness. — ^Andrew M. Pooley, "J^pan at the Cross Roads," p. 20. 

The net judgment with which we returned to America, after three 
visits during seven months, is a judgment of increased respect for Japan 
and for what she has achieved, and a deepened confidence in the worthy 
and better elements of Japanese life and character. There are circles 
both in the East and in the West in which it is almost as much as a 
man's life is worth to express such a judgment as this, so deep is the 
feeling of racial distrust of the Japanese and of suspicion of their political 
and commercial ambitions. . . . 

No one can complain of fair and discriminating judgments, but 
what frightens one in much of the prejudice against the Japanese is its 
unfairness and its lack of discrimination. Courses of action pursued by 
America or Great Britain or Germany are viewed and judged in an 
entirely different light from similar courses of action pursued by Japan. 
Japan's conduct is often considered a matter of mere political expediency 
or a cover of sinister purposes, while wrong done by Western nations is 
too often condoned or lamented with soft judgments. Wrong and right 
are not affected by degrees of longitude. Evil or unworthy actions on 
the part of the Japanese ought to be judged on precisely the same basis 
as that on which a Western race or nation would be judged, unless the 
latter be held to a stricter accountability because of their fuller light. — 
Robert E. Speer, Missionary Review of the World, July, 191 6, p. 517. 

American Opinion o£ Japan 

I have touched the mind of the country in cities and villages in the 
east and middle west. I do not think it too much to say that there is a 
general suspicion of the motives and program of Japan. The Japanese 
course at the Peace Conference, whatever it may have accomplished 
diplomatically, has undoubtedly cost that country the confidence of the 
American public. . . . 

One simple idea seems to have taken possession of America's mass 
consciousness. It believes that Japan is the Germany of the East. One 
does not have to suggest this idea. Everywhere one is asked if it does 
not explain most of the things that are now happening in the Orient. 
And it will take more than fair words and high banqueting to wipe it out. 

It is likely, of course, to take some time for this feeling to reach the 
point where it demands action. The United States is thoroughly sick of 
foreign trouble. The seventy thousand dead who lie in France form a 
wholesome check to precipitate action in any quarter of the world. But 
with the passage of time, especially if proofs of Japan's imperialism 
accumulate, belief that China and Korea are being exploited for the 



JAPAN A MENACE TO PEACE OF WORLD? 5 

benefit o£ an archaic militarism will lead to belief that such a policy 
cannot be permitted in a sphere where the interests of the United States 
are as great as they are in the Pacific. — 'T. H.," China Christian Ad- 
vocate, September, 1919, p. 7. 

When you ask . . . why the affection for the Chinese and the hatred 
for the Japanese — there is a good deal of selfishness and human weak- 
ness mixed up in the answer. The Chinaman is not ambitious in a 
worldly way. The Japanese is. The Chinaman does not want to own 
land in America. He does not leave his employers suddenly and without 
warning to take a more lucrative job or go into business for himself. 
According to the California appraisal of character and traits, the Jap- 
anese is the direct opposite of all these things which make the Chinese, 
welcome. . . . Nothing here written on the subject is in any way an 
attempt at expression of personal opinion or prejudice for or against the 
Japanese or Chinaman. It is merely the report of what seems to be 
practically unanimous opinion throughout the state. It is the opinion of 
such men as Benjamin Ide Wheeler and Senator Phelan, of shipping men, 
bankers, merchants, gardeners, and farmers. Frequently the opinion is 
expressed with an apologetic admission that fear of the Japanese is based 
chiefly on the feeling that the Japanese are much more clever than the 
Americans. — Charles A. Selden, New York Times, January 25, 1920. 

Militarism in Japan 

Japan's success in the Russo-Japanese War did not insure the peace 
of the Far East ; now ten years later Japan has attacked and defeated the 
Germans in order to insure that peace. But no sooner has she defeated 
the Germans than she finds it necessary to fall upon the Chinese, likewise 
to "insure peace." The process is cumulative. The peace of the Far 
East will, it would appear, only be assured when there is no one left to 
disturb Japan's peace of mind; that is, when all of Japan's rivals for 
commercial and political influence have been eliminated. And then, 
when the peace of the Far East has been established to Japan's satisfac- 
tion — what about the peace of the world ? — Stanley K. Hornbeck, "Con- 
temporary Politics in the Far East," p. 300. 

It is specially to be deplored that such a reactionary spirit, largely 
influenced by the political theories of German writers, had played on 
the mind, when the constitution was being framed by government leaders. 
It was in those days of the 8o's that the cry of "Preserve the best of 
Japan" or "Japan for the Japanese" was loudly proclaimed. Magazines 
and books were published for the spread of the propaganda. This con- 
siderably hampered the Anglo-Saxon influence of earlier days as well 
as the religious work of missionaries, which was moving on by leaps 
and bounds. 

The universities had been most influenced by German ideas of 



6 AMERICA'S STAKE IN THE FAR EAST 

Kultur. The army, which was at first modeled after the French army, 
had been gradually Germanized. German methods, with their exact 
precision and comprehensive organization, strongly appealed to the young 
minds of Japan, as they had to not a small number oiE Americans before 
the war. Japanese students flocked to the German universities, and later 
accepted the important positions in the Government and in the institu- 
tions of higher learning. But the compelling cause for the collapse of 
the Anglo-Saxon democratizing influence was Japan's discovery of her 
own danger, both political and economic. The governments of Europe 
she saw organized on a basis of force, rather than of right. She saw 
them engaged in world-wide rivalry for the possession of those countries 
which were weak, backward, and unable to defend themselves from 
European aggressors. The native peoples of the Americas, of Africa, 
of south and north Asia and of all the Pacific Ocean had already been 
swallowed up by the aggressive white races of Europe. In the Far 
East China and Japan alone remained unappropriated. 

This discovery brought a horrible chill to every thoughtful Japanese. 
Not her intrinsic civilization, nor her attainments in appreciating the 
moral, intellectual, and political achievements of the most advanced 
nations of the West, would of themselves alone protect her from the 
engulfing swirl of European militaristic domination. Only by her own 
military might could she hope to confront their military might and 
maintain her independent life. Even most of those who through the 
70's and 8o's had been liberal leaders, since 1890 had at least acquiesced 
in the rise of the new militarism of Japan. They said that "prepared- 
ness" was essential to safety in such a world as Europe had created. — 
President Tasuku Harada, Doshisha University, Japan Review^ February, 
1920, p. 105. 

A certain Japanese writer stated not long ago with startling frank- 
ness . . . that "a united, awakened, organized, efiicient China is a menace 
to the very existence of Japan." That statement, while in a sense the 
very essence of reality, is, by the light of dawning world peace, the 
pathetic negation of truth. Consider the reverse side of the statement — 
a China disintegrated, demoralized, and wholly subservient to Japanese 
domination — would that mean a great destiny for Japan? In the first 
place, it suggests a parting of the ways with world democracy. It means 
a program autocratic, materialistic, and militaristic to the last degree. 
Its logical goal would be the complete subjection and reorganization of 
China's countless laborers and resources under Japanese overlordship as 
a vast industrial foundation for Japanese military power. Imagine its 
limits, if you can. — ^Jackson Fleming, Asia, August, 1918, pp. 636, 637. 

To the Japanese themselves, I venture to repeat words that I wrote 
over eleven years ago: They are even more true now than when they 
were written : 



JAPAN A MENACE TO PEACE OF WORLD? >9 

"The future of Japan, the future of the East, and, to some extent, 
the future of the world, lies in the answer to the question whether the 
militarists or the party of peaceful expansion gain the upper hand in the 
immediate future (in Japan). If the one, then we shall have harsher 
rule in Korea, steadily increasing aggression in Manchuria, growing 
interference with China, and, in the end, a titanic conflict, the end of 
which none can see. Under the other, Japan will enter into an inheri- 
tance, wider, more glorious, and more assured than any Asiatic power 
has attained for many centuries. . . . Japan has it in her to be, not 
the Mistress of the East, reigning, sword in hand, over subject races — for 
that she can never permanently be — but the bringer of peace to, and the 
teacher of, the East. Will she choose the nobler end?" — Frederick A. 
McKenzie, "Korea's Fight for Freedom," pp. 319, 320. 

The Vision of Japanese Statesmen 

Consolidation of Asia under Japanese domination is the vision of 
the Japanese statesmen ; and toward the attainment of this national goal 
there is unity of purpose among Japanese leaders. With this in view. 
Inner Mongolia and Fukien province are being overwhelmed, and, last 
but not least, Japan has obtained from the Powers at the Peace Confer- 
ence the official recognition of her paramount interests in Shantung. At 
the present rate of Japanese aggression, China cannot last very long. 
Shall she be left to her own fate, or will the Powers of the West take an 
active interest in the Far Eastern affairs and save her national entity? 
The United States is not interested in any particular European or 
Asiatic problem, individual in character. But the United States is inter- 
ested in a problem that has far-reaching effects on the world's peace and 
the welfare of mankind. What are her obligations, by treaty, by policy, 
by moral rights, to her sister republic in the East? — Henry Chung, "The 
Oriental Policy of the United States," pp. 11-13. 

Shantung is only an incident in Japan's imperial policy for dominat- 
ing Eastern Asia.' Behind Shantung is Japan's determination to control 
the economic resources of China, in order to raise herself to a first-class 
power and to maintain that position. Everyone now knows that this 
program is a policy of force to the utmost. We know it. Europe knows 
it. China knows it. Japan knows it. 

Japan is carrying this program to the limit of Prussianism. Upon 
a country with whom she was not at war — merely a weakened people in 
vassalage to her, Korea — Japan has committed extreme cruelties, sabering 
and beating the people, burning whole villages, abolishing civil rights. 
Japan has terrorized a nation, and until recent weeks was in the act of 
terrorizing a great province in China. She has poisoned whole popula- 
tions through illegitimate smuggling of morphine and opium. . . . 

But admitting that Japan has gone to extremes, drawing the heaviest 



8 AMERICA'S STAKE IN THE FAR EAST 

indictment against her, it remains that in principle she has merely fol- 
lowed the example of Europe — imperialism in its essence — the policy of 
taking everything you can lay hands on, whether or not it belongs to 
you. We in America, in ignorance of the game of international affairs, 
thought the Great War had ended that. We are now undeceiving 
ourselves. 

Sharply then, and immediately, our democracy has collided with 
Japan's imperialism. There is no blinking that fact. There are two 
opposed systems. They have met in the persons of Americans and 
Japanese in Manchuria, buying beans or selling oil or soldiering against 
the Bolsheviki. They have met again over the conference tables of 
statesmen. — Louis D. Froelick, Asia, September, 1919, p. 875. 

Clouds on the International Horizon 

One such cloud that constantly hangs on the horizon of Japan- 
American friendship is the anti-Japanese agitation in California. It is 
but a tiny spot on the great body politic of America, but the latter should 
remember that it is quite big to Japan which has an area less than the 
state of California. Another cloud threatens to darken the horizon of 
America's relations with Japan in China. Americans will understand 
our feeling on this subject if they can but put themselves in our place and 
imagine what America would think and how her people would feel if 
Japan began to interfere in American relations in Mexico or some 
country of South America! Russia, too, promises to provide another 
problem in which Japan's relations with America may be put to the test; 
but after all, this also is nothing but the China problem in another guise. 
— 'Baron Yoshiro Sakatani, Japan Review, February, 1920, p. 107. 

American Imperialistic Tendencies 

In the course of a hundred years or so the United States had jumped 
the Mississippi River, crossed the Rockies, occupied the Pacific slope, and 
since Japan's war with China had spanned the Pacific, occupying Hawaii 
and the Philippines, and was seeking investments in Chinese mines and 
railways. What might she not do next? What wonder that many 
Japanese, misunderstanding the spirit of the American people, should 
be irritated by their open-door policy and regard it as a hypocritical cloak 
for selfish designs? What wonder that they should think of America as 
a menace and, even if they could be persuaded that for the present she 
had no selfish motives, should believe that commercial expansion and the 
investment of capital in China might lead her later to challenge Japan's 
special interests in that land? Many of them might feel, too, that the 
open door, splendid in theory, could not be left safely to the protection 
of Occidental powers. All of Japan's experience had been to the 
contrary. — Kenneth S. Latourette, "The Development of Japan," p. 206. 



JAPAN A MENACE TO PEACE OF WORLD? 9 

Modesty, moderation, and content with existing boundaries, in the 
sense in which Americans have sometimes enjoined them upon other 
nations, have not thus far revealed themselves as American traits. It 
would be unwarranted to attribute to Americans in this period of national 
expansion a definite policy of deliberate and unlimited expansion. They 
have had no such policy — indeed, no consistent and persistent policy 
whatever — and they have consistently and sincerely condemned such a 
policy on the part of others. But they have had, like other peoples, what 
the outside world quite naturally construes as such a policy, a permanent 
instinct of self-assertion which acts automatically in all situations. 
They don't want the earth — far from it. But whenever circumstances 
have directed their attention toward some concrete portion of it, it has 
looked good to them, and they have cast about successfully for reasons 
why they should possess it. They have wanted it, and if possible have 
taken it, from impulse, and then have justified the taking by arguments 
developed later. Best of all, they have justified it by their own large 
power to organize, develop, and bless. The need of room, so often and 
plausibly cited by other peoples in justification of their aggressions, is a 
need that they have never known. The needs and the convenience of 
neighbor nations they have never regarded. American imperialism has 
been of the most unmistakable and undisguised variety. — Harry H. 
Powers, "America among the Nations," pp. 68, 69. 

America's Contribution in Opening Japan to the World 

As Japan witnesses her enormous and unprecedented expansion of 
trade today and her rapid and colossal increase of specie, she cannot but 
reflect on the fact that such progress would have been impossible had 
not America forced open our doors and brought us into contact with the 
world at large. 

One cannot help saying that there is no true Japanese who is not 
deeply grateful to America for what that country has done in the way of 
bringing Japan once more into commerce with the outside world. It is 
only right that 'we should acknowledge our obligations to the United 
States in this regard. — Baron Yoshiro Sakatani, Japan Review, Febru- 
ary, 1920, pp. 106, 107. 

Helping Japanese Liberals 

The outcome of the war has dealt the militaristic and bureaucratic 
party in Japan the greatest blow it has ever had. It is not too much to 
say that only one thing could have shaken its hold to a greater extent, 
and that is the actual defeat in war of the party itself. . . . 

The moral of all this for our own country is almost too obvious to 
need mentioning. The cause of liberalism in Japan has taken a mighty 
forward leap — so mighty as to be almost unbelievable. The causes which 



lo AMERICA'S STAKE IN THE FAR EAST 

produced it can sustain it. If they do sustain it, there will be little 
backward reaction. If they do not continue in force to sustain it, they 
will betray it. To speak more plainly, the release of liberal forces that 
had been slowly forming beneath the lid was due to the belief that 
democracy really stood for the supremacy of fairness, humanity, and 
good feeling, and that consequently in a democratic world a nation like 
Japan, ambitious but weak in many respects in which her competitors are 
strong, could afford to enter upon the paths of liberalism. The real test 
has not yet come. But if the nominally democratic world should go back 
on the professions so profusely uttered during war days, the shock will be 
enormous, and bureaucracy and militarism might come back. One cannot 
believe that such a thing is to happen. But every manifestation of 
national greed, every cynical attack upon the basic ideas of the League of 
Nations, every repudiation of international idealism, every thoughtless 
word of race prejudice, every exhibition of dislike and unjustified 
suspicion directed at Japan, is a gratuitous offering in support of the 
now waning cause of autocratic bureaucracy in Japan. Liberalism here 
has plenty of difficulties still to overcome. Only the liberals in Japan 
itself, who have now taken heart and courage, can work out the problem. 
But liberals elsewhere can at least fight against those untoward develop- 
ments in their own countries, which will restore to the Japanese reaction- 
aries the weapons which the outcome of the war has loosed from their 
hands. — John Dewey, Dial, May 17, 1919, pp. 502, 503. 

The Rising Tide in Japan 

The breaking down of the former political structure, as well as the 
ancient social structure, under the stress of modern industrialism is 
turning Japan into paths that may lead to regions of radical experiment. 
The question now disturbing the country is not how to avoid change, 
but how to maintain the old authority until a suitable modern authority 
can take its place. . . . 

Intelligent Japanese, close to high official circles, say frankly that 
fear of revolution — or something akin to revolution — chills the heart and 
stays the hands of the authorities. This fear may be exaggerated. It 
certainly seems so to one who has moved about among the working 
people and attended their confidential meetings. The ignorant coolie 
laborers of Japan are still stolid — ^not people to start anything, or to stop 
where reason dictates if once started by others. Intelligent and edu- 
cated workingmen, who are by no means a mere handful, are primarily 
seeking relief from the intolerable burden of exorbitantly rising prices; 
but in the course of this effort they are involuntarily acquiring more 
radical ideas and are learning to promote their interests in new direc- 
tions. The labor movement is marching in Japan. 

But above these people is the "brain proletariat," restless, alert, dis- 



JAPAN A MENACE TO PEACE OF WORLD? ii 

satisfied, repressed. It has sympathizers and sentries in every govern- 
ment bureau, factory office, bank, and counting-house in the Empire. Its 
sentiments creep into the organs of public opinion in innumerable covert 
as well as overt ways. It has the ear of the silent thousands who are 
doing the manual labor of Japan — whose very discipline may become one 
day a weapon against established institutions. The thought of this brain 
proletariat has many aspects — from Buddhist passivism to Bolshevist 
activism — but through them all runs the red thread of a new discontent, 
of criticism of everything that has been and is. It resents even its former 
prides and affections. An educated Japanese of liberal sympathies 
illustrated this by declaring, with his usually conventional English 
rendered picturesque by irritation, "These tourists who bubble at the 
mouth about cherry-blossoms must have empty heads, or they would 
see more serious things in Japan to talk about." — Victor S. Clark, 
Atlantic Monthly, March, 1920, pp. 394, 397. 

The Contribution of Christianity to Japanese National Life — 
Two Notable Japanese Testimonies. 

Christianity has more than anything else diffused among our people 
the notion of international brotherhood. . . . Nobody could deny the 
tender influences of Christianity which is giving the final touch to their 
catholicity of mind. 

It would be amiss if I failed to mention the enormous benefit Christi- 
anity is contributing to Japan in the line of women's education and 
philanthropic works, which would never have attained their present 
magnitude and development but for the guiding hand of foreign mission- 
aries. 

I believe that in Japan freedom of conscience obtains more than in 
any other country; but religions will become the integral part of a 
nation only when they are thoroughly acclimatized. I hope and believe 
that in the fullness of time a real Japanese Christianity will evolve, and 
be a beacon light in the path of the Japanese people in the progress of 
civilization. — Hon. T. Tanaka, Missionary Review of the World, Novem- 
ber, 1916, p. 825. 

Although Christianity has enrolled less than 200,000 believers, yet 
the indirect influence of Christianity has poured into every realm of 
Japanese life. It has been borne to us on all the currents of European 
civilization; most of all, the English language and literature, so sur- 
charged with Christian ideas, have exerted a wide and deep influence 
over Japanese thought. 

Concerning the future it is my own conviction that no practical 
solution of many pressing problems is in sight apart from Christianity. — 
Count Okuma, Quoted in the Missionary Review of the World, Novem- 
ber, 1916, p. 825. 



CHAPTER II 

HOW FAR HAS JAPAN BECOME THE DOMI- 
NATING FORGE IN THE FAR EAST? 

I. What effect did Japan's part in the Great War have upon 

her acquiring a dominant position in the Far East? 

1. What part did Japan take in the Great War? 

2. How did this part strengthen her position in the Far East ? 

3. What effect did the awarding of the former German rights 
and concessions in Shantung have upon her influence in China ? 

4. How far and in what ways did the Peace Conference recog- 
nize Japan's claim to a prior position in determining the policies 
of the Far East ? 

II. How much of a foothold has Japan on the mainland of 

Asia? 

1. Look at the map and see in what ways you think her control 
of Korea strengthens Japan's influence on the Asiatic mainland. 

2. If Canada owned, maintained, policed, and operated say the 
northern group of the American transcontinental railroads, 
owned and operated the mines in the general region traversed 
by these railroads, controlled practically all the commerce of 
the region with other regions, and was able to insist that in this 
belt of states all legal cases in which Canadians were involved 
should be tried in courts under Canadian jurisdiction and 
according to Canadian law, to what extent would you say 
American sovereignty in the states from Minnesota to Washing- 
ton had passed from the United States? This is practically 
the situation in Manchuria. To what extent has Manchuria 
become in effect a Japanese dependency ? 

III. How does Japan's position in the Far East compare with 

that of other powers? 

I. Look at the map and see the location of the Japanese Islands 
with reference to the mainland of Asia. Locate the regions 
where she is in actual or in practical control on the mainland 
of Asia. 

12 



JAPAN DOMINATING FORCE IN FAR EAST? 13 

a. Would you or would you not say that Japan's naval power 
and her present territorial foothold give her control of the 
Yellow and Japan Seas, with their approaches to China and 
Vladivostok ? 

b. In what ways does Japan's control on the mainland of Asia 
help to make her a dominating force in the Far East ? 

2. How does Japan's influence in the Far East compare with the 
influence of Great Britain, the United States, and other Western 
powers in this same general area? 

3. Is Japan or is she not the dominating force in the Far East ? 
Why do you think so ? 

IV. To what extent does Japan's policy indicate a purpose to 
dominate the Far East? 

1. To what extent were Japan's twenty-one demands upon China 
an indication of her determination to dominate China ? 

2. To what extent is Japan in Siberia because of a real menace 
from the "Red" forces; to what extent is she taking advantage 
of the present disorder to establish herself in Siberia? 

3. What share of responsibility to aid the anti-Russian forces 
in Siberia has Japan taken ? Were you a statesman in Japan at 
this time, would you consider the present summons to police 
duty in maintaining order in Siberia an opportunity or a 
burden ? Why ? 

REFERENCE MATERIAL 
Japan in the World War 

The question has been asked, "What has Japan done in this war?" 
I answer only by saying that Japan has done her best. . . . Her fleets in 
the Pacific and Indian oceans and in the Mediterranean traversed over 
1,200,000 miles in the work of protecting transports and merchant 
.vessels from the submarines, and we escorted 750,000 men rushing to 
the aid of France and Britain. Japan's geographical position, her re- 
sources, and the fact that the Pacific Ocean was freed of the menace 
which has threatened the freedom of other seas, enabled us to provide 
considerable quantities of war supplies and materials to Russia, to Eng- 
land, and to France, and, including loans to Russia, the money expendi- 
ture has been a very considerable item in the budget of Japan. But these 
are small matters in comparison with the magnificent sacrifices of our 
Western allies. The Government and the people of Japan have been 
the loyal allies of Great Britain and France and the friends of Russia 
and of the United States. — Baron Makino, Japanese Peace Commissioner, 



14 AMERICA'S STAKE IN THE FAR EAST 

in "J^pan and China: An Official View," published in London Daily 
Telegraphy quoted in Modern Review, August, 1919, p. 174. 

Japan the Indisputable Leader Nation of the Orient 

Japan emerged out of the war practically unharmed and relatively 
stronger. She is now the only nation in the East, Far or Near, that 
enjoys a complete independence. She is the indisputable leader nation 
of the Orient. The World War offered her the opportunity of "ten 
thousand years" and Japan will see to it that she will have her place in 
the sun. Japan will see to it that the Western nations shall not meddle 
in the affairs of the Far East without Japan's consent. Japan considers 
it her obligation to redeem the unnumbered millions of Asiatics from 
what might be the world's greatest tragedy — of being reduced to a per- 
petual servitude to the white races. Japan will see to it that the 
regenerated East may work out her human destiny in harmony instead of 
in antagonism to the civilization of the West. Meanwhile, Japan will 
see to it that her "sphere of influence" in China, be it ever so humble 
in comparison with what the European nations have already secured in 
that country, will yield sufficient economic advantage to provide her for 
future contingencies. And, finally^ if China does not awake from the 
danger of everlasting confusion, constantly offering fresh opportunities 
to the Western nations for more aggression upon herself, bringing new 
frontiers and new problems to her neighbor, Japan will see to it that 
she will act again and again and take many more provinces just as she 
took Shantung. Let there be no mistake about this. — Setsuo Uenoda, 
"When East Meets East," Asia, December, 1919, p. 1217. 

The Bitterest Outcome of the War to China 

In order to make the Pacific safe for the ships of the Allies, Japan 
wrested from Germany the harbor of Kiaochow Bay and the city of 
Tsingtao and the claims which Germany had extended into the province 
of Shantung. In accomplishing this Japan crossed Shantung from the 
north, invading China's neutral soil, and not content with taking over 
Germany's establishment she built brick barracks along the railroad, 
filling them with Japanese troops, and erected a great military estab- 
lishment in Tsinanfu, the provincial capital, where she could control not 
the railroad east and west alone but also the trunk line north and south 
between Nanking and Tientsin, and dominate the entire government of 
the province. She overran the province with Japanese, as the Germans 
had never done with Germans, and introduced far and wide a diabolical 
trade in morphine. It was absolutely necessary that German power in 
Shantung should be overthrown, but the absorption and retention of so 
extensive and absolute control of this great province by Japan has been 
the bitterest outcome of the war to China and has caused great dissatis- 



JAPAN DOMINATING FORCE IN FAR EAST? 15 

faction with the Peace Treaty to many friends both of Japan and China 
in the West. On China's side it is urged that the original acquisition of 
her rights in Shantung by Germany was by wrong and injustice; that 
Japan promised to return what she took from Germany to China ; that on 
entering the war China denounced her agreements with Germany and 
resumed all extorted rights ; that she needs and has a right to the return 
of a harbor, which is one of the few remaining harbors on her coast 
which European powers have not absorbed; that she is now striving to 
get her national house in order and needs all the help other nations can 
give her, instead of being pillaged of her resources ; that she has already 
ample cause to distrust Japan, and that the Japanese claim to Shantung 
can do nothing but deepen this distrust and foster hatred between two 
peoples who must live in neighborly relations forever and who ought to 
be friends. On the side of Japan it is argued that Japan was asked to 
drive Germany out of Shantung by Great Britain ; that Germany's rights 
had been granted to her by China and that it was Japan and not China 
which took them back from Germany; that Great Britain is seeking 
Tibet and has no intention of returning to China what she has taken 
directly from her in the past, and that since the war began France has 
helped herself to more of China's territory at Tientsin ; that China is in 
danger of breaking up, and that it would be suicidal for Japan to run the 
risk of having some European power in Shantung; that Japan has 
promised to return to China all but a small part of Kiaochow Bay, and 
that she will hold this only on a long lease, so that in time China may 
have all back if China grows capable and trustworthy. If only Japan, 
which has learned so much from the West, would transcend the political 
tradition of the West and honestly seek to build China up, to strengthen 
the best elements of the nation, to be an absolutely unselfish friend — 
this would be to expect more of Japan than Western nations have been 
wont to do, but it would begin a new day in Asia, and from a friendly, 
grateful China Japan would gain more than she can ever wring from 
China outraged and embittered. — ^Robert E. Speer, "The Gospel and the 
New World," pp. 45-47- 

Statement by the Chinese Peace Delegation 

One of the most remarkable documents to which the Peace Confer- 
ence has given birth is the statement issued by the Chinese Peace Delega- 
tion. Dignified and restrained, but remorselessly logical, it is a scathing 
indictment of the Treaty of Versailles in its effect upon the Far East. I 
cannot close this chapter better than by quoting its salient points: 

"China came to the Conference with strong faith in the lofty prin- 
ciples adopted by the Allied and Associated. Powers as the basis of a 
just and permanent world peace. Great, therefore, will be the disap- 
pointment and disillusionment of the Chinese people over the proposed 
settlement. If there was reason for the Council to stand firm on the 



i6 AMERICA'S STAKE IN THE FAR EAST 

question of Fiume, there would seem all the more reast)n to uphold 
China's claim relating to Shantung, which involves the future welfare 
of 36,000,000 souls and the highest interests of peace in the Far East. . . . 

"The German rights in Shantung originated in an act of wanton 
aggression in 1897, characteristic of Prussian militarism. To transfer 
these rights to Japan is therefore to perpetuate an act of aggression which 
has been resented by the Chinese people ever since its perpetration. 

"Moreover, owing to China's declaration of war against the Teutonic 
Powers, and the abrogation of all treaties and agreements between China 
and these Powers, the German rights automatically reverted to China. 
This declaration was officially notified to and taken cognizance of by the 
Allied and Associated Governments. . . . The Council has bestowed on 
Japan rights not of Germany but of China, not of the enemy but of an 
ally. Such virtual substitution of Japan for Germany in Shantung, 
serious enough in itself, becomes grave when the position of Japan in 
South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia is read in connection with 
it. Firmly entrenched on both sides of the Gulf of Peichili — the water 
outlet of Peking — ^with a hold on three trunk lines issuing from Peking 
and connecting it with the rest of China, the capital becomes but an 
enclave in the midst of Japanese influence. Besides, Shangtung is 
China's Holy Land, packed with memories of Confucius and Mencius 
and hallowed as the cradle of Chinese civilization. . . . 

"The Chinese Delegation understand that the decision of the 
Council has been prompted by the fact that Great Britain and France 
had undertaken in February and March, 1917, to support at the Peace 
Conference the claims of Japan to German rights in Shantung. To 
none of these secret agreements, however, was China a party, nor was 
she informed of their contents when she was invited to join the war 
against the Central Powers. The fortunes of China appear thus to have 
been made an object of negotiation and compensation after she had 
already definitely aligned herself with the Allied cause." — Herbert Adams 
Gibbons, "The New Map of Asia," pp. 522-524. 

Japan in Manchuria 

Since the Russia-Japan War an anomalous condition has prevailed. 
Theoretically, Manchuria remains a part of China. Its officials are 
appointed by the Government of China, and are supposed to be amenable 
to it. Practically, the Viceroy and his subordinates are in a very em- 
barrassing position. They are expected by the Peking Government to 
rule the country; but north of Changchun the Russians, until the chaos 
which followed the revolution of 1917 weakened their hold, were in 
possession of the railway and all the leading cities en route. South of 
Changchun the Japanese hold the railway, the fortified city of Port 
Arthur, and the commercial city of Dairen. Both Russians and Japanese 
do as they please in their respective territories, with little regard for the 
wishes of the Chinese officials. It is true that their jurisdiction is 
technically limited to a narrow strip on each side of the railway, but 



JAPAN DOMINATING FORCE IN FAR EAST? 17 

as that railway is the one thoroughfare of the country, along which all 
streams of trade and travel flow, and in which practically all the activ- 
ities of Manchuria center, the limitation is more nominal than real, and 
a Chinese magistrate who acted on any other assumption would quickly 
find himself in hot water. , . . 

I heard many complaints that during and immediately after the 
Russia-Japan War hundreds of Japanese tradesmen had taken possession 
of shops in Manchurian cities, in some cases forcibly ejecting the Chinese 
proprietors, and that they have kept these shops ever since, refusing to 
pay rent except where some particular shopkeeper was able to compel 
payment. . . . 

Japan, too, is under no less constraint than before to resist the 
advance of any European nation in Manchuria, and to maintain para- 
mount influence in China. It is difficult to understand how any one 
who knows what they have done and are now doing can imagine that 
they contemplate anything else than permanent occupation. The 
Southern Manchurian Railway is one of the best railways in Asia. . . . 
The Japanese have expended great sums at Dairen. They have con- 
structed immense docks for shipping, opened new streets and repaved old 
ones, erected handsome public and private buildings, and in general are 
making Dairen a model city of the Far East. . . . 

As a matter of fact, why should the Japanese withdraw? They 
knew perfectly well that if they did the Russians would move down and 
occupy their old positions, and that the conditions which preceded the 
Russia-Japan War, and which caused it, would recur. It is fundamental 
to sound thinking on this subject to remember that Japan cannot be 
expected to acquiesce in having any European Power form a wedge 
between Japan and China and lie along the Korean frontier in such a 
way as to make Japanese occupation of Korea precarious. — Arthur J. 
Brown, "The Mastery of the Far East," pp. 213, 214, 215, 219, 220, 221. 

Will Japan Withdraw from Siberia? 

Japan, it is to be feared, has been preparing for the present crisis 
for many months. She has had 75,000 troops in Siberia for a year and 
a half. In every town along the Siberian Railway, and extending out 
into the vast rich country on either hand, she has established the founda- 
tions of her economic control. She is reported to have taken steps to 
acquire the industries of Siberia; has surveyed the mines and arranged 
the necessary concessions with the Cossack Semenov, whom she has 
constantly supported and intended finally to place in power. This is 
the tale which comes from thoroughly competent observers. If Japan 
were to withdraw her troops from Vladivostok tomorrow, everyone 
knows that the day after tomorrow the people of Vladivostok would set 
Up their soviet; again. It is the delusion of madness (or of a discredited 



i8 AMERICA'S STAKE IN THE FAR EAST 

statesman) to think that Japan will withdraw. — Lincoln Colcord, "Japan 
in Siberia," Nation, January lo, 1920, p. 38. 

Keeping the Peace in Eastern Siberia 

The Japanese expedition to Siberia has not been sent for the, 
exclusive purpose of helping the Czecho-Slovaks : it was also with the 
object of keeping the peace in eastern Siberia. It is for this purpose that 
Japan has given aid to all anti-Bolshevik leaders — Kolchak, Horvath, 
Semenov, etc. Should the Empire vacate Siberia, what will become 
of Siberia ? Britain and France still regard the Bolsheviki as an enemy, 
but their internal troubles and financial conditions make it difficult for 
them to send troops to Russia or even to help the anti-Bolsheviki with 
goods. This is why they have come to the decision that Russian affairs 
should be left for the Russians to decide. And this they can afford to 
do, because even though the influence of the Bolsheviki may spread, 
Britain and France will not be directly affected, as there are the inter- 
vening countries of Courland, Poland, Germany, Austria, etc. 

Not so with this country. Korea, which is our territory, Manchuria 
and Mongolia which are our sphere of influence, and China, which is in a 
relation of mutual dependence with us, are all contiguous with Siberia and 
immediately exposed to the poisonous influence of the Bolsheviki. Be- 
sides, the disturbance in Siberia will at once imperil the first line of 
Japan' national defense, and is sure to be followed by a disturbance in 
Korea and Manchuria and Mongolia. — Quoted from the Tokyo Yamato in 
Literary Digest, January 31, 1920, p. 26. 

China's Interest in the Siberia Question 

China is the focus of the Eastern question, and her interest in all 
phases of it is absolute. It is not too much to say that China's interest 
in the Siberian question is as vital to her future security and national 
position as the Alsace-Lorraine question is vital to France, or the 
existence of buffer states like Holland and Belgium in Europe has been 
vital to the security of England. As a result of the Russo-Japanese 
War, China virtually lost control of her vast provinces of Manchuria and 
Mongolia. As a result of Russia's collapse in the Great War, China 
had a chance to regain control of northern Manchuria and to recover 
Mongolia. Now came a proposed Japanese occupation of eastern Siberia 
to menace again the whole of China's northern territories and to cast a 
longer shadow over the Middle Kingdom. By all the catch-phrase tests 
which diplomacy has invented in the process of modern empire building, 
China's interest in the Siberian question is fundamental. By the test 
of "territorial propinquity," China has a major position, for China and 
Siberia are contiguous on a land frontier extending for several thousands 
of miles. By the test of "vested interests," China is again paramount 



JAPAN DOMINATING FORCE IN FAR EAST? 19 

by reason of her reversionary ownership of the Chinese Eastern Railway, 
which lies for about a thousand miles in Chinese territory. By the test 
of population contacts, China also is paramount, for hundreds of 
thousands of Chinese reside in Siberia and own much property there. 
By the test of the alleged menace of Bolshevism, China is more exposed 
to its penetration, for China at bottom is a great, loosely knit democracy 
and very susceptible to such penetration; whereas, for instance, Japan 
is a rigid autocracy remarkably impervious to such penetration. In the 
circumstances that existed, China could not feel otherwise than menaced 
if Japan was given a "free hand" in Siberia, for a Japanese occupation 
of that country east of Lake Baikal would envelop China's northern 
provinces in an elbow, with a large part of southern Manchuria already 
under a Japanese quasi-sovereignty. In short, the considerations that 
were potent in inducing China to join the Allied group at war against 
the Central Powers would vanish in good part, and a situation would be 
created that probably would work out adversely to China in practice. — 
Thomas F. Millard, "Democracy and the Eastern Question," pp. 289, 290. 

Japan Tarrying at the Cross Roads 

As a region for colonization on a large scale, Siberia would probably 
not be attractive to the Japanese, who do not settle even in southern 
Manchuria in large numbers, as the climate is unfavorable. But the 
direction of mining and manufacturing enterprises and of transportation 
would enable Japanese capital to exercise a very profitable control. To 
the outsider, however, it would appear that any attempt to exercise 
political domination in eastern Siberia will be accompanied with so many 
risks, and, on the other hand, the opportunities for friendly cooperation 
in a square and above-board manner in the development of Siberian 
natural resources will be so great that it should be an easy matter for the 
Japanese nation to make its choice. . . . 

Should Japan adopt the militarist and imperialist alternative to the 
extent of using the present crisis for the purpose of gaining control of 
the eastern part of the Trans-Siberian, and of the North Manchurian 
(Chinese Eastern) Railway, this would not only reveal a policy dangerous 
to the peace of the world, but it would specifically be a direct attack on 
the policy of equal opportunity in which America is vitally interested. 
Experience has amply shown that the ownership by a foreign government 
of a railway in any country in practice destroys equality of commercial 
and industrial rights. Should Japan further embark on a policy involv- ' 
ing a policy of exercising political control within other countries, through 
ownership of the means of transportation and other methods, such ambi- 
tions could lead her only to the end where German's military power 
ultimately found itself, confronted by the solid opposition of the civilized 
world. The American Government, both in its function of protecting 



20 AMERICA'S STAKE IN THE FAR EAST 

American rights and anticipating imminent dangers to national life, and 
as a friend of Japan and upholder of international peace and equity, could 
hardly look on in indifference were such tendencies to assert themselves. 
Should, however, Japan choose the other course, no one will begrudge 
her any natural advantage which she has — and there are many — for 
prominent participation in the development of Siberian resources. — Paul 
S. Reinsch, Asia, February-March, 1920, pp. 169-171. 

National Sentiment in China over the Shantung Decision 

There can be little doubt that the Government had officially instructed 
its delegates to the Peace Conference in Versailles to sign the treaty, 
recognizing though it did the Japanese appropriation of German rights in 
Shantung. National sentiment was, however, tremendously aroused. If 
Japan had set out to instigate a new national spirit which should over- 
whelm the old local provincialisnis, she could not have proceeded in a 
more effectual way to accomplish the purpose. The people took the 
matter out of the hands of the Government. By cablegrams to Paris, by 
telegrams to Peking, by mass meetings and agitations, finally by a strike 
of students and then of the mercantile guilds in the larger cities, they 
made it clear that national sentiment would regard as traitors all those 
who should take part in signing the treaty. It was an extraordinarily 
impressive exhibition of the existence and the power of national feeling in 
China. It was all the more impressive because it had to work without 
organized governmental agencies, and, indeed, against the resistance of 
deeply intrenched pro-Japanese officialdom. If there still remained any- 
where those who doubted the strength and pervasiveness of Chinese 
patriotism, the demonstration was a final and convincing lesson. But it 
took a great crisis of foreign menace to focus the feeling; Japan in the 
last two years has done for China what otherwise might have taken a 
generation more. But when the immediate task of preventing the signing 
of the treaty that gave away Chinese rights was performed, the feeling 
lapsed. Perhaps it remains equally intense, but it has lost in sureness of 
direction. — John Dewey, "Chinese National Sentiment," Asia, December, 
1919, p. 1241. 

Japan's Policy in Relation to China 

In her dealings with China, the famous Twenty-One Demands may 
be said fairly to represent the method and the gist of Japan's policy. 
These were presented to China in what was intended to remain a secret 
manner. On January 18, 1915, the Japanese Minister presented to the 
President of China a list of demands arranged in five groups. Secrecy 
.was...enjoined upon the Chinese Government, but so momentous were 
the proposals that it was found impossible to maintain it. The demands 
leaked out, but the public was promptly assured by subsidised news 



JAPAN DOMINATING FORCE IN FAR EAST? 21 

agencies that there had been no demands. Subsequently, in answer to 
official inquiries, the Japanese Government furnished to various govern- 
ments, including the United States, a version of the demands which 
eventually proved to be different both from the original demands as 
presented to the President of China on January i8th and from the revised 
demands presented to the Minister of Foreign Affairs April 26th. So 
strong were the denials of the Japanese Legations in London and Wash- 
ington that American and English newspapers were unwilling to publish 
the first reports sent to them by their experienced correspondents in 
Peking. Later developments showed that there had been no exaggeration 
in these earliest reports, . . . 

The scope of these demands was commensurate with the ambition of 
Japan. They were subdivided into four geographical groups: (i) 
Manchuria and Eastern Mongolia, (2) the province of Shantung, (3) the 
Yangtze valley, and (4) the province of Fukien. The only parts of 
China which were not directly affected were the western and south- 
western provinces which adjoin British or French concessions. All of 
the northern provinces, those of the Yangtze valley, and the coast 
provinces, with the exception of Canton, came within their purview. The 
specific items of the demands provided for the exploitation of iron and 
coal mines, the construction and management of railways, joint agri- 
cultural enterprises, joint iron and steel works, the extension of the 
period of leased territories, and other affairs of similar far-reaching 
consequences. They even took cognizance of a "report" that had 
reached the Japanese Minister "to the effect that the Chinese Govern- 
ment had the intention of permitting foreign nations to establish on the 
coast of Fukien province dockyards, coaling stations for military use, and 
naval bases," and the Chinese Government was solemnly required to give ' 
the lie to the "report." The most cursory consideration of the geograph- 
ical limits of the territory mentioned in these demands and of the wide 
range of interests involved can leave no one in doubt as to the character 
of the policy of Japan in her relations with China. — ^John C. Ferguson, 
"Pan-Nipponism," Asia, September, 1919, pp. 890-892. 

Japan's Extraordinarily Favorable Geographical Situation 

A glance at the map shows how this long procession of islands 
from Saghalien to Formosa, lying like a series of wharves along the 
coast of eastern Asia, with its outposts and inlets at Korea, on the 
Liaotung Peninsula, at Kiaochow, and now at Fukien, gives Japan an 
enormous commercial as well as a strategical advantage in the competi- 
tive war of the near future, as compared with her rivals in Europe or in 
America. Never in history was so remarkably favorable a geographical 
situation in the hands of one nation, controlled by men capable of taking 
full advantage of it and looking to the future of Agia as in some sort the 



22 AMERICA'S STAKE IN THE FAR EAST 

heritage of the Japanese race. — H. M. Hyndman, "The Awakening of 
Asia," pp. 169, 170. 

The Shaping of Events in the Far East 

What part should the United States take in the shaping of events 
in the Far East? Upon the correct analysis and proper solution of this 
problem hinges the future peace in the Pacific basin and the welfare of 
one fourth of the world's population. If the problem be correctly solved, 
and the situation wisely handled, the Pacific Ocean in the future will be 
a basin of cultural and commercial activities ; the United States will hold 
her political prestige and commercial advantages in the East; the oldest 
civilization in the world will be preserved, and China will in time take 
her place among the powers of the world. If, on the other hand, the 
Asiatic question is left to a hit-or-miss policy with a lax and indifferent 
attitude, Asia will ultimately be consolidated under Japanese domination. 
Asia, with great natural resources and limitless man-power, dominated 
by an aggressive empire, European or Asiatic, is a menace to the world's 
peace, and a direct threat to the welfare of the United States. — Henry 
Chung, "The Oriental Policy of the United States," pp. 94, 95. 

Conflicting Aims and Interests o£ America and Japan 

Though never seeking a quarrel with Japan and though having no 
ambition for possessions in the. Pacific any more extensive than those we 
now hold, a number of events of the present generation have in a striking 
and unmistakable way placed Japan and the United States as the 
champions of opposing and conflicting aims and interests. The conflict 
of interests of the two countries is not a possible development of the 
future ; it is an immediate and at-present-existing fact, which no amount 
of peace-advocate logic can reason away. In the course of time one of 
the two countries must recede from its present position. We must give 
up some of our cherished traditions and renounce policies in which all 
Americans have taken a just pride, or Japan must give up imperial ambi- 
tions which are dear to all Japanese and have dominated state policy for 
years. — Carl Crow, "Japan and America," pp. 3, 4. 

World Problems and World Outlook 

The United States is a world power, destined increasingly to par- 
ticipate in world commerce and world politics. The fate of peoples, the 
disposition of territories, and the determination of commercial policies in 
the Far East are bound to be of enormous consequence in world affairs. 
What occurs in the Pacific will have its effects upon the activities and 
policies of the major nations everywhere. The people of the United 
States already have large social and considerable commercial interests 
in the Pacific. They are entitled to increase, and in the natural course 



JAPAN DOMINATING FORCE IN FAR EAST? 23 

of events undoubtedly will increase, their activities in these lines. We 
should endeavor in the present to safeguard the opportunities of the 
future. We should ask for nothing but what is just, giving due con- 
sideration to the rights and needs of all, demanding no special privileges 
for ourselves; but we should, on behalf of our own interests and of the 
cause of peace, frame our policies and practices with a view to the 
defense of the principles upon which we, along with the other powers, 
have agreed. 

The international problems of the Far East are world problems. As 
such, they merit and demand the attention of every nation which has a 
world outlook and world interests.— Stanley K. Hornbeck, "Contemporary 
Politics in the Far East," p. 403. 

The World-Wide Application of Wilsonian Principles 

Summarizing his principles in the form of questions, President 
Wilson. . . said, "Shall strong nations be free to wrong weak nations 
and make them subject to their purpose or interest? Shall there be a 
common standard of right and privilege for all peoples and nations, or 
shall the wrong do as they will and the weak suffer without redress?" 

The issue for the Orient as well as the Occident seems to be clear- 
cut. The President has said: "These issues must be settled— by no 
arrangement or compromise or adjustment of interests, but definitely and 
once for all and with a full and unequivocal acceptance of the principle 
that the interest of the weakest is as sacred as the interest of the 
strongest." 

No human being can view the incalculable loss of human life and 
wealth . . . wrought by the Great War, and remain unmoved. "For 
what purpose is this waste ?" Only in the achievement of some such prin- 
ciples as given above can any such loss be reconciled. These principles 
must be no less than world-wide in their application ; they should extend 
not only to the free peoples of Europe and America, but also to the 
newborn democracies of the Mongol and the Slav. Especially do they 
concern the vast' republic across the Pacific, whose future relations with 
the rest of the world are so full of potential possibilities for discord 
or for peace. The importance of these relations was summarized twenty 
years ago by John Hay in two sentences: "The storm-center of the 
world has gradually shifted to China. . . . Whoever understands that 
mighty Empire socially, politically, economically, religiously, has a key 
to world-politics for the next five centuries." Against the background 
of the great democratic upheavals in the East that are just beginning 
to take concrete shape and expression, and of the costly cataclysm in 
the West . , . these statements have a new meaning, both as a warning 
and a prophecy, concerning the new age which is to come. — W. Reginald 
Wheeler, "China and the World War," pp. 181, 182. 



CHAPTER III 

SHOULD JAPAN BE ALLOWED INCREASINGLY 
TO DOMINATE THE FAR EAST? 

I. What kind o£ a record has Japan in the Far East? 

1. In her policy of commercial and administrative penetration 
of the Asiatic mainland, how far has Japan followed the policy 
of Great Britain and other powers in the extension of "spheres 
of influence" ; how far has she used other methods of acquiring 
control ? 

2. In what ways has Japan used her power to help Korea, 
Manchuria, and Shantung? In what ways has she used it to 
exploit these territories? 

3. If Japan becomes increasingly dominant on the mainland of 
Asia, how far can we count on her using her powers for the 
good of the peoples concerned ? 

II. Compare Japan's reasons for wanting territory with those 

of other powers. 

1. Why did Russia want Manchuria? Why does Japan want 
it? Why does China wish to keep it? 

2. Compare Russia's and Japan's reasons for wishing Siberia. 
Take into consideration extension of commerce, establishing 
empire, finding ports, giving room for relief of congested popu- 
lation. 

III. How far is Japan's increasing control on the mainland 

to the interest o£ the Far East? 

1. For the development of the Far East which would you 
consider better — that Korea, Manchuria, and eastern Siberia 
should belong to China, to Russia, or to Japan, or that they 
should become independent states? Why? 

2. If a worthy government of a democratic type were established 
in Russia, which government, Japan or Russia, would be more 
acceptable as the dominant power in the Far East ? 

3. How far is it of benefit to the Far East that Japan's control 
should increase in China proper? 

24 



JAPAN INCREASINGLY TO DOMINATE? 25 

IV. Should Japan be allowed increasingly to dominate the Far 

East? 

1. Why did China refuse to accept the award of Shantung to 
Japan by the Peace Conference ? What is her attitude toward 
the increase of Japanese control ? What weight should be given 
to this ? 

2. On what grounds can Japan claim a right to a dominating 
position in the Far East? On what grounds could this claim 
to priority right be regarded as invalid? 

3. How much and what sort of a menace to peace in the Far 
East is the further extension of Japanese control on the Asiatic 
mainland ? 

V. What attitude should the United States take toward the 

increasing domination of Japan in the Far East? 

1. In what way has the United States used her diplomatic influ- 
ence against the extension of "spheres of influence" in China 
and for the integrity of China ? 

2. What difference does it make to the United States what 
happens in the Far East ? 

3. Do you or do you not feel that the United States should seek 
to prevent the extension of Japanese control ? Why ? 

4. How far do you feel the United States would be justified 
in going in helping to shape the outcome ? 

5. Just what can America do to help in guiding the Far East to a 
right destiny ? 

REFERENCE MATERIAL 
Japan*s Record in the Far East 

There can be no question but that Japan is engaged in the attempt 
to control and where possible throttle the economic development of 
China. . . . She has acquired the last Chinese owned railway, seventy- 
four per cent of the mines and mineral deposits, and most of the forests 
and water power of the country. Of course we point the finger of scorn 
at the corrupt officials who have passed these things over to her for a 
song, but the fact that these officials have been corrupted by Japanese 
influences and are maintained in office in the face of Chinese public 
opinion by Japanese intrigue is also to be borne in mind. 

Any study of the desperate internal political situation leads you 
straight back to the same sinister influences. Not a single one of the 
freebooting generals who are destroying the inner peace of China today 



26 AMERICA'S STAKE IN THE FAR EAST 

but depends on Japan for money and munitions. When Chang Tso-lin, 
one of the worst, commenced his march on Peking to overthrow the 
Government last year, he was armed with the rifles which the Germans 
surrendered to the Japanese Government at Tsingtao. It is significant 
that the conditions of anarchy and brigandage which are supposed to 
necessitate intervention by Japan in China have been most rife in the 
two provinces which Japan claims as her particular sphere. It is to 
Japan's interest to keep China's political affairs stirred up, and she is 
doing so. 

Japan's effort to undermine the moral stamina of the Chinese, to 
make impossible "cohesive and sacrificial patriotism," by the widespread 
dissemination of morphia among the people is already known to the 
world. ... I can send ... a list of ninety Japanese shops which were 
discovered to be engaged in this devilish business in a single small city. 
The combination of the Japanese brothel, the Japanese "drug" store, and 
the Japanese hospital is the most widely known Japanese business com- 
bination in China. 

It is this fact that, while China is struggling desperately to free 
herself from her past and erect a modern democracy amidst the -im- 
memorial autocracy of Asia, Japan is constantly pressing in to affect her 
affairs, and that everywhere her touch brings bane, not blessing, that 
arouses our indignation. It is no small thing that across the top of every 
statement sent out by the press bureau of the awakened students of China 
there is blazoned the words of a Japanese minister of foreign affairs, 
spoken in an official capacity: "Japan cannot view with equanimity the 
awakening of 400,000,000 people." — "P. H.," China Christian Advocate, 
November, 1919, p. 5. 

Japan's Policy on the Asiatic Mainland 

Japan, the infant prodigy of the East, crowded for space for her 
ever-increasing population, and with an insatiable desire to become a 
first class power among the family of nations, has a vision of political and 
commercial expansion on the mainland of Asia. Consolidation of Asia 
under Japanese domination is the soul of Japanese foreign policy, and 
has been so ever since Japan became a modern nation. In the first 
blocking out of her program she proposed to annex Korea within forty- 
nine years, but this has been accomplished in twenty-six. Now the same 
process is being repeated in China. Already Japan dominates Manchuria, 
Inner Mongolia, Fukien, Shantung, and Liaotung. The same policy — the 
policy of opportunism — that was used so effectively in undermining the 
Korean Government is in full operation in China now. . . . The open 
door principle is practically destroyed, for in the territories controlled by 
the Japanese the door is open only to Japanese trade. — Henry Chung, 
"The Oriental Policy of the United States," p. 96. 



JAPAN INCREASINGLY TO DOM 



'^i 



00 



European versus Asiatic Ethics 

Can it be that Christian Europe "can do no 
benighted souls it is a puzzle that European powers i 
crime in Asia with impunity, while an Asiatic nation 
and condemned for taking the necessary steps to prepare itsen agcmist 
their further encroachment upon its backward neighbors. 

To know something of the portentous possibilities of the British and 
Russian policies in China, one need only think of the vastness of the 
territories which they have staked out for themselves. Russia claims as 
her sphere of influence Outer Mongolia (1,000,000 square miles), Sinki- 
ang (548,000 square miles), and more than three-fourths of Manchuria 
(273,000 square miles). These total an area of 1,821,000 square miles. 
On the other hand. Great Britain claims Tibet (533,000 square miles), 
Szechuan (218,000 square miles), Kwangtung (86,800 square miles), and 
the provinces along the lower reaches of the Yangtze River (about 
362,000 square miles), making a total of 1,199,800 square miles for the 
British sphere of influence. In the south, France claims Yunnan (146,- 
700 square miles) as her Sphere of interest. Before the war Germany 
claimed Shantung (55,900 square miles), from whence she was scheming 
to expand in various directions. 

The chief source of misconception on the part of Americans concern- 
ing Far Eastern affairs lies in their ignorance of Chinese geography. 
Open the map of China, mark out the spheres of influence established by 
European powers, and compare them with the Japanese sphere. Then 
you will begin to wonder why it is you make so much ado about Japan's 
activities in China. As against England's 1,199,000 square miles, and 
Russia's 1,821,000 square miles, Japan's sphere of influence, consisting of 
South Manchuria (90,000 square miles), Eastern Inner Mongolia (50,000 
square miles), Fukien (46,000 square miles), and a section of Shantung 
(18,600 square miles), totals 204,600 square miles. Remember that it 
was not Japan which originated the idea of spheres of influence. It was 
because European^ powers were bent upon dividing China into so many 
spheres of influence that Japan was obliged to step in and take such 
measures as might be necessary to safeguard her position in the Far East 
against any emergency that might arise. . . . 

It is interesting to note how spheres of influence have been estab- 
lished by the Powers. Japan paid for her small sphere in Manchuria 
$1,000,000,000 and the blood of 100,000 of the flower of her population, 
for that was the cost of the war which was forced upon Japan by Russia. 
On the other hand, Russia, England, and France secured their vast 
spheres practically for nothing. The price paid by Germany for her 
sphere was the lives of two missionaries, whose questionable conduct 
resulted in their murder by Chinese. — Kiyoshi K. Kawakami, "Japan in 
World Politics," pp. 128-130. 



28 AMERICA'S STAKE IN THE FAR EAST 

A Korean Estimate of Japan 

Japan . . . ambitious of her future and jealous of her rights, has 
chosen the expedient rather than the righteous path to reach her place 
in the sun. Her poets have sung the glory and grandeur of war; her 
philosophers have praised the valor and virtue of militarism. Her 
merchants have practiced "dumping" and misrepresentation of goods as 
a matter of course; her statesmen have adopted the Bismarckian "iron 
and blood" policy as the only road to national greatness. Japan is no 
longer the gallant knight she was deemed to be in the earlier years of 
her national ascendency, setting out to rescue Asia from the European 
dragon; she is now the armed bully of the East. The Asiatics had 
looked upon her as their teacher and leader; now their hope and faith 
are shattered in finding her a merciless conqueror, reigning, sword in 
hand, over subject races. — Henry Chung, "The Oriental Policy of the 
United States," pp. 171, 172. 

Japan in China during the World War 

You know quite well from what you have seen for yourself in China 
on your various visits and from what your numerous well-informed 
friends in China have told you at various times, that Japan has taken 
every possible step during the four years of this war to ruin China, 
by creating and sustaining trouble; by financing the most objectionable 
elements in every community in which she has been interested; by the 
employment of agents provocateurs; by the encouragement of the use 
of morphine over large areas ; by the use of Japanese immoral women in 
Chinese official households; by the protection given to bandits and other 
outlaws ; by the wrecking of native banks, as in the recent Mukden case ; 
by the corruption of officials through loans, bribes, and threats; and by 
the wholesale misrepresentation of Allied war aims and the most 
vigorous efforts to prevent China from coming into the war, and then 
later to discredit the country by preventing China from being of any 
use or service to the Allies. You also know that during these four years, 
which have been publicly heralded as Japan's years of opportunity, it 
has been the distinct object of the Japanese to gain a monopoly upon 
political influence in China, and at the same time to make openings for 
Japanese trade which would give the Japanese commercial folk as strong 
a commercial monopoly as possible. And in every instance in which the 
Government has created an opening through political maneuvering, 
seldom creditable, the Japanese business man, said by his defenders to 
be opposed to the truculent and unscrupulous policy of the Japanese 
Government, has been only too ready to take advantage of the oppor- 
tunities offered to drive in the trade wedge, whether the trade was in 
legitimate imports and exports or in morphine or cocaine or women or 
Chinese cash or the rights and liabilities of the Chinese people. 



JAPAN INCREASINGLY TO DOMINATE? 29 

Not only has Japan been working against the present interests and 
future good of the Chinese people, but her policy in China has been 
deliberately shaped to undermine the trade, influence, and prestige of the 
Occidental peoples, nominally her Allies, throughout the East, Every 
ideal which we have developed and announced as participants in the 
present European War is disowned or discounted in the Japanese press 
and by Japanese propagandists among the Chinese; and in actual diplo- 
matic practice Japanese officials in China have practiced every subterfuge 
and committed every diplomatic crime with which we credit the Germans, 
and have invariably been supported by the home Government and en- 
couraged by their commercial representatives in China. — From a private 
letter quoted by Thomas F. Millard in "Democracy and the Eastern 
Question," pp. 246, 247. 

A Defense of Japan's Trade Policy 

A British merchant of Changchun, Manchuria, sends the writer the 
following letter in relation to the attitude of the Japanese in Manchuria: 

"With regard to that part of Manchuria which comes under Japanese 
influence, too great praise cannot be given. The conveniences and 
facilities to banking institutions, railway communications, postal and 
telegraph service are far and away superior to those afforded by the 
Russian and the Chinese institutions. The Yokohama Specie Bank, with 
its numerous branches, enables foreign traders to transact business on 
the same lines as they are accustomed to do in other civilized countries. 
Transactions with this bank are free from the exorbitant rates and the 
petty 'red-tapeism,' to which it is necessary to conform in working with 
either the Russians or the Chinese. It is a recognized fact that it takes 
any time over an hour to get a cheque cashed at a Russian bank; more- 
over, the absence of any knowledge of the English language renders 
transactions with them considerably irksome. Every employe in the 
Yokohama Specie Bank, on the other hand, has a good knowledge of the 
English language. Notwithstanding the fact that the Chinese Customs 
are supposed to manage the postal service in Manchuria, that service has 
become practically confined to the transmission of Chinese correspon- 
dence. The Japanese appear to handle the greater part, if not all, of the 
foreign mail in a satisfactory manner. 

"In conclusion, Japan has fulfilled all her obligations, and continues 1 
to do so, in the development of Manchuria, and woe betide the day if 
the country comes under Russian influence or if it is handed back again 
to the control of the Chinese. Too great attention cannot be devoted 
to this country by the press in Great Britain, in order to direct the 
attention of British firms to the enormous prospects which await them 
here in various directions. It is to be hoped that they will soon awaken 
to these possibilities. If these efforts are delayed too long they will 
find that it is too late, as other countries will have secured the business." 

It is well in criticizing a government to reflect long enough to con- 



30 AMERICA'S STAKE IN THE FAR EAST 

template the results which would follow in the event of its overthrow. 
The choice, should the Japanese relinquish or abandon Manchuria, 
would be either Russia or China, alternatives which may well make 
foreign traders willing to bear their present ills rather than to end them 
by flying to evils that, in this instance, they know all about. — Robert P. 
Porter, "Japan : the New World Power," pp. 756, 757. 

Taking Advantage of Natural Laws o£ Trade 

In her commercial rivalry with America and other nations in China, 
Japan has benefited herself simply by taking advantage of natural laws 
of trade. Japan's geographical situation, her enormous investment in 
China, the presence of 200,000 Japanese there consuming Japanese goods, 
the abundant supply of cheap labor at her disposal, her familiarity with 
the use of the Manchuria pulse of which she is the greatest customer, a 
certain similarity between the Chinese language and her own — these are 
the conditions which have been instrumental in the advancement of 
Japanese trade in Manchuria. — Kiyoshi K. Kawakami, "Japan in World 
Politics," pp. 137-139. 

Japan versus Russia in Eastern Asia 

Japan, like England, is situated close to the mainland in a position 
of wonderful strength. But, even more than in the case of England, the 
disparity in size between the little island state and the mainland is 
enormous and is not offset by the divisions in the latter which have so 
long been England's protection. Japan faces on the continent only a 
single modern power, whose area is nearly sixty times her own. Her 
relation to Russia well illustrates the complexity of modern international 
relations. There is little race antipathy between them, and Russia suffers 
from dearth rather than from congestion of population. Yet the conflict 
of interests between them is as marked and as irreconcilable as any in 
the world. So long as the control of necessary gateways is a part of the 
policy of enterprising nations, Russia will be impelled by the strongest 
considerations of commercial convenience and national defense to force 
her way through to the eastern sea. At present she has no satisfactory 
outlet. There is, indeed, but one really available outlet alike serviceable 
to commerce and capable of defense — the Gulf of Peichili, with its great 
harbor at Dairen, its Gibraltar at Port Arthur, and its impregnable out- 
posts in Korea and Shantung. Toward these Russia was pressing with 
all the force of her mighty energy when the nineteenth century closed. 

Japan viewed this advance of Russia with the utmost solicitude. It 
is most important that we should understand the reasons for her anxiety. 
These are essentially two, political and cultural, though, as we have seen, 
they are but different aspects of a single interest. 

If Russia should advance a' solid front clear out to the Japan Sea and 
intrench herself in Korea and Port Arthur, while ample communications 



JAPAN INCREASINGLY TO DbMINATE? 31 

were established with the populous districts of western Russia and the 
regions of eastern Siberia were filled with Russian settlers, there could be 
no question but that Russia would dominate the entire East. China for 
an indefinite period would be unable to oppose any effectual opposition, 
and against a power so vast as Russia Japan could not protect herself. 
It is, of course, possible that Russia would never have attacked Japan, 
but the mischief would nevertheless be done. Between two countries so 
situated there are sure to be numerous questions on which interests and 
opinions would differ, questions of their commerce with China and with 
each other, questions of naval and maritime privilege, questions of every 
conceivable sort, the decision of which would make a great deal of 
difference to both citizens and state. Against this greater Russia little 
Japan could never make her will prevail. If she accepted in every case 
Russia's view of the situation, she would be unmolested but would dwindle 
into insignificance. If she resisted she would be coerced and probably 
annexed and assimilated. Her fate would be that of docile Denmark or 
devastated Serbia. This was the political danger. 

But something far worse menaced little Japan. The Japanese 
culture is one of the daintiest and most exquisite in the world. There is 
a porcelain-like delicacy and fragility to the wondrously beautiful civiliza- 
tion which the Japanese have inherited from old Japan and to which they 
are attachefi with passionate devotion. What would happen to this 
civilization if it were lined up in helpless subserviency to the huge raw- 
boned might of Russia ? . . . Nothing discredits a culture like impotence. 
Indeed, the first marked effect of the opening of Japan and the revelation 
to her people of the power of the Western nations was an almost tragic 
disparagement of their own civilization, accompanied by a domestic van- 
dalism and a tasteless foreign craze, the results of which a generation 
of restored sanity has not been able to obliterate. No, it needed no 
invasion or conquest to destroy Japan as her wise leaders knew and loved 
her. Only let Russia build out in fulness of strength on the nearby 
mainland and the mischief was wrought. Little Japan could never exist 
alongside of Greater Russia. 

What was the way of escape? There was but one possible answer. 
There must be no Greater Russia, and there must be a Greater Japan. 
This is the program of Japan. — Harry H, Powers, "America among the 
Nations," pp. 227-230. 

China versus Japan in Manchuria 

While strategically and politically Manchuria presents problems for 
each of the three countries whose territories converge on its borders, 
when considered as a field for colonization its importance commands 
more specifically the attention of China and Japan. . . . Manchuria is a 
natural outlet for the excess of China's population more truly than for 



32 AMERICA'S STAKE IN THE FAR EAST 

that of Japan; and, as far as rights to this open field are concerned, 
China has the better claim. The pressure of excess population seeking 
an emigration outlet will probably be greater from China than from 
Japan — for there are 400,000,000 Chinese as compared with 70,000,000 
Japanese and Koreans, and the former are no less adept at "replenishing 
the earth" than are the latter. 

Manchuria has an area of 363,700 square miles, a part of this area 
being immensely fertile, other portions being rich in timber and in 
mineral resources. Experts are agreed in the estimate that this region is 
capable of supporting a population of 100,000,000. The population today 
numbers perhaps 17,500,000 persons. Of these about 17,000,000 are 
Chinese subjects, some 13,000,000 of them being of Chinese and perhaps 
as many as 4,000,000 of Manchu race; 250,000 are Koreans; about 100,000 
are Japanese; and about 50,000 are Russians. To enter Manchuria the 
Chinese have but to step through the breach in the Great Wall at 
Shanhaikwan or to sail across the ninety miles of water between the 
Shantung Peninsula and the Liaotung Peninsula. As many Chinese 
farm hands come and go between Chihli and Shantung provinces and 
Manchuria each year as there are Japanese in South Manchuria after 
ten years of occupation. What people, then, would it seem, have the best 
natural right to Manchuria; and what people, if events are left to their 
natural course, will settle this great potential outlet for excess population ? 

Though Japan takes South Manchuria, and whether she leaves it 
open to Chinese immigration or whether she closes it, her occupation 
will not settle the question of population pressure. Still less will it insure 
the peace of the Far East. — Stanley K. Hornbeck, "Contemporary Politics 
in the Far East," pp. 271, 2^2. 

The Struggle for Manchuria 

During the Chino-Japanese War in 1894-5 there was some fighting 
about Haicheng and Newchwang in southern Manchuria, and Japan 
after her victory received a grant of territory embracing the Liaotung 
peninsula and its hinterland. Through the intervention of Russia, 
France, and Germany, however, this was ceded back to China in return 
for a handsome indemnity. Japan ousted, Russia took her place — 
first, in 1896, securing the concession for a railway through central 
Manchuria, then the lease of Port Arthur and the right to build a 
line from Harbin to Dalny [Dairen]. During the unsettled years that 
followed the Boxer uprising of 1900 Russia's influence was extended, 
and her failure to complete the evacuation of Chinese territory — New- 
chwang and neighboring towns — in October, 1903, brought on the crisis 
which culminated in the war with Japan. 

It is unnecessary to dwell upon the history of that struggle. Russia 
desired an ice-free port. More than that, she wished to retain under 



JAPAN INCREASINGLY TO DOMINATE? 33 

her control the northern portion of Korea. In this Japan refused to 
acquiesce, for it was imperative that she break the strategic line between 
Port Arthur and Vladivostok. — Willard Straight, "China and the Far 
East," Clark University Lectures, p. 134. 

The Value of a Solvent Japan 

Japan, with a rapidly increasing population, has nearly reached the 
limit in the home country. Internal pressure of population and the 
expanding energy of the people force her to seek an outlet. Racial 
opposition, dense population, or climatic conditions limit the field of such 
expansion, except in the contiguous territories of Korea and Manchuria, 
In these provinces, however, Japan has encountered the antagonism both 
of China and of various European powers intent upon territorial aggran- 
dizement. In order to control the situation, Japan has been compelled to 
fight two wars and build up an expensive military equipment that is 
breaking her down financially. So long as other nations threaten Japan's 
natural expansion, she will be compelled to maintain this armed prepared- 
ness. In the writer's opinion it would profit the other powers' selfish 
interest to oppose this movement no longer, on the ground that a solvent 
Japan is of more value to them than a bankrupt Japan. Japan's future 
commercial prosperity depends upon the integrity of China and her 
interests in that quarter are consonant with those of America. We need 
not fear that Japan will ever permanently control China proper, even as 
the result of a successful war. There are too many Chinese, and it 
would be too expensive an undertaking. . . . 

Japan is passing through her own hobble-de-hoy period. Her cocki- 
ness, her bumptiousness, her exaggerated sense of dignity, her concern 
to be recognized as an international power — all these phenomena we 
ourselves have displayed in our time and with far greater crudity. It 
was a passing phase with us and it will be with the newer nation if we 
do not take it too seriously. At any rate, nothing is so futile, so stupid, 
as international recriminations. We have much to gain by retaining 
Japan's personal friendship, we have everything to lose by losing it. 

England's attempts to limit our expansion to the Pacific were based 
upon a priori considerations, not on her own desires for that territory. 
The United States expanded through its own exuberant energy rather 
than through necessity or pressure of population, and England's attempts 
at hindrance roused the fiercest resentment. Japan's present-day ex- 
pansion is also partly a phenomenon of national vigor as well as of 
economic pressure, and the attempts of foreign nations to curb it excite 
the same resentment that we ourselves have experienced. Again, have 
we any call to put ourselves on the side of Japan's opponents ? — James F. 
Abbott, "J^P^^^fise Expansion and American Policies," pp. 233, 234, 
257, 258. 



34 AMERICA'S STAKE IN THE FAR EAST 

Three Possibilities for America 

Japan may be reborn to abandon her policy of force for peaceful 
and legitimate commercial progress in China and East Asia. 

Or China may find her spine, straighten up, and oppose the marauder. 

There is no immediate prospect of either, though each will un- 
doubtedly slowly develop and partially solve the problem. 

As for us, we have at last reached the place where we must plan our 
own course on the probabilities and not the hopes. We can do three 
things : 

1. We can say, "All of this is none of our affair. Let them work it 
out themselves." And with this attitude we may stay out of the League 
[of Nations], and either honestly believe that our civilization can wield 
its greatest power by standing, unimpaired, alone, or simply do the slacker 
trick of avoiding a bad mess. 

2. We ca^ make a lot of cheap, noisy talk and goad Japan into 
readiness to declare war, while we mean to do nothing and are prepared 
to back down at any threat from the East. We then convict ourselves 
of insincerity and encourage aggression against our rights and principles. 

3. We can enter the League of Nations determined to stand by our 
principle of democracy. The logical result is that we definitely make up 
our minds to be ready to fight for it. 

The hope for our peace with our neighbor in the East is that we 
be so strongly and deeply convinced of our democracy that we 
are ready to fight for it. — Louis D. Froelick, "Democracy Collides with 
Imperialism over Shantung," Asia, September, 1919, p. 875. 

America's Help for China 

The world is being too closely unified for two incompatible political 
ideals to exist together — imperialistic autocracy based upon militarism, 
and representative democracy founded on political liberty. President 
Wilson crystallized this idea into a political principle when he said in his 
message delivered at a joint session of the two houses of the Congress, 
April 2, 1917. . . . "The world must be made safe for democracy; its 
peace must be planted upon the tested foundations of political liberty. 
, . . We shall fight for the things which we have always carried nearest 
our hearts — for democracy, for the rights of those who submit to 
authority to have a voice in their own governments, for the rights and 
liberties of small nations, for a universal domination of right by such a 
concert of free peoples as shall bring peace and safety to all nations and 
make the world itself at last free." 

It is a clear enunciation of new Americanism. The United States 
fought for her own freedom in the Declaration of Independence. She 



JAPAN INCREASINGLY TO DOMINATE? 35 

was willing to fight for the freedom of the peoples of the Western 
Hemisphere in declaring the Monroe Doctrine. In the European War 
she fought for the freedom and democracy of the whole world. China, 
if unselfishly aided and wisely guided, can revive her ancient genius and 
develop her vast potential resources, and will eventually take her place 
among the powers of the world as a strong, democratic nation. Will the 
United States of America, true to the new principles of her political 
conviction, perform her mission toward China in the consummation of 
this noble task?— Henry Chung, "The Oriental Policy of the United 
States," pp. 109, no. 

The Larger Problems of Human and National Relationships 

In the interests of human freedom, the peoples of the world must 
face three groups of problems. The first concerns the relations between 
the politically developed states, upon whose cooperation the solution of 
international problems depends. It is to these states that we must look 
for the evolution of those ordered relations, which lie at the base of inter- 
national life, not only affecting these states in their direct relations with 
one another, but necessary for the solution of the international problems 
falling into the other groups. The second series centers round the 
difficult questions arising out of the relations between races at widely 
differing stages of political and economic development. There are two 
main sides to these problems: there is first, the question of protection 
against exploitation, whether political or economic; and second, the 
question of developing among backward peoples those broad principles, 
moral, social, and political, upon which free societies must be built. 
Both merge into each other at many points; on the whole, the former 
are concerned with immediate, and the latter with ultimate, questions. 
Broadly speaking, we are here faced with "the white man's burden," 
which hitherto has often appeared to cloak purely selfish ends, but which 
is the analogy in the international field of the communal protection of 
the young and the weak in domestic politics. The third series of prob- 
lems relates to thfe control by the states of the world of the great cosmo- 
politan interests, mainly economic in character, whose growth has been 
one of the most striking features of the last century. These three sets 
of problems overlap and cannot be kept distinct; but broadly they are 
political, sociological, and economic, though all of them are closely 
related to international ethics. Indeed, reduced to the simplest form of 
expression, the task is to "moralize" international relations. To confine 
the issue to the problem of how to keep a single strong-headed nation 
in its due place, or of how to settle international disputes without 
recourse to war, is to miss the real significance of these questions as 
phases of the larger problems of human and national relationships.— 
Arthur Greenwood, "An Introduction to the Study of International 
Relations," pp. 195, 196. 



CHAPTER IV 

HOW CAN AMERICA SAFEGUARD HER TRADE 
RELATIONS WITH THE ORIENT?* 

I. How important is the Chinese market to the United States? 

1. China is said to be the greatest potential market in the world. 
What considerations lead you to doubt this claim ? What con- 
siderations lead you to believe it ? 

2. America would look askance upon a Japanese attempt to 
achieve commercial priority in Mexico. Would Japan have a 
right to look equally askance on any attempt by the United 
States to achieve commercial ascendancy in China? 

3. I£ Japan achieves the commercial supremacy of the Far East 
by permitting her manufacturers to produce goods cheaply 
through sweated labor of women and children, in what ways 
would it concern America? 

4. Just in what ways, if any, aside from commercial loss would 
it be a disadvantage to the United States to lose her full share 
in the Chinese market? 

II. What chance has America against Japanese competition in 

the Orient? 

1. Admittedly under Japanese ommation in Manchuria, much 
of the American trade with that part of China has disappeared. 
How has this commercial supplanting been brought about by 
Japan ? 

2. What peculiar advantages does Japan have to secure the trade 
of the Asiatic mainland? 

3. What probability is there that Japan will secure an increasing 
monopoly of trade relations in the Orient ? 

4. What do you feel is the relative pressure upon Japan and the 
United States : (a) To secure an adequate market for the output 
of home industries? (b) To provide assured raw materials for 
these industries? What bearing does this have upon the 



♦The discussion group or world problem forum may prefer to give two 
weeks to this topic. If so, Sections I to III could be covered the first week; 
Sections IV to VI the second. 

36 



TRADE RELATIONS SAFEGUARDED? 37 

relative importance for the two countries of the development of 
commercial relations with China ? 

III. What can America do to secure her fair share o£ Oriental 

trade in competition with Japan? 

1. If Japan's procedure continues to make it difficult to promote 
American trade with the Asiatic mainland, what steps in your 
judgment are justified to protect the American position? 

2. What recourse other than to arms would the United States 
have for securing "satisfaction" for the "freezing out" of its 
trade in the Orient? 

3. Japanese raw silk is sold to the United States. Japan buys 
much of her raw cotton from us and from it manufactures 
cotton goods which compete with the American product. If 
these cotton goods should supplant our trade in manufactured 
cottons in the Far East, would or would not the United States 
be justified in putting an embargo on silk imports and raw 
cotton exports to influence industrial conditions in Japan? 
How far would conditions in American cotton mills justify 
America in taking this attitude? How far could we count on 
American silk manufacturers and cotton growers joining in such 
a weapon to their own economic detriment? 

4. Just what part do you feel America should rightfully take in 
the trade and commercial development of China ? 

5. If you wished to advance American trade in China, just what 
proposals would you make to the United States Government ? 

IV. What bearing does our shipping program have upon the 

whole question of America's future position in the Far 
East? 

1. What advantages, if any, has Japan over America in the 
development of Pacific shipping? Of what importance is it, 
if any, that our commerce should be carried in American 
bottoms ? 

2. If American youth because of superior business opportunities 
ashore prefer not to go to sea, should restrictions against non- 
American sailors on ships of American registry be removed? 
Why? Why not? 

3. Would you favor American personnel on our shipping, even 
though substantial subsidies were necessary to make possible 
wages that would induce American youth to go to sea for a 
living? Why? Why not? 



38 AMERICA'S STAKE IN THE FAR EAST 

V. What kind of an effect has America's commercial impact 

upon the East? 

1. To what extent are America's commercial contacts with the 
Far East now on a Christian basis ? Is the impact of our trade 
approach to the Far East prevaiHngly Christian in its influence ? 
Consider this with respect to the materials of commerce, the 
personnel of American trade as you may know it, the methods 
of salesmanship as you may have heard of these, the diplomatic 
procedure of America in dealing with controversies that arise 
with other governments growing out of our trade contacts, and 
the fundamental motives that lie back of the extension of our 
trade in foreign lands. 

2. In what ways should this commercial impact be Christianized ? 

3. What would be involved in the Christianizing of America's 
commercial impact upon the East? 

VI. What hope is there that the trade interests of the East and 

the West can be harmonized? 

1. Do you feel that the ultimate best interests of Japan and of 
the United States with respect to the developing trade of the 
Far East are inescapably in conflict? 

2. Are there values to be secured which are securable by only 
one or the other, to the gain or loss in each case by one or the 
other ? 

3. To what extent is there an international community of interest 
in the commercial development of the Far East? 

4. Are or are not the economic relations of nations to one an- 
other essentially interdependent, consequently requiring true 
cooperation and recognition of mutuality of interest for their 
highest development? 

5. If you believe in this principle of interdependence of the 
nations in the realm of economics, how would you go to work 
to make this principle evident under international commercial 
conditions which seem now purely competitive ? 

REFERENCE MATERIAL 
Possibilities of the China Market ' 

Most of the eighteen provinces [of China] and the three provinces 
of Manchuria contain coal, and China may be regarded as one of the 
first coal countries of the world. Iron ores are abundant in the anthracite 
field of Shansi, in Chihli, in Shantung and other provinces, and iron 



TRADE RELATION'S SAFEGUARDED? 3T 

(found in conjunction with coal) is worked in Manchuria. On the 
Upper Yangtsze and in Shensi province petroleum is being worked. Tin 
is the most important mineral export. Antimony ore is exported from 
Hunan. Yunnan province is one of the richest coppe^- districts in the 
world. 

Cotton is grown widely even as far north as the southern part of 
Chihli, the chief area of production being the Yangtsze valley. 

About twenty-seven per cent of the world's supply of raw silk is from 
China. 

Treaties forbid the export of grain with the exception of the soya 
bean, the chief product of Manchuria, of which in 1917 205,853 tons 
were exported as beans, 821,941 tons as bean cake, and 104,213 as bean 
oil. — Statesman's Year Book, 1919. 

A great wealth of undeveloped resources in minerals awaits the 
engineer, the scientist, the laborer, and the financier of the New China. 
Hundreds of millions of acres of fertile lands await the application of 
scientific methods of agriculture, to make them trebly productive. 
Millions of acres of barren hill lands await afforestation with its at- 
tendant blessings. Good sanitation, irrigation, rural credits, and modern 
transportation facilities are essentials to the farmers of the New China. 
Household industry is to be superseded by the factory, with all its prob- 
lems of sanitation, organization of labor and capital, congested city 
populations, education, and morals which are attendant upon an industrial 
society. Along with this industrial development there will be great ac- 
cumulations of wealth with their attendant opportunities and responsi- 
bilities. Big business with its manifold ramifications must accompany 
transition from the bamboo to the iron age. Railways, steamship lines, 
electric power, and all that machinery and modern invention have meant 
to Western society will enter into the life of the New China. These 
developments in all their varying phases call for organization. In- 
dividualism must give way to group activity, to organization in the larger 
unit. Over and above all there must develop a still greater organization, 
an efficient and progressive governmental administration. China must 
develop the capacity for organization, effective organization, and organ- 
ization for a common constructive end. — Julean Arnold, American Com- 
mercial Attache, Chinese Recorder, April, 1918, pp. 220, 221. 

The possibilities of our Pacific trade are shown by the growth of 
Japanese commerce. In 1868 Japan's foreign trade was $13,123,272, 
gold; in 1888 it had increased fivefold and was $65,580,382; in 1898 
it was $221,627,954; in 1913 it was $680,934,729 — $15 per inhabitant. 
The foreign trade of China probably will make a greater relative increase 
per inhabitant during the next twenty-five years. The trade of Japan 
increased almost fourteenfold from 1888 to 1913. If the trade of China 
increases at a similar rate during the next twenty-five years, it will reach 



40 AMERICA'S STAKE IN THE FAR EAST 

over $8,000,000,000 by 1941, half of which will consist of imports. But 
if China is to import $8,000,000,000 worth of goods a year within the 
next quarter of a century, the importance of the Chinese market to the 
United States for the maintenance of our export trade can scarcely be 
overestimated. — James W. Bashford, "China: An Interpretation," pp. 
435> 436. 

Japan's Commercial Purposes, Progress and Methods 

If the British and the Americans in China are opposed to Japan's 
commercial expansion in China, they are welcome to oppose it. But 
they should go at it in a business-like way, that is by means of commercial 
competition with the Japanese. They should not mind little toys like the 
Twenty-One Demands. These will not hurt, nor will they bring any 
very great influence to bear upon the commercial market of keen competi- 
tion. If the Japanese business men can continue to produce goods at low 
cost which will sell well in China, the only way the British and the 
Americans can oust the Japanese goods is to reduce their cost of produc- 
tion and transportation. Boycotts or strikes started by agitators will not 
shake the Japanese trade with China from the foundation. If only Japan 
should find it impossible to continue production at low cost, owing to rise 
of wages, cost of living, etc., whereas the Western countries may remain 
stationary as far as the cost of production is concerned, then it will be 
time for the Westerners to compete with the Japanese goods in the 
Chinese market effectively. 

One thing the Westerners in the Orient should remember ... is 
that we will not stop growing until we shall have approximated the ad- 
vanced races of the West in our possession of wealth, strength, and 
civilization, individually and as a nation. — Jihei Hashiguchi, Far Eastern 
Review, August, 1919, p. 572. 

Recently a special agent of the United States Department of Com- 
merce made a summary of the disabilities under which American 
merchants now operate in Manchuria and Shantung, as follows : 

1. Delays at the Japanese banks. Shroffs [clerks] of American 
and other foreign firms are made to wait while Japanese are given prompt 
attention. 

2. Holding of goods at the ports of entry and railway stations on 
various pretexts, while goods shipped by or consigned to Japanese 
merchants are moved and handled promptly. 

3. Similar delays at Kobe, Japan, and at other points of transship- 
ment, where cargo shipped by or consigned to American firms is held up, 
while cargo shipped by or consigned to Japanese firms is moved promptly. 

4. Special favors accorded by the railways in China under Japanese 
control to Japanese shippers, including an obscure system of rebates. 



TRADE RELATIONS SAFEGUARDED? 41 

5.^ Subjection of Chinese to a "graft" system, except those who 
work in with the Japanese. 

6. Encroachments on Chinese business and property, except that 
of those who work in with the Japanese. 

7. Evasion of local Chinese taxes by Japanese traders and mer- 
chants, while other foreign merchants and the Chinese have to pay them. 

8. Manipulation of public utilities controlled by Japanese, like postal 
and telephone and telegraph communications, to give advantage to 
Japanese merchants. 

^ 9. Taking advantage of the war censorship and the circumstances 
which have caused mails from America destined to China and other places 
in the Orient to be turned over to the Japanese postal authorities in 
Japan to be forwarded, to delay the business mail of American firms trad- 
ing in China and other Oriental countries, to learn the business secrets 
of those firms, and to use the information thus gained to obtain the busi- 
ness for Japanese firms ; and similar use of telegraph and other communi- 
cations controlled by Japan. 

10. Refusing space in Japanese ships to American cargo in order 
to give advantage to competing Japanese firms, and giving lower rates 
or rebates to Japanese shippers than are given to competing American 
firms. 

11. Counterfeiting of the trade-marks and other distinguishing 
features of well known American manufactured articles and the extensive 
sale in China of inferior Japanese imitations of those articles.— Thomas 
F. Millard, "Democracy and the Eastern Question," pp. 274, 275. 

Japan is poor. How poor it is only those who have visited the 
country can comprehend. . . . The whole population— men, women, and 
children — labors incessantly and for a mere pittance. Various forms of 
disease, especially tuberculosis, create an appalling death rate. This 
condition of the great mass of the Japanese has been made more serious 
as a result of th^ war, even though wages have been somewhat raised. 

Japan has been eager to become a manufacturing nation and the 
international conditions evoked by the present European situation have 
opened a remarkable opportunity to the few to realize this ambition. 
All forms of manufacture have increased at an astonishing pace in the 
great cities. The factories have been largely the possession of a small 
company of fortunate investors or speculators and have been immensely 
profitable. These newly rich are conspicuously in evidence in the great 
centers of Japan and the morals of those who have thus suddenly acquired 
munificence is one of the most serious problems which the country faces. 

On the other hand, the growth of these manufacturing industries has 
largely been accomplished by prostituting the labor of men, women, and 
children. The pay of all workmen is pitifully small, while that of women 



42 AMERICA'S STAKE IN THE FAR EAST 

and children is shockingly inadequate, although they are often compelled 
to work twelve to fourteen hours a day. Even the holidays are few, a 
rest day once in two weeks being commonly the maximum opportunity 
of change. The result is that the death rate among laborers is exceed- 
ingly high. A woman worker endures the strain only a few months, or 
years at most, and the result of the sad situation is that new sources of 
supply for female labor are constantly being sought, young women from 
the outlying parts of Japan and from Korea being brought in in large 
numbers to fill the gaps which these fatal conditions create. — Deputation 
to Japan appointed by the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign 
Missions, 1918, "The Kingdom of God in Japan," pp. 61, 62. 

Advantages of Japan's Geographical Propinquity 

There is one enormous advantage that Japan has over the rest 
of the world, in the China trade, and that is geographical propinquity. 
This advantage which Japan has sought to improve by diplomatic means, 
has been of assistance both in legitimate and in somewhat doubtful ways. 
. . . The legitimate advantages derivable from geographical propinquity 
... all resolve themselves into reduced costs, and therefore cheapness. 
Every item in transportation costs is less for the shorter distance, and 
when to this is added the fact of substantial subsidy, as has been the case 
with Japan, the advantages of geographical propinquity are considerably 
enhanced. There are two advantages over the Western trader that the 
Japanese enjoy in the highest degree. The first is the advantage of 
language. It is a comparatively simple matter for the representative of 
Japanese commerce in China to speak and read Chinese. On the value 
of this advantage there is no need to dilate. The second advantage is 
that conditions of life for a Japanese in China are much more closely 
similar to those to which he is accustomed than is the case with the 
Westerner, and the result is that he lives much more cheaply, which 
means that his distributing or collecting costs are correspondingly — and 
considerably — lower. — W. S. Ridge, Far Eastern Review^ September, 
1919, p. 613. 

Developing American Trade in the Orient 

Other nations have concrete advantages in China. . . . We have the 
good will of the buying and the selling public. The next important thing 
is to keep it. We can do this by sending out to China the goods they 
want, packed as they want them, and delivered when they want them. 
We can do it by the following up of our many "commercial investiga- 
tions" and extravagant talk about the possibilities of the country, with 
careful, but definite, financial investments and the establishment of in- 
dustrial enterprises. It is important, too, that the men who are sent out 
there to handle our business interests should be selected with care. They 



TRADE RELATIONS SAFEGUARDED? 43 

should be men of the highest type only, not the adventurers and the 
sightseers, but the far-seeing, purposeful men who make their business 
their first interest, and who will maintain the same caliber of work 
and the same standards as we expect of them at home. In a word, they 
should be men whom we shall be proud to have judged as representative 
Americans. Every man sent out who can not stand this test, even though 
he be in the most insignificant clerical position, will work against us. — 
Chester C. Lincoln, National Marine, September, 1919. 

While the peace settlement has made the political international issue 
most acute for the moment, the financial and industrial question is the 
important one in the long run. Here lies the great chance of the United 
States. The introduction of a unified comprehensive currency system, 
improved modern harbors and terminal facilities, the reconstruction of 
the inland waterway system to improve transportation and avoid destruc- 
tive floods — these are samples of the important tasks that must be under- 
taken. At the present time the United States is the only country that 
combines the requisite capital, engineering ability, and executive talent. 

The important thing is that by undertaking big things on a large 
scale the United States will get around much of the competition that 
breeds irritation and suspicion. If the scale is big enough, there will 
be no competition. Japan is not prepared to take hold of these things on 
a large scale. A negative policy that can be interpreted as putting 
obstacles in the way of the legitimate development of Japan is fraught 
with dangers. To concentrate upon big enterprises in a constructive 
way will leave Japan plenty of opportunities, while it will once and for 
all avert the possibility of rendering China a virtual subject of Japan — a 
danger which the best friends of Japan must admit to be real as long as 
the militaristic-bureaucratic element continues to dominate her policies. 
The serious source of evil in the present situation is the likelihood that 
the United States will have sufficient interest in the Far East to talk a 
.great deal, and to act in minor ways but upon the whole in ways which 
can be construed, with more or less justice, as having for their main 
object to thwart the ambitions of other countries, especially Japan. 

It is not necessary to say that the next few years are crucial. In 
China as elsewhere reconstruction is imminent, but for the time being 
things are in solution. Distance has its disadvantages in all the lesser 
relations. But it can be made an advantage if the attention of America 
is fixed on large scale undertakings. . . . 

Leaders must come whom Chinese leaders recognize as their equals 
and who are intellectually prepared to deal with Chinese leaders as equals. 
And the plans must be on such a scale that it is evident that, while ample 
security and reasonable profit are given to foreign investors, the outcome 
will be to make China the mistress of her own economic destinies. When 
this is accomplished, she will have no difficulty in looking out for herself 



44 AMERICA'S STAKE IN THE FAR EAST 

politically. Just because the controlling factor in the policies of other 
nations has been to cultivate the economic subjection of China, the United 
States has an unparalleled opportunity to pursue the opposite course. 
Has it the imagination and the energy? — ^John Dewey, New Republic, 
December 3, 1919, pp. 16, 17. 

The way to create wide interest in foreign affairs is to give a wider 
number of people an interest in them, and this can be accomplished by 
making foreign trade and investment in backward countries a less risky 
and more normal enterprise. 

The effect of this enlarged interest would be to break down the 
uncanny pretentiousness of diplomacy. . . . This exclusiveness is an 
illusion which collapses when anyone goes behind the etiquette of diplo- 
macy to the substance of it. People will not go behind it, however, 
unless they are made to feel that the subject matter of diplomacy is re- 
lated to their daily lives. Without some direct and constant interest, 
public opinion ignores foreign affairs until a crisis is reached. . . . 

But if trade with these regions were extended, hundreds of firms 
would be sending buyers and traveling salesmen to them, establishing 
branch offices, and in endless ways intensifying communication. Busi- 
ness men would have to learn languages, study history and political 
conditions, and some knowledge of foreign countries would become a 
commercial necessity. The schools would have to meet the demand, 
the newspapers would have to give space to foreign news, there would be 
a growing section of the public well enough informed to ask the State 
Department pertinent questions. Congressmen would have to show that 
they knew not only that there was urgent need for a new postoffice in 
Ashtabula, but what was the political situation in China or in Costa Rica. 

In brief, to have public opinion there must be interest, and this can 
be created not by preaching but by making the subject of it part of the 
business of life. . . . Just as there is a political machine which governs 
because the voter is too ignorant and too lazy to govern himself, so there 
is a diplomatic machine which counts upon the apathy, the docility, and 
the explosive emotions of the people. In this darkness and silence the 
world is rigged, and all manner of cruelty and selfishness flourishes. — 
Walter Lippman, "The Stakes of Diplomacy," pp. 196-198. 

Importing the Products o£ Oriental Cheap Labor 

The people of the United States, with wages at two to five dollars 
per day, cannot import goods from China, with wages at twenty cents a 
day, without exporting something to pay for it. It is a national enrich- 
ment for us to buy the produce of what some call pauper labor, because 
we get goods we need and use, pay for them in other goods that we have, 
and, therefore, the import of goods stimulates the export of goods. If 
one will take the trouble to think nationally, he will see that there is no 



TRADE RELATIONS SAFEGUARDED? 45 

escape from that sentence.— J. Russell Smith, Annals of the American 
Academy of Political and Social Science, May, 1919, pp. 299, 300. 

The Province of Shansi can give the v^orld coal enough to supply 
the needs of the world for some thousands of years at one shilling and 
sixpence a ton. How is that produced ? The porters who carry it have 
to carry a 400-lb. load for less than one penny a mile, and so the ordinary 
thing is that they work one week and lie up the next. Other workers 
work up to their middles in water and suffer so from swollen legs that 
the average time sheet shows that they work two days a week out of four. 
. . . There are almost 1,000,000 factory girls in Japan. The factory 
girl gets less than a single woman can live on — and you know the rest. 
Reports tell us that investigation revealed that of the girls who come up 
from country homes to city factories more than sixty per cent are never 
heard of again at home. We buy the stuff cheap, dyed with the blood 
of our sisters. Is it our job to put that right?— Rev. W. E. S. Holland, 
Address at Sheffield, England, November, 1919. 

Two Varieties of Monroe Doctrine 

^ It seems as though there is absolutely nothing that Japanese can 
do in Mexico without treading upon the sensitive toes of the advocates of 
the Monroe Doctrine. ... If a Japanese secures a fishing privilege along 
the Mexican Coast, he is held to be encroaching upon that doctrine. If a 
Japanese gets a mining concession there, the same doctrine stands ready 
to expel him. If a handful of Japanese farmers or laborers manage to 
get into Sonora or lower California, down comes the Monroe Doctrine 
to denounce them. If a Japanese business firm sells arms to the 
Mexican Government, that is regarded as a violation of the doctrine. 
What, indeed, would the Monroe Doctrine say if a Japanese concern, even 
unassisted by the Japanese Government, were to propose building a rail- 
way in Mexico? In short the Monroe Doctrine of today, as applied to 
the Japanese, is not a political doctrine as it was meant to be by President 
Monroe ; it is an economic dogma conceived to bar out all Japanese enter- 
prises, which are in nature purely economic, and which are the result of 
the natural growth of the ordinary pursuits of individuals, unattended by 
governmental influence. 

And yet, on the other hand, America has more than once proposed 
to build railways and work mines in Manchuria. She has no hesitation 
in recognizing the right of her financial interests to advance funds to the 
Chinese Government, or build railways, or exploit mineral resources in 
China or Eastern Siberia. Japan, of course, has no desire to pick 
quarrels with America on such matters, but she may at least be permitted 
to point out the peculiarities of the Monroe Doctrine as applied to her 
citizens in the Western hemisphere.— Kiyoshi K. Kawakami, "Japan and 
World Peace," pp. 91, 92. 



46 AMERICA'S STAKE IN THE FAR EAST 

Christianizing America's Commercial Contacts with the East 

Our impact upon the East must be Christianized because we are 
moving out upon the East in very many different ways, and those ways 
are sure steadily to increase. . . , And we cannot separate the different 
forms in which that movement of the West upon the East is taking place. 
They are all of them inextricably intertwined. And every one of them 
is bound to suffer or to benefit from the character of the rest. Christi- 
anity is sure to be damaged in its purer form of expression in the 
missionary enterprise by everything that is non-Christian in all the 
other forms of the movement of the West upon the non-Christian 
world. . . . 

We have a right to demand that the attitude of this nation toward 
every non-Christian nation should be a Christian attitude. The idea of 
war between the American people and any Asiatic people is preposterous. 
There are no possible conflicts in sight that justify us in any other atti- 
tude toward the whole non-Christian world than an attitude of sympathy 
and brotherhood and peace. And we are bound to practice in our 
national relations with all of these nations the same spirit of restraint, 
of generous confidence in another's good will, of unselfish regard for 
another's interest, which we regard ourselves as under obligations to 
practice in our relationship one to another as Christian men. Our news- 
papers should realize this and behave with decency. So also should 
Japan's. That is the first thing. 

In the second place, we can do it by making sure that the men who 
go out to represent this country in commerce and in trade really represent 
that which is best and truest in the land. The Government is not to go 
into the business of religious propagandizing. But this country is a 
Christian country. . . . We have a duty to seek to make sure that all 
that goes out from this nation to the rest of the world, whether politically 
or commercially, should justly represent the true character of our people. 
. . . There have been in the past great bodies of noble men who have 
gone out to represent the Western nations to the Eastern world . . . 
statesmen and merchants who carried their Christian character with them 
and who, wherever they were and in all that they did, stood unabashed 
and faithful as Christian men. We can Christianize the impact of the 
West upon the East by making sure that this kind of man goes out to 
represent us there. 

In the third place, we must do it by Christianizing our trade. . . . 
We cannot expect to conduct our trade with the East upon non-Christian 
principles, and then have the East turn the other cheek to us and practice 
Christian principles in trade with us. We are bound to carry on our 
trade with other nations on a Christian basis — I mean with honesty, and 
with unselfishness, and a desire for mutual helpfulness and good. — Robert 
E. Speer, "The Gospel and the New World," pp. 142, 143, 148-150. 



TRADE RELATIONS SAFEGUARDED? 47 

The morphia that was seized in the recent smuggling case in Shanghai 
was all manufactured in Philadelphia — a fact verified in open court by a 
lawyer of the International Anti-Opium Association. It would be a 
criminal offense to ship this direct to China. But there is no law against 
shipment to Japan. American traffic through the two channels of British 
goods in bond and our own products has reached vast proportions already. 
The official statistics show that for the first five months of the current 
year [1919] 25,000 ounces of morphia reached the port of Kobe from 
American ports. But the Japan Chronicle, published in Kobe, is re- 
sponsible for the statement that the manifestos of ships arriving in Kobe 
during the same period show about 90,000 more ounces not appearing in 
the custom house returns. The conclusion is certain. This amount was 
transhipped in Kobe harbor to be smuggled into China. That this shows 
gross connivance on the part of Kobe port officials may be argued. But 
the^ primary responsibility is with the laws and administration of the 
United States. We have become a large partner in the contemptible 
business of drugging China at the time when China is making heroic 
efforts to emancipate herself from the narcotic evil. — John Dewey, New 
Republic, December 24, 1919. 

Economic Cooperation 

It is through the development of economic cooperation that the 
world-family will solidify itself, and the world-order will develop. A 
league of peace which deals only with political questions is but a paper 
pact. The workers of the world have gone beyond the intellectuals in 
that they propose to give the organized supra-nation some task at once 
to accomplish, and it is only by action that organisms develop. Moreover, 
in this they are in actual tune with the facts and needs of today, for the 
business of economic production has now proceeded far beyond the 
political organization of mankind. Politically we are living in one 
century and economically we are living in another. The artificial boun- 
daries of the states do not correspond to the facts of economic production 
and exchange, any more than they correspond to the ideal of fellowship 
and the capacity for its enjoyment. There are today no independent 
economic units. These absolute sovereignties, called states, which exist 
in political philosophy and practice, do not exist when it comes to the 
interdependent economic life of the world, which crosses all frontiers. 
Here is the actual beginning of that world-family life to which religion 
seeks to call the loyalty of the individual and of the nation. — Harry F. 
Ward, "The Opportunity for Religion," pp. 64, 65. 



CHAPTER V 

WHAT HOPE IS THERE THAT CHINA CAN 
BE SAVED AS A NATION ? 

I. How much can we expect of the Chinese? 

1. The Chinese are called the x\nglo-Saxons of the Orient, and 
are said by travelers and missionaries to be a particularly able 
race with exceptional qualities of leadership. What is your 
estimate of Chinese as students, laborers, business men, agri- 
culturists, or diplomatists ? How did you come by this estimate ? 

2. H the Chinese are the kind of people that many claim, why are 
400,000,000 Chinese seemingly so impotent either to protect 
themselves against foreign aggression, or to work out their 
own destiny ? What is the matter with China ? 

3. What potentialities for a national life of high significance 
does China already have? What are the great weaknesses of 
China ? 

II. What hope is there that China can work out her own 

destiny? 

1. Does China's present lack of national cohesion and adminis- 
trative efficiency lead you to a pessimistic attitude of mind 
with reference to her ultimate national destiny? Why or why 
not? 

2. How far is China's present condition due to her age-long con- 
servatism, how far to inherent national and racial weakness, 
how far to the interference of foreign countries in her internal 
affairs and the attempts at exploitation by foreign governments ? 

3. It is claimed that China has made great progress in the last 
twenty years. What are the outstanding changes that have 
taken place? What are the indications that this progress will 
continue ? 

4. Do you feel that if China were guaranteed that Japan and 
other nations would not interfere she could establish a strong 
national government and work out her own national destiny? 
Why or why not ? 

5. Given a truly worthy internal development in China, would 

48 



CAN CHINA BE SAVED AS A NATION? 49 

her international position have to be asserted by force of arms, 
or could this be achieved by peaceable means? 

6. To what extent should President Wilson's principle of the 
self-determination of peoples hold for China, if she seems 
unable to achieve adequate self-determination? 

III. What is best for China and for the world? 

1. Which do you think would be preferable for China: a larger 
chance to work out her own destiny, Japanese suzerainty, 
division between the powers, or some form of international 
commission or mandatory government? 

2. Which of these would be preferable for the Far East in 
general, and for the peace and progress of the world ? 

REFERENCE MATERIAL 
China's Basal Lack 

China, with her old ordered life shattered and the foundations of a 
new order still unlaid, has discovered no stable government, largely 
because she has not bred, on a large scale, a reliable, powerful, and dis- 
interested leadership, and is in the grip of a smouldering civil war, so 
persistent as to seem to be almost endemic. 

Yet, if we look at China alone . . . we discover the greatest popula- 
tion in the world, a people with striking powers of endurance and con- 
stituting an inexhaustible reservoir of labor, with her ablest sons capable 
of a powerful leadership that is still largely undeveloped; a country 
having mineral resources of incalculable value and variety, with practi- 
cally every product needed for the support of the most advanced civiliza- 
tion, including, incidentally, enough coal of high quality to provide the 
whole world at its present rate of consumption for over a thousand years 
and, alongside the coal, vast and indeed incalculable stores of iron. This 
people which has already established its 7,000 miles of railway, its com- 
plete postal system, its ironworks whose products successfully compete 
with those of Pittsburg and Bethlehem, and its ramified wireless installa- 
tion, is bound to take a large part in directing the destinies of the future. 
Yet, at present, China has not "found" herself. She tosses rudderless 
and defenseless in the tempest of the world's unrest. "Surely never 
richer freight went derelict on the waters of time." — Basil Mathews, 
"Essays on Vocation," p. 6. 

China's Progress in Recent Years 

The cleavage point between the new and the old in China's awaken- 
ing was the disastrous war with Japan in 1894. Through that humilia- 



50 AMERICA'S STAKE IN THE FAR EAST 

tion, as by one flash of intelligence, China came to realize that she was 
hopelessly outclassed in efficiency. . . . 

The first step was throwing wide open the doors to foreign diplomacy 
and commerce. China joined the world. The next step was the institu- 
tion of Western science and education as the basis of her new life. This 
required a reconstruction of the educational system. The memorizing 
of the classics, a mechanical process with slight relation to character 
and none at all to practical efficiency, had been the backbone of her educa- 
tion for two thousand years. . . . All this was abolished at a stroke. . . . 
We find now a complete system of public schools, of primary, grammar, 
and high-school grades, with Western branches — geography, history, 
physics, and chemistry — taught alongside of proper Chinese subjects. 
Provincial universities for the districts and the University of Peking for 
the nation at large crown this admirable scheme. The last figures obtain- 
able show nearly 40,000 public schools, with an enrolment above 
1,000,000. . . . 

Transportation and commerce early demanded the attention of the 
new order. In the lack of capital, concessions were granted to foreign 
corporations, and railroad extension began with a rush. ... By such 
means the Government has been able to build up an excellent post-office 
system that reaches the leading cities and interior towns, and is proving 
of incalculable value as a binding element for the widely scattered 
districts and divergent populations. Factories are springing up at 
commercial centers, in which Western machinery is taking the place of 
hand labor. The public press has seen a remarkable development. . . . 
China contains the greatest coal deposits in the world. Iron and 
petroleum are abundant. It is, therefore, a highly favorable sign that 
stock companies are being formed akin to those in the West for the 
development of these and other natural resources. The Chinese are 
learning to trust one another. With such vast wealth under their feet 
they will not always remain in their present poverty and helplessness. 

The development of governmental institutions, like the army and 
navy, law courts, police protection, public sanitation, a trained diplomatic 
service, have been coincident with the growth of the democratic idea and 
the establishing of the republic in 191 1. Through all the vicissitudes 
of the new regime the great goal of a Westernized Orient has not been 
lost to sight. 

The greatest test of all has been China's willingness to give up the 
ancient customs which hampered her development. From the beginning 
of history conquerors of alien civilizations have been brought up standing 
when attempting to change the customs of the land. China has taken this 
matter into her own hands. . . . The voluntary abolition of the queue, 
first in the army, then among students, then in commercial centers, and 
now increasingly throughout the land, is a sufficient answer to those who 
would question the depth of China's purpose to become an integral part 



CAN CHINA BE SAVED AS A NATION? 51 

of the world. If anything else is needed, consider the prohibition of the 
opium traffic, which had been forced upon China by outside nations, but 
which she dealt with in a way peculiarly her own. With some 25,000,000 
people addicted to the foreign drug, the passing and enforcing of a 
prohibitory measure was a task from which the most centralized and 
favored nation might well shrink. Yet China cast out the evil thing with 
scarcely a ripple of excitement. . . . 

Taking it altogether, may it not be said that China has made almost 
as much progress in fifteen years as Japan made in half a century? 
When we consider that these changes have occurred among a people 
until a few years ago characterized as unresponsive, inert, and hopelessly 
conservative, regarding it a crime to attempt to improve upon the past, 
and holding the outside world in scorn, even the best historical parallels 
fail to impress. — Cornelius H. Patton, "World Facts and America's 
Responsibility," pp. 8-13. 

The permanent improvements which have been made in hundreds of 
Chinese cities during the past seven years, the roads built, the thousands 
of small and large industrial plants erected, the improvements in sanita- 
tion, the schools, colleges, and hospitals endowed and opened, the hills 
reforested, the mines developed, the newspapers established, and the 
remarkable growth of knowledge of foreign affairs during a period of 
unceasing political turmoil punctuated by a series of natural calamities 
and blanketed by a war-trade depression, are conspicuous evidences of 
wholesome progress and of a genuine interest among the people in im- 
provements and innovations. Although an administrative scandal in 
Peking is cabled to every Occidental capital while the erection of a new 
factory in Wuhu or of a new girls' school in Nanking is described locally 
in an inconspicuous paragraph, we all know, if we stop to consider, that 
the building of a school or a factory in the provinces is a much more 
significant omen of the tendencies of the Chinese people than a squabble 
within the mandarin ranks; but, with politics so blatantly conspicuous, 
it is exceedingly difficult to be just and fair to the people who have yet to 
make their influence felt upon the administrative systems which in 
no sense represent them. — North China Herald, July 13, 1918, p. 65. 

Struggling toward a Larger National Life 

Foreigners who pretend to be friends of the Chinese incessantly harp 
on the disturbances in China, saying that the country is in a state of 
anarchy, that the Chinese people are not fit for self-government, and 
that they must be placed under international tutelage. Arguments like 
these have been widely circulated by interested parties, whose sole aim 
is to see a weak China — one which will allow them to perpetuate their 
control and interference in the affairs of that country. The Chinese are 
now in the midst of a great transformation. Everyivhere the old order 



52 AMERICA'S STAKE IN THE FAR EAST 

is changing, giving place to new. The ancient ideas and hoary traditions 
and customs are being discarded and a new scheme of life that is foreign 
in origin is being gradually absorbed. Such a transition necessarily 
brings forth discord and dissension. For national transformation is 
fundamentally a struggle for advancement; it is a conflict between the 
new and the old ideals of a people, and the conflict will go on until a 
new system is evolved and incorporated into the life of the nation. 
Viewed in this way the various ills which have rendered China unsightly 
before the eyes of the foreigner are nothing but the natural outcome of 
the attempt to adjust a nation, that has for hundreds of years been 
isolated from the rest of the world, to the new environment created by the 
invasion of extraneous ideas and the introduction of Western culture. 

Although common to the history of every nation during its period 
of creative change, the internal disorders in China and the different 
complications that constitute what is known as "the Chinese Question" 
have suffered severe criticism at the hands of many a foreign writer. 
There is really no cause for discouragement at China's struggle for a 
reformed and stable central government. Rome was not built in a day. 
Neither can a modern democracy be instituted in eight years in a country 
which has had centuries of absolutism. It is to be borne in mind that 
those Latin-American republics, which today are stable and prosperous, 
were for many decades 'in a state of confusion and distress, and we must 
not forget that it took the long years between 1776 and 1865 for the great 
American nation to establish itself firmly. — Chong Su See, "The Foreign 
Trade of China," pp. 376, 377. 

The fitness of the Chinese for self-government and the possibility 
of China's becoming a united and constitutional state should not be 
questioned because eight years of confusion and lack of harmony have 
followed the proclamation of the republic. What government in Europe 
or America has not passed through initial stages of internal discord, 
marked by revolution, bitter parliamentary dissension, attempted secession 
of provinces, and civil war ? The assumption of superiority by the white 
man in creating and maintaining the machinery of government is unfair. 
If we compel non-European races to erect governments patterned after 
our own in order to escape from our political and economic yoke, should 
we not give them a little time before hailing with delight their incapacity 
for self-government? — Herbert Adams Gibbons, "The New Map of 
Asia," pp. 451, 452. 

The two conditions of all progress are steadfastness and mobility. 
Are not both these conditions met in the Chinese people. What people 
possess more steadfastness? Three centuries ago the Manchus over- 
threw the Chinese, but who really was overthrown? For those three 
centuries the Chinese kept the line of racial cleavage sharp and distinct, 
subtly drained away the energies of their conquerors, and now after two 



CAN CHINA BE SAVED AS A NATION? 53 

hundred and fifty years of steadfastness of purpose have broken the hated 
yoke. Where on earth is there any other nation with such abiding quali- 
ties of stability and endurance? And only those who are ignorant of 
Chinese history can think of the Chinese as impassive or immobile. No 
nation has ever been shaken by mightier upheavals, or responded more 
readily to new ideals, or shown a more unflinching will for moral change. 
— Robert E. Speer, International Review of Missions, April, 1916, p. 208, 

Waking Up or Just Turning Over? 

"The dormant giant is stirring; he will soon rise, shake himself, and 
call his tormentors to account." This is the sort of rhetoric which just 
now comes glibly from sanguine friends of the Celestial Republic. 
Among knowing ones in the Far East a quite different sentiment has 
been appreciatively savored : "China is not waking up : she's only turning 
over in her sleep." Somewhere between the seers and the cynics lies the 
truth; but who shall say at what distance from either extreme? . . . 

It must be owned that there are disconcerting features in present-day 
Chinese life. "The Chinese lavishes so much loyalty on family, com- 
munity, and province that he has none left for the nation," says a clever 
returned student at dinner. "The country is practically sold out now; 
no wonder the Peking politicians are getting what they can," declares 
another. "Oh, we always absorb any invaders in the course of two or 
three centuries," is the philosophic dictum of a serene spectator of his 
country's danger. In a company of intelligent, foreign-trained, young 
Chinese, some of them minor government officials, questions about the 
composition of the present legislative bodies, the qualifications of the 
electors, the number participating in the voting and the like, elicit amused 
replies or merely provoke gently ironic laughter. 

Certain things in China may well cause apprehension : the division 
between north and south, which are terms of political faith rather than 
of geography; large armies unpaid for months, living on the countryside 
and terrorizing iowns and cities ; bandits now and then committing depre- 
dations within a few miles of centers like Peking and Canton ; a govern- 
ment vacillating between the demands of militarists and fear of popular 
uprisings ; revenues needed for constructive national tasks diverted to the 
uses of clamorous generals or dissipated in administration inefficient or 
worse; the development of natural resources hindered by the lack of 
public order and security ; internal discord and weakness inviting aggres- 
sion from without. 

But when the worst has been said, there remain other aspects of 
China which are full of hope. One marvels that in spite of all the diffi- 
culties that have been mentioned the mighty current of Chinese life flows 
on steadily, calmly, irresistibly, for the most part in beds worn during the 
centuries but increasingly, too, in newly broken channels of innovation 



54 AMERICA'S STAKE IN THE FAR EAST 

and progress. China is typical of a distracted world. If attention be 
fixed solely upon the sorrow, disease, poverty, strife, bitterness, and 
suspicion of the present hour, it is well-nigh impossible to escape despair. 
But when one takes account of the persistent, normal, upbuilding influ- 
ences at work in the world, he takes heart again. So with China. There 
is a dark side, but there is also a bright and encouraging side. . . . 

The cynical may smile at the mention of the Republic; they may 
deride the senate and the lower house. The fact remains that the 
Manchus rule no longer. The forms of republican government may for 
the moment seem somewhat to mock the Chinese people, but these very 
forms and names mark a sharp and dramatic break with the old order. 
They serve as symbols of a new regime, suggesting modern ideas, and 
inviting to a fuller realization of them. The Chinese are not to be 
hurried too rapidly. They must be gradually inoculated with novel 
theories. They are becoming accustomed to the language of popular 
government; in time they may demand not only the rhetoric but the 
reality of republican institutions. 

As a matter of fact, the present government in Peking is by no 
means an irresponsible autocracy. Of late it has had to reckon with an 
organized and powerful public opinion, and unmistakable feeling of na- 
tionality. Under the leadership of the "students" — that is, not only school 
boys and girls and college graduates, but alumni as well — and organiza- 
tions of business men, a sense of national unity and of national danger has 
been astonishingly extended and deepened. A jealousy of encroach- 
ments from without, a suspicion that men in authority are disloyal to the 
country, a demand for international justice, a program of industrial 
autonomy have manifested themselves in striking ways. This national 
consciousness seems to have penetrated the remotest parts of the Republic. 
The "wiseacres" of the treaty ports admit that this is a novel phenom- 
enon. There may be something in the awaking giant idea after all. — 
George E, Vincent, American Review of Reviews, November, 1919, pp. 
515. 516, 518. 

China's Economic Problems 

The world is deeply interested in the awakening of China. It is 
difficult for a people who are accustomed to an environment of modern 
industrialism to appreciate the significance to the world at large of the 
transition of a population, equivalent to one-fifth of that of the earth or 
nearly that of the whole of Europe, from a medieval civilization to one 
which will bring it into tune with what the West has given the world 
during the past century in scientific, industrial, and social developments. 
The changes which the Chinese people will experience during the next 
few decades are so stupendous in their significance to themselves and to 
the world at large that we can have no conception of their immensity. 



CAN CHINA BE SAVED AS A NATION? 55 

China is about to recruit a vast army of men and women soon to 
pass from the household and field to the modern factory. Probably eighty 
per cent of its population is still agricultural, and a somewhat larger 
percentage of the industry is of the domestic, handicraft character, but the 
inrush of modern ideas, modern materials, and modern organization is 
coming so rapidly that China's society is soon to be overwhelmed by it. 

With a country larger in area than the United States, marvelously 
wealthy in natural resources and possessing a population of industrious, 
democratic, peaceful, good-natured peoples, with the potentialities men- 
tally and physically of any other race, with a rich culture which has 
filtered down through the entire mass, the resultant of the four or 
five thousands of years of their civilization, and on a continent which 
can claim fifty-one per cent of the earth's inhabitants, China has a 
wonderful future in the modern economic world. Its people are gifted 
with a mechanical instinct, are quick to learn, and, given the advantages 
of modern popular education and an effective modern governmental 
administration which they are capable of developing, there are no limita- 
tions to their possibilities. There is no caste among the people. Gener- 
ally speaking, the only difference between one Chinese and another is 
difference in opportunity. One shudders as he looks out over the horizon 
of the new era in China and realizes the gravity of the problems which 
confront these people in their transition from their past secluded, simple, 
pastoral laissez-faire existence to the modern, highly organized industrial 
society, rendered many fold more complex by its relations with the out- 
side world, more especially with those of its neighbors. 

The fact that the nation and the communities have not as yet enacted 
factory legislation, made provisions for sanitation in connection with 
their civic and industrial life, or developed a body of corporate law, 
indicates the tardiness of the country in modern industrialism. Are the 
four hundred millions of China doomed to struggle through the same ex- 
periences in their adjustments and in the relationships between labor 
and capital as have marked the progress of Western society ; or will their 
people profit by what the West has learned and build their social structure 
upon a sounder foundation because of this knowledge? . . . 

Not only is China confronted with adjusting itself to modern in- 
dustrialism . . . but it has an equally great problem in that of modern 
transportation. At present six-sevenths of China's population is con- 
centrated in one-third its area — that of the south and east, which is rich 
in waterways, although there are hundreds of thousands of acres of fertile 
lands in the north and west dependent upon land transportation still to be 
opened to development. Huge areas in west China, though fairly well 
populated, are cut off from economic communication with the outside 
world because of lack of railways. There are also, in Central Asia and 
Siberia, empires rich in virgin resources still to be colonized and opened 
to modern development. Railways carry with them protection. De- 



56 AMERICA'S STAKE IN THE FAR EAST 

velopment will follow in their wake even without efifort on the part of 
the Government. We have only to witness the signal success of Chinese 
settlers in the Philippines, Java, the Straits Settlements, and other sec- 
tions where transportation facilities have made it possible for them to 
settle, to appreciate the ease with which Chinese populations flow into 
areas where colonization is made possible. In a sense, China's problems 
all center about that of transportation. Give the country the railways 
needed to bring all sections into connection with the sea and give it access 
to Central Asia, provided that we do so without involving the country in 
grave political complications with other powers, and that it can be done 
for the welfare of the Chinese people, which in the broader sense will be 
for the welfare of others as well — and we shall witness an economic 
transformation following therefrom which will astound the world in 
the immensity of its proportions. Industry, agriculture, and commerce 
may all be revolutionized with the solution of China's great transportation 
problem, and a new economic order prevail, but this new order will bring 
with it new problems, affecting all phases of the life of the people. — 
Julean Arnold, Chinese Recorder, August, 1919, p. 517. 

There will be no hasty transformation of scene in China, which 
would be as disastrous to her as an over-investment of capital. China's 
hope lies not in a sudden revolutionary destruction of the old order, but in 
slow, steady growth, by educative processes, which shall enable the nation 
to adapt itself gradually to its changed environment. Only in a very 
small degree have the Chinese begun to realize the idea of nationality, 
of a central government, of a uniform legal system, and of taxation as 
distinguished from tribute and official perquisites. Left now to work out 
her own salvation on these and other lines, China's progress would be 
painfully slow and surely harmful to foreign interests: therefore the 
necessity of a mild and friendly form of international finaacial "control," 
at least in such matters as affect the foreigner directly. — T. W. Overlach, 
"Foreign Financial Control in China," p. 279. 

Ignorance and Dishonest Officialdom in China 

China has given during the year [1919] a very striking demonstra- 
tion of a quality which it had been generally supposed her people did 
not possess — the spirit of national patriotism. The protest which was 
evoked throughout the land by the action of the Peace Conference, in 
regard to the transfer of the rights previously possessed by Germany 
under the treaty of Kiaochow, exhibited a unanimity and a depth of 
feeling entirely new in the Chinese treatment of the relations of the 
Central Government with foreign powers. It would be too much to say 
that the old provincial point of view is a thing of the past ; but it marks 
an enormous advance toward a pervasive national consciousness to have 
a question like this of Shantung plainly affect all classes of the population 



CAN CHINA BE SAVED AS A NATION? 57 

and form the occasion of demonstrations by students and merchants, 
which fulfilled the purpose of driving certain obnoxious high function- 
aries from office. The students have shown themselves to be a power 
with which the Government must reckon, and if that power is to be 
exerted in the right way it may regenerate their country. 

It must be admitted that in the attitude of the foreign-educated 
students toward the vital problems now facing China there is an absence 
of practical political sense. Their spokesmen are greatly addicted to the 
use of the catchwords of the Western defenders of popular freedom, quite 
ignoring the two great problems that have to be solved before China can 
be judged capable of self-government — .the rescue from the darkness of 
ignorance of the underlying mass of the population, and the acquirement 
by all grades of the office-holding class of respect for the standards of 
public honesty accepted by other great nations. Young China seems to 
be fully awake to the necessity for public education, but in none of 
its manifestos can there be found any reference to the crying need of 
common honesty in high places. In an appeal for Western sympathy 
issued by one of the Chinese plenipotentiaries at the Peace Conference, 
stress is laid on the ardent desire of the people of China to retain the 
republican form of government, but the fact is ignored that the chief 
danger to the established political order is to be found in the militarist 
Tuchunate,* whose arrogant dictation renders the nominal existence of 
free institutions a farce. When the Chinese intelligentsia have succeeded 
in freeing their country from this incubus, they will have a better chance 
to command attention for questions which they have lately been dragging 
into the forum of discussion, such as the abolition of spheres of foreign 
influence, the surrender of extraterritoriality, and the attainment of tariff 
autonomy.— John_Foordj_/||ia,^I^?C(^^ 

The Place of Chinese Christian Women in the Development o£ 
China 

Let us say it with all due reverence and humility : Chinese Christian 
womanhood will be the most potent factor in the regeneration of China. 
. . . The hope of China lies in the spread and growth of Christianity in 
this country. Who can promote this growth better than the Christian 
women of China? Theirs will be not only "the hand that rocks the 
cradle," but the mind to direct young China on its way, and the soul 
which shall enable adult China to cling to its way along the narrow path 
of righteousness and truth. China cannot develop without sweeping away 
all that is wrong and false, and who can do this clearing better than the 
Christian women? Theirs will be the hand to raise a high standard, 
theirs to demand a cleaner record, and a sterner probity in all strata of 
society. Theirs will be the voice to negative the debasing practice of 

^ Military governorship. 



58 AMERICA'S STAKE IN THE FAR EAST 

concubinage, theirs to claim freedom from the subtle bondage of an- 
cestral worship and the demoralizing vices of gambling and opium smok- 
ing. Ultimately theirs will be the vote to decide whether China shall be 
democratic in name or in truth. There is nothing boastful in these state- 
ments. All who are familiar with Chinese history know that, compared 
with other heathen countries, her women are held in higher esteem and 
consideration. Christianity alone can crown her and give her an equal 
share in the home and nation, and it is the Christian women who must 
come forward and assist in the development of the country. 

Already in thousands of Christian homes they are laying the founda- 
tion of a more Christ-like character in the lives of children, and these 
little ones will become the pillars of state. Unlike the students of old 
they are willing to work with their hands as well as with their minds, 
and the double toil will enable them so much the more, so that the results 
of their labor will be the production of a new race, not effeminate 
but strong and masterful and capable of accomplishing all that is required 
of them whether in the home or state. Their spiritual welfare will be 
fostered also by these same Christian mothers. Thus grace of mind will 
be enhanced by the moral beauty of the soul. A true race of patriots 
will arise who will scorn self-seeking and by the integrity of their lives 
prove that Christianity has the power to save men whether white or 
yellow. Japan then will not be able to coerce China, when the Christian 
element will be strong enough to crush traitors. — Ida Kahn, M.D., 
Chinese Recorder, October, 1919, pp. 659, 660. 

Christianity and the Leveling Up of Life 

The whole point is that, if the four hundred millions of Chinese 
people are to be forced to fight for their own existence and to get hold 
for themselves of the "strong mailed fist," there will be a terrible war 
between the white peoples and the Chinese. But the Chinese do not be- 
lieve in war; the Chinese believe in moral forces to build up a civilization 
of a high order. We believe in what Sir Douglas Haig said — the leveling 
up of the whole social life. The growth of China from a small state of 
three or four million square miles of territory has been created through 
moral forces. It was a process of leveling up the surrounding tribes and 
people. Our literature, our philosophy, and our idealism have gone with 
us and, as it were, converted the surrounding tribes. 

Coming into contact now, however, with a Christian civilization, we 
find a higher order still of idealism based on a conception of mutual 
service. If the Western people now will endeavor to help China in 
her transition from the old order into the new order, through the 
process of leveling up instead of leveling down, then the world will 
have an assurance of peace and the League of Nations will become a 
reality. We younger men in China are doing our best to convince China 



CAN CHINA BE SAVED AS A NATION? 59 

to go against militarism and to develop on democratic lines. We are 
firmly convinced that our cherished idealism, our belief that war is a 
curse, is correct; that the nations can adjust their differences through a 
right conception of the relation between nation and nation, and through 
the supremacy of international law over violence and physical force. 
In our effort to establish a true democracy in China we are convinced 
that an effective way of realizing our objective is to bring Christianity 
to the Chinese people. — Dr. C. T. Wang, Chinese Peace Commissioner, 
in an interview with the representative of the Westminster Gazette as 
quoted in the London and China Express of May 22, 1919, and in the 
Chinese Recorder, August, 1919, p. 512. 

The Only Hope 

The only hope for the future of the world lies in the universal 
recognition and application of those ideas of international order, justice, 
and brotherhood which Christ proclaimed, and of which the foreign 
missionary enterprise is the organized expression. All other ties 
snapped in the war. Science, philosophy, education, commerce — each 
and all failed to hold the world together. Labor and socialism came 
nearer than any of them to maintaining a kind of unity; but they, too, 
were soon rent apart. The home churches were as widely sundered as 
other interests. Foreign missions alone preserved the international idea. 
... No political adjustments between governments can create enduring 
peace unless they rest upon a foundation of righteousness and good will ; 
and these are precisely the foundations which the missionary enterprise is 
laying. Treaties are no stronger than the moral character of the peoples 
that make them, and missionary work makes moral character. . , . The 
special service that foreign missions can render in rightly influencing the 
pressing world problems in eastern Asia was well expressed by Viscount 
James Bryce, when he said that the jarring contact of many nations in 
the Far East today imperatively calls for the strengthening of foreign 
missionary work, ^ which, he declared, must be the chief influence in 
smoothing that contact, in allaying irritation, and in creating those con- 
ditions of international good will which are essential to the preservation 
of world peace; and he added: "The one sure hope of a permanent 
foundation for world peace lies in the extension throughout the world of 
the principles of the Christian Gospel."— Arthur J. Brown, "The Mastery 
of the Far East," pp. 485, 486. 



CHAPTER VI 

HOW MUCH HAS CHINA A RIGHT TO 
EXPECT OF AMERICA? 

I. Has America really been a friend to China? 

1. Some say America has proved untrue to China and deserted 
her in the Peace Conference in allowing Shantung to go to 
Japan. What do you think about it? 

2. What things has America done in the past that showed her to 
be a friend of China ; what things has she done that would make 
China doubtful of this friendship ? 

3. Why has America shown herself friendly to China? How 
far has America followed her policy from altruistic motives, and 
how far because she considered it good national life insurance ? 

4. Why has China looked to the United States for continued 
friendship? Why does China today set such a high estimate 
on the friendship of the United States ? 

II. Just how far is the integrity and development of China 

essential to the welfare of all the nations on the Pacific? 

1. If China should fail in her attempt to establish a republic, 
and should be taken over by Japan, or be divided between the 
powers, in what ways, if at all, would this have an unfavorable 
effect upon the United States ? 

2. What effect would the break-up of China have upon the 
danger of war over Far-Eastern matters ? Would or would not 
the United States be likely to be involved in such a war ? 

III. What, if anything, should America do to help save China 
as a nation? 

1. To what extent is America morally obligated to stand by 
China in this time of crisis? How far would she be justified 
in going to prevent Japanese or other foreign aggression and to 
help China work out her own destiny? 

2. If China is given a chance to work out her own destiny, what 
do you feel that America could do to help her make good ? 

3. Appraise honestly the relative value in fending off foreign 

60 



CHINA'S EXPECTATIONS FROM AMERICA? 6i 

aggression and in guaranteeing China's integrity of diplomatic 
help ; loans to the Government and for private enterprises ; pro- 
viding for the education in America of potential Chinese 
leaders; and increase of missionary work. 

4. How far should America go? Suppose it involved sacrifice 
and disadvantage to the United States, would you or would you 
not vote for our undertaking the responsibility? 

5. If China proves unable to work out her own destiny without 
foreign intervention of some kind, just what processes of 
friendly helpfulness from America do you feel would do most 
to hasten the commercial, industrial, intellectual, and moral 
stabilizing of Chinese life, so that at the earliest hour possible 
the Chinese people might again assume full control of their own 
national affairs ? Consider this question from the point of view 
of your own appraisal of the assets of American life and char- 
acter which might be mobilized for these purposes and also take 
into consideration the attitude, so far as you can judge it, of the 
Chinese towards various methods of helpfulness which have 
already been tried or which might be proposed. 

REFERENCE MATERIAL 
The Failure of Justice to China at Versailles 

That in some way China has come out of the recent war settlement 
with less of consideration as a disorganized nation, and less of justice as 
a fellow-member of the world fraternity, is generally conceded. As to 
the placing of the blame therefor, wide and conscientious differences of 
opinion exist. Some would go back to Germany, some would charge it 
all up to Japan, others find the cause in American diplomatic weakness, 
still others lay it to certain treaties, as to which there is again difference 
of opinion as to whether they should have been made, yet since they have 
come into existence many conscientiously feel that honor is involved in 
their being kept. Yet others would blame a certain section of the Chinese 
people for involving their country, through treaties and loans. We can- 
not claim to know all the ramifications of the situation. In part what has 
happened is due to general failure on the part of all concerned to live up 
fully to the ideals of the "Fourteen Points." There has been, however, 
a persistent note in recent books and articles coming from many quarters, 
that justice has not been done to China. Whether this mistake must be 
undone by an "act of grace" on the part of Japan, by concerted action by 
all the Powers, or by the League of Nations, is a problem we are unable 
even to attempt to solve. Yet inasmuch as commerce is now the greatest 
"political interest," and Christianity has so much political significance 
that the "powers that be" talk of curbing its activity, and we believe. 



62 AMERICA'S STAKE IN THE FAR EAST 

furthermore, that even politics could and ought to be Christian, we cannot 
keep quiet ! We sympathize with the very natural resentment of the 
Chinese people at the way their territory is assigned to others. We 
believe that justice should be done, and that against this, as well as all 
other injustice, the Christian Church needs prophets to protest. There is 
a real danger that to patriotic Chinese the Christian nations will seem 
to acquiesce in this unjust action. A way must be found to undo this 
injustice. China seems to lack a friend disinterested enough to try 
first of all to secure for her justice. — Editorial, Chinese Recorder, 
October, 1919, pp. 650, 651. 

In the discussion and solution of no problem before the Conference 
of Paris were the insincerity and bad faith of the great powers more 
apparent than in the disposition of the Shangtung question. The facts of 
history were distorted. The principles for which the Entente powers and 
the United States declared they had fought were ignored. The powers 
showed their inability to rise to the high level of international morality 
essential for tTie creation of a society of nations. Instead of trying to 
lay the foundations of a durable peace in the Far East, the statesmen of 
the Entente powers and the United States decided for the continuation of 
a policy that has provoked several wars and given rise to injustice and 
oppression. For the European powers and Japan, the solution proposed 
for the Shangtung question was the holding fast to traditions and prac- 
tices of the past. For the United States, it was the abandonment by our 
Government of the idealism and disinterestedness that for more than 
half a century have characterized American diplomacy in the Far East. 

The solution of the Shangtung question incorporated in the treaty 
dictated to Germany is the triumph of the policy of economic exploitation 
through political blackmail, against which John Hay and his predecessors 
in the American State Department struggled with skill and a large 
measure of success. — Herbert Adams Gibbons, "The New Map of 
Asia, 1900-1919," pp. 285, 286. 

American Friendship for China 

The "open door" of the twentieth century is in all essential respects 
the same objective that was desired by our countrymen who first sailed 
around the Cape to compete in a world market without expectation of 
support from naval forces behind them. 

In the hundred years since that intercourse began we have refused 
to yield to the temptation presented by military weakness unexpectedly 
exposed. We have steadily refrained from coercing a helpless people 
ourselves, though we have not denied to others their right to defend 
their commercial and political interests by stern measures, nor have 
we shown any quixotic reluctance to reap from these measures the bene- 
fits that accrued to all. We have accepted no cessions of territory, even 



CHINA'S EXPECTATIONS FROM AMERICA? 63 

at the treaty ports. We have never menaced the territorial integrity of 
China and have been among the foremost in upholding her sovereign 
right to her own soil. However fatuous and unfair our treatment of 
Chinese in America, it cannot be denied that we have endeavored to treat 
the Chinese Empire as honorably as other countries and have consistently 
desired to include men of every race and color in the great family of 
nations, so soon as they could prove their birthright by the plain tests of 
morality and culture. And, finally, we have declined at all times to force 
upon an unwilling people our scientific and economic methods of industry 
or transportation, or to take possession of their affairs in the proud and 
selfish conviction that we could manage them better than they could 
themselves. In policy, if not always in performance, America in her 
relations with China has tried fairly to maintain the high ideals of a 
Christian nation. 

The chief blemish in the conduct of American relations with China 
is, of course, our treatment of her subjects in the United States. I have 
no excuse or palliation to ofiFer for conduct in which our national honor 
has been compromised for the sake of a group of unscrupulous politicians 
in the Pacific coast states, but it is at the same time true that to our 
previous fairness toward China has been due her patience under indig- 
nities received at our hands. Unhappily for our own credit, it is now 
evident that, as a people, we spoiled our case with China by mere blunder- 
ing. Had political societies and state legislatures been sufficiently 
far-sighted to restrain their impatience in the presence of a supposed 
menace of invasion by Chinese workmen, it would at any moment have 
been possible to adjust the matter of Chinese immigration with the Gov- 
ernment in Peking. As it was, we placed ourselves in the wrong, 
violating our treaty stipulations while insisting that China should fulfill 
hers. In spite, nevertheless, of just causes for resentment the Chinese 
authorities, mindful of past mercies, have acquitted themselves with 
decorum and conceded to us the further restrictions demanded of them. 
Their conduct is a^ notable instance of the political value of long-continued 
friendly relations when unexpected circumstances may suddenly threaten 
to overturn them. — Dr. F. W. Williams, "China and the Far East," 
Clark University Lectures, pp. 82, 70. 

American Altruism in the Treatment o£ China 

I imagine the British Government stating its case [in regard to the 
Hay Doctrine of the "Open Door" in China], confidentially, something 
like this : "You Americans want to keep the door open in China, so that 
your commerce and your finance can enter on equal terms. You also 
want to maintain the integrity and autonomy of China. You have moral 
grounds for this — ^justice and humanity and the integrity of treaties, and 
all that — and we will give you credit for a reasonable amount of genuine 



64 AMERICA'S STAKE IN THE FAR EAST 

altruism ; your national record entitles you to that. But deeper than that, 
you begin to see that there in time may be an Oriental peril for you. You 
have seen within a few years a small Oriental nation rise to be a for- 
midable power by learning and applying Western military science; from 
that you reason that if this method and disposition are communicated to 
the whole of eastern Asia, and that region becomes consolidated under 
one arrogant and aggressive and predatory government, then you had 
better look out lest the weight of that impact will be thrown against your 
country, and your institutions, and your standards of life." — Thomas F. 
Millard, "Our Eastern Question," pp. 377, 378. 

Just as by the Monroe Doctrine we seek to prevent European powers 
from conquering, colonizing, and dividing up America, so in China, our 
interest, apart from a share of the trade and investment chances, lies in 
contributing to the world's peace by removing that vast territory from the 
field of international political competition. What we should mean by 
"the open door" in China is the integrity of that country and its immunity 
from conquest, partition, and forced exploitation. The plea of an "open 
door" as a mere tariff policy comes with ill grace from us, who have 
closed the door both in i'orto Rico and at home, but China's integrity is 
an issue of a different character. It is important to us not so much for 
immediate economic reasons as because it is likely to promote peace. 
It is a world, rather than a national, interest. 

Because it is a world interest, it should be secured by the efforts of 
many nations and not by the United States alone. — Walter E. Weyl, 
"American World Policies," pp. 213-215. 

The Friendship of China for America 

Of the friendship of China for America today there can be no ques- 
tion. The Chinese look to the United States as a relatively disinterested 
nation that has the desire and the power to secure for them freedom and 
fair play. There is something pathetic in this faith. Surely, they say, 
the country that declined to accept an indemnity, that never seized any 
Chinese territory, that has sent thousands of men and women to do un- 
selfish deeds of mercy and benevolence, that has fought in a world war 
in behalf of self-government and of justice among nations, will not fail 
a people who are seeking to realize for themselves American ideals of 
representative government and of national independence and dignity. 

The embarrassment which such an appeal involves is obvious. The 
situation in the Far East is complex, difficult, almost baffling. It contains 
perhaps the germs of another mighty conflict. To fix sole responsibility 
upon any one nation is unfair and futile. It is a world problem, the solu- 
tion of which demands magnanimity and sacrifice by all the interests 
concerned. The Chinese look to the United States as the one power 
that can assume the leadership in a statesmanlike attempt to find a 



CHINA'S EXPECTATIONS FROM AMERICA? 65 

solution which will substitute for independent aggressions and dangerous 
rivalries a cooperation in guaranteeing the integrity of the Republic, and 
in helping to develop its resources, physical and social, for its sake and 
for the welfare of the world. In all this is China awake or only dream- 
ing? — George E. Vincent, American Review of Reviews, November, 19 19, 
p. 518. 

Complexities in Applying the Open-Door Principle 

Though at first sight political, and fought by diplomacy, the struggle 
for foreign control in China was not less one of international financial in- 
terests, contending for the exploitation of new opportunities for invest- 
ment. Foreign capital was attracted by the great profits to be gained 
from the impending industrial revolution of China. In order to eliminate 
financial competition of other nations or to counteract political moves on 
the part of other governments if such were destined to be harmful to its 
own expansion, foreign finance often solicited, and freely received, 
diplomatic protection. With a protection and promotion of foreign enter- 
prise several governments combined the furtherance of national ambitions 
of a more or less political character. All banks and syndicates in charge 
of the railways and loans became more and more generally recognized 
as indispensable means to the political and commercial ends of their 
respective governments. The struggle for foreign control in China has 
accordingly been marked by a most singular and distinguishing feature, 
namely, the closest possible cooperation between foreign finance and 
foreign policy. The period was one of "conquest by railroad and bank." 

The tenacious determination on the part of several powers to control 
their respective spheres to the greatest possible exclusion of their com- 
petitors tended to prejudice not only China's integrity but also the full 
and free enjoyment of the treaty rights of others. Though protesting 
vehemently and professing adherence to the "open-door" doctrine, nations 
nevertheless viewed with jealousy the preserves seized by others. They 
were driven to bitter diplomatic strife over each new prospective "sphere." 
In short, the tremendous pressure of modern imperialism coupled with 
modern capitalistic enterprise was, in China as elsewhere on earth, a 
constant menace to peace. . . . For China will unquestionably become 
once more one of the principal centers of world politics, in which Great 
Britain, Russia, France, Germany, Japan, and the United States are 
concerned. — T. W. Overlach, "Foreign Financial Control in China," 
pp. i-iii. 

Foreign Control of Railroad Development in China 

The extent of foreign conquest in China with railway development 
as a weapon needs special attention. . . . About 14,000 miles of railway 
are to be constructed in China by foreign capital, and wherever the rail- 



66 AMERICA'S STAKE IN THE FAR EAST 

way extends there will follow the governments of foreign powers, creat- 
ing spheres of influence. It certainly looks sinister and monstrous that 
this network of railways, instead of consolidating the industrial and com- 
mercial life of China, merely proceeds to or from the centers of the 
"spheres of influence" through the very heart of China, for the military, 
and political consolidation of the nations concerned. — Setsuo Uenoda, 
Asia, December, 1919, p. 1215. 

Substance o£ the Lansing-Ishii Agreement of November 2, 1917 

The Governments of the United States and Japan recognize that 
territorial propinquity creates special relations between countries, and, 
consequently, the Government of the United States recognizes that Japan 
has special interests in China, particularly in the part to which her 
possessions are contiguous. 

The territorial sovereignty of China, nevertheless, remains unim- 
paired, and the Government of the United States has every confidence in 
the repeated assurance of the Imperial Japanese Government that, while 
geographical position gives Japan such special interests, they have no 
desire to discriminate against the trade of other nations or to disregard 
the commercial rights heretofore granted by China in treaties with other 
powers. 

The Governments of the United States and Japan deny that they 
have any purpose to infringe in any way the independence or territorial 
integrity of China, and they declare, furthermore, that they always adhere 
to the principle of the so-called "open door," or equal opportunity for 
commerce and industry in China. 

Moreover, they mutually declare that they are opposed to the acquisi- 
tion by any government of any special rights or privileges that would 
affect the independence or territorial integrity of China, or that would 
deny to the subjects or citizens of any country the full enjoyment of equal 
opportunity in the commerce and industry of China. — Henry Chung, "The 
Oriental Policy of the United States," pp. 290, 291. 

"Territorial Propinquity" Pushed to Its Logical Conclusion 

The essential point that makes this declaration [the Lansing-Ishii 
Note] different from the notes exchanged between America and Japan in 
1919 is that the former now recognizes the special interests of the latter 
in China, especially in regions to which the possessions of Japan are 
contiguous. It is obvious, however, that all states whose territories are 
adjoining have mutual interests, such as the control of the cross-frontier 
traffic and the enforcement of rules of sanitation. A mutual protection 
of these interests by the states concerned is a condition of their normal 
life and needs no recognition by a third power who is separated from 



CHINA'S EXPECTATIONS FROM AMERICA? 67 

either of them by a vast ocean. Moreover, if Japan has special interests 
in China, China has equally special interests in Japan, and a recognition 
of these interests should be extended to one of these two states as much 
as to the other. The note under our consideration, however, takes no 
notice of this mutual right: it says nothing of the special interests of 
China in Japan, while it grants recognition to the special interests of 
Japan in China. The explanation of this unilateral arrangement is found 
in the fact that neither America nor Japan meant by "special interests 
created by territorial propinquity" those interests that I have just men- 
tioned — interests arising from adjacent or conterminous boundaries — but 
those acquired by Japan, not because of the accidents of territorial con- 
tiguity, but because of her deliberate and aggressive policy of encroaching 
upon the territorial rights of China. Such are her interests in Man- 
churia, in Mongolia, in Shantung, and in Fukien. On the surface of it, 
the recognition of these interests by the United States is unfortunate 
because most of them are only granted by China under duress, and it is 
hoped that they will be taken away from the hands of Japan as soon as 
the Western powers have time to redress the injustice inflicted on China 
by her neighbor, who has taken advantage of their preoccupation in the 
war. 

The term "special interests" is exceedingly vague, and it is not clear 
whether it is confined to those already obtained by Japan or can be 
extended to those that may be acquired by her in the future. Should it 
happen that Japan, in pursuance of her policy of expansion, exacts from 
China further territorial and economic acquisitions in regions contiguous 
to her leased territory or where her economic interests are already 
strong, would the Government of the United States be obliged to recog- 
nize her claims and support her demands ? Such a recognition or support 
would not only reverse the friendly attitude which has characterized its 
diplomacy towards China, but would also be inconsistent with the noble 
ideals of right and justice so loudly pronounced by President Wilson. 
Moreover, there is almost no limit to the rights and interests Japan 
might claim under the phrase "territorial propinquity." The different 
islands that constitute the Japanese Empire stretch for a distance of 
twenty-eight degrees of latitude and are situated in a curved line parallel 
to the coast of China. Should she enforce her claims to the full extent, 
Japan might assert that the United States should recognize her special 
interests in all the coastal provinces of China — from Manchuria to 
Canton. In time, she would be able to control the greater part of China, 
as it has been her intention to do. Such a condition would be destructive 
of the principle of the "open door" and equal opportunity for the com- 
merce of all nations. The only thing that has hitherto reconciled that 
principle with the possession of spheres of influence by different powers 
is that, in all these spheres and in leased territories, the same tariff rates 
should be enforced as in any other part of China, and the most favorable 



68 AMERICA'S STAKE IN THE FAR EAST 

treatment should be accorded to the subjects of all states. The experi- 
ence in South Manchuria has, however, shown that, irrespective of what 
the treaties and laws may provide, Japan will always grant greater 
facilities to her own merchants in the spheres under her control than to 
those of other nationalities. This should have been taken into account 
by the United States Government when it exchanged the new note with 
Japan. — Sih-Gung Cheng, "Modern China," pp. 295-297. 

The Weakness of China Will Trouble the World 

Is anything gained for the world's permanent peace by the prospect 
of a conquered or disintegrated China? Only the blindness which does 
not see beyond the immediate present can feel anything but sorrow if 
China is on the road to chaos. For the trouble being prepared ty the 
weakness of China will trouble the world. It will haunt its peace. And 
no clairvoyance is needed to prophesy that if China is unable to stand 
on its feet and assume control of its own affairs, innocent people the world 
over will pay taxes for armaments, and those who are boys today will 
perish on distant battlefields. This is no scaremongering. The Chinese 
are almost a quarter of the human race. Let them sink into helpless 
disorder, thwart them, oppress them, and they will become to the world 
what Turkey and the Balkan states have been to Europe — a running sore 
which infects everyone. 

How irrelevant to such a problem is the doctrine preached by the 
ordinary pacifist — as if not fighting were a policy which touched even the 
fringes of this problem, so gigantic that it darkens the thought of anyone 
who looks into the future. For of all the stakes ever offered to diplomacy 
China is the richest and largest. If comparatively insignificant territories 
like Morocco and Bosnia can bring the world to the edge of war, what 
lusts of imperialism will a helpless China arouse? — Walter Lippmann, 
"The Stakes of Diplomacy," pp. 224-226. 

American Obligation to China 

Between ourselves and China there exist mutual confidence and 
reciprocal good will. This is a practical as well as a moral asset. But, 
in addition to and beyond this, there is needed something more. We have 
pleaded for the respecting of China's integrity. We do not believe in 
the policy of partitioning or absorbing China. We profess to believe in 
China's powers of regeneration. We deprecate international aggressions. 
But what do we do when evidences of policies which run counter to 
these principles are laid before us? 

Any upsetting of the political status quo in the Far East becomes 
a menace to our interests, along with those of other nations. China is 
pledged to the equal treatment of all nations, the nations are pledged not 



CHINA'S EXPECTATIONS FROM AMERICA? 69 

to establish inequalities against each other in China's markets, and all 
nations have the right to equal opportunities. It was special concessions 
demanded and received from China by particular nations that led to the 
scramble for concessions which marked the years 1895-1898, which led in 
turn, indirectly, to the Boxer uprising. The Chinese people are now 
developing a national patriotism ; they are beginning to know something 
of international affairs ; they have become alarmed at the menace of sub- 
jugation which threatens them. This means that they will not be ready 
to endure patiently any considerable invasion as a result of concessions 
which have recently been required of them. To prevent the establishing 
of inequalities, to insure against the partition of China, to save China 
herself from internal disturbances, and to guard against some new form 
of anti-foreign agitation which may affect all foreign nations alike 
injuriously, should not every nation which is in a position to do so exert 
itself to restrain any other whose policies appear likely to induce some or 
all of these undesirable consequences ? 

The Chinese look to the United States to exercise a positive and 
helpful influence in the solution of their problems of reconstruction. The 
American Government in its official advocacy of the open-door policy 
assumed a position of responsibility — responsibility towards the interests 
of every power and every people concerned. This responsibility makes 
imperative something more than mere reiterated protestations of friendly 
interest. It calls for most careful consideration, and substantial, con- 
structive political and economic effort. 

Finally, and quite independently of immediate expectations or obliga- 
tions, it must be recognized that the United States is a world power, 
destined increasingly to participate in world commerce and world politics. 
The fate of peoples, the disposition of territories, and the determination 
of commercial policies in the Far East are bound to be of enormous conse- 
quence in world affairs. What occurs in the Pacific will have its effects 
upon the activities and policies of the major nations everywhere. The 
people of the Ignited States already have large social and considerable 
commercial interests in the Pacific. They are entitled to increase, and 
in the natural course of events undoubtedly will increase, their activities 
in these lines. We should endeavor in the present to safeguard the 
opportunities of the future. We should ask for nothing but what is just, 
giving due consideration to the rights and needs of all, demanding no 
special privileges for ourselves; but we should, on behalf of our own 
interests and of the cause of peace, frame our policies and practices 
with a view to the defense of the principles upon which we, along with 
the other powers, have agreed. 

The international problems of the Far East are world problems. As 
such, they merit and demand the attention of every nation which has a 
world outlook and world interests. — Stanley K. Hornbeck, "Contemporary 
Politics in the Far East," pp. 401-403. 



70 AMERICA'S STAKE IN THE FAR EAST 

A Mandate to Christian Institutions 

The movements in China are like the currents in a wide, deep sea. 
The instruments to measure them have not yet been made — it may be 
doubted whether they have yet been invented. Here is antiquity in the 
mass. Here is pride of intellect — a pride slowly crystallizing through the 
centuries, but now rudely shocked by revelations of the nation's sluggish 
response to aggression, and its incompetence in clearing the highways of 
its own destiny. Its keener self-respect is wounded by the realization of 
the corruption of its leaders. Suddenly from its slow indifference comes 
the students' strike. It is like the flash of a blade so long resting in its 
scabbard that men had guessed that there was scabbard and no blade. 
The new protest against corruption issues from the schools — many of 
them the mission schools and the national schools — for which the Chris- 
tian institutions have set the type. Over large sections of China reaches 
the curse of banditry. The exactions of fear exhaust the resources of the 
people and paralyze industry. It impresses one as sheer lawlessness. 
There is in it also protest. At times it is not far from patriotism — 
misguided but genuine. In Foochow the stage is set for another Shan- 
tung. We may not venture to adjudge the guilt in the clash of interests 
and arms, but the challenge of China, to the neighbor nation whom she 
fears, to show cause rings with a note with which Celt and Anglo-Saxon 
are not unfamiliar. The year which has brought this huge, old nation 
into the very center of the world's thought and diplomacy has confirmed 
the long cherished conviction of leaders . . . that to the Christian school, 
with the Christian Church, has been given the mandate for China's rescue 
and reconstruction. — Extract from Report of Dr. Frank Mason North 
to the Annual Meeting of the Board of Foreign Missions of the Methodist 
Episcopal Church, New York, December 5, 1919. 

What Missionaries Have Done for China 

In the first place, China owes a great deal to the foreign missionaries 
for the introduction of modern education. Not only through their trans- 
lation of books of modern science, but also through their personal efforts 
in teaching modern science and arts and in establishing modern schools 
and colleges, missionaries, particularly those from this country, have 
awakened an interest on the part of the Chinese masses in the importance 
and value of modern education. The present widespread educational 
movement in China is traceable in its origin to a very large extent to 
the humble efforts begun half a century ago by pioneer missionaries of 
the Christian Church in China. The efficiency of missionary institutions 
in training men of discipline and character is a fact generally admitted. 
Indeed, many of the missionary schools and colleges are recognized as 
among the best of our educational institutions. 

In the second place, the missionary, as a doctor, has rendered no less 



CHINA'S EXPECTATIONS FROM AMERICA? 71 

service to China than as an educator. The missionary hospitals and dis- 
pensaries, numbering, I am informed, nearly four hundred, are not only 
places of comfort to the sick and suffering, but also serve as centers from 
which the light of modern medical science radiates to the length and 
breadth of China. 

Then the missionary as a moral and religious teacher and as a social 
reformer has been a distinct force in China. Perhaps no one can tell how 
many miserable lives have been made happy and how many living in 
darkness have been brought to see the light by missionary teaching. 
Many of the epoch-making reforms, such as the suppression of opium 
and the abolition of foot-binding, have been brought about with no little 
support from the workers of the Christian Church in China. 

I hold missionary work in high regard, as do many of my fellow- 
countrymen. The Christian Church has not only rendered valuable 
service in propagating Christian doctrines, but has by her various activ- 
ities contributed to the modernization of China, and under the neAV regime 
of republicanism Christianity is bound to make even more rapid progress 
and accomplish much more in China than she has in the past. — Dr. V. K. 
Wellington Koo, Chinese Minister to the United States, in Missionary 
Review of the World, October, 1916, p. 763. 

Agreement as to the Meaning o£ Life 

It is not chiefly an economic problem that distresses men. There is 
such a shrinking of the world, it is true, that wages in Glasgow or Liver- 
pool may come to depend upon the economic conditions that hold in the 
Pacific. But this plain and admitted fact, terrible as it is in its possi- 
bilities, is not to be considered by itself. Nor is the race problem 
political only, unless a deeper meaning is given to politics than it com- 
monly bears. It is in reality a spiritual problem; it is concerned with 
ideals and values. Nations must live together, but how can they live in 
the same house in peace unless they are agreed upon the meaning of 
human life, and upon its true values and its destiny ? If the nations must 
differ here, it would be of little value that they spoke the same tongue, or 
were linked by wireless telegraphy; there could be no fellowship of an 
enduring kind. The quest of the moment must be for a reconciliation 
of all nations upon a certain interpretation of human life which will give 
common values and yet not rob the nations of their distinctive glories and 
commissions. — E. Shillito, International Review of Missions, January, 
1919, p. 22. 



CHAPTER VII 

IS JAPAN'S SOVEREIGNTY IN KOREA A BENEFIT 
OR A MENAGE TO THE ORIENT? 

I. What significance has the status of Korea for the future of 

the Far East? 

1. Look at the map and see what gives the control of Korea so 
much importance in reference to the domination of the Far 
East. 

2. What nations have sought to control the Korean peninsula 
during the last forty years? What special consideration led 
each to desire this control ? 

II. Has Japanese control of Korea been beneficial or harmful 

to the Koreans? 

1. How did Japan's occupation of Korea come about? 

a. As a result of a national zeal for territorial aggrandizement ? 

b. As a field for Japanese colonization? 

c. Out of a demand for national self-protection against 
Russia ? 

d. As a counter-move against the scramble for "spheres of 
influence" of various European powers which were working 
towards the dismemberment of China ? 

2. Does Japan seem to you to be administering Korea for the 
sake of the Koreans or for that of the Japanese ? 

3. If Japan wishes to maintain control in Korea, which policy do 
you feel is the better for the Japanese Government to pursue : 

a. One of friendly sympathy for Korean sentiment, granting, 
for instance, every possible concession in the use of the 
Korean language in schools and assemblies, in books and peri- 
odicals, and making no rigid requirements as to the use of 
the "national language"? 

b. Her accepted method of pressing the use of the Japanese 
language in every possible way as an appropriate means to 
rapid assimilation? 

According to the experience of the United States, what relation 

72 



JAPAN A MENACE IN KOREA? 73 

is there between the maintenance of their national customs 
and the use of their mother tongue by immigrants and their 
rapid Americanization? What has been the American ex- 
perience in the PhiHppines ? 

4. In what ways do you feel Japanese control will be a benefit, in 
what ways a detriment, to Korea and the Koreans ? 

III. What effect has Japan's sovereignty in Korea upon the 
welfare of the Far East? 

1. In what ways do you feel Japanese control of Korea will be a 
menace to the peace of the Far East ? In what ways a real aid 
to a peaceful solution of the Far Eastern problem ? 

2. Which would be best for the future peace and welfare of the 
Far East, that Korea should be independent, that she should 
belong to Japan as a dependency, or that she should enjoy some 
large measure of self-government with full and responsible rep- 
resentation in the imperial parliament? Why do you hold this 
position ? 

REFERENCE MATERIAL 

The Strategic Position of Korea 

The peninsula of Korea juts out from the mainland of Asia toward 
Japan between the Japan Sea and the Yellow Sea. The Japan Sea is as 
important to Japan as is the North Sea to Great Britain. The Yellow Sea 
is as important to China as is the stretch of the Atlantic between Boston 
and Newport News to the United States. Korea has been called a dagger 
pointed at the heart of Japan. This expression is no exaggeration. Were 
Korea in the hands of any European power, the menace to Japan would 
be as the menace to Great Britain of Belgium in the hands of Germany. 
A European power ensconced in Korea could separate Japan from China 
and control the outlet of northern China to the Pacific. . . . Korea lost 
her independence through the imperialistic ambitions of European powers 
in the Far East. She will regain her independence only through the 
definite renunciation of those ambitions. — Herbert Adams Gibbons, "The 
New Map of Asia 1900-1919," pp. 346, 369. 

From Recognition of Independence to Declared Annexation 

At the beginning of the war with China in 1894 Japan had made a 
treaty of alliance with Korea, in which Article I declared: "The object 
of the alliance is to maintain the independence of Korea on a firm foot- 
ing." In the treaty of Shimonoseki at the end of the war China recog- 
nized "definitely the full and complete independence and autonomy of 
Korea." 



74 AMERICA'S STAKE IN THE FAR EAST 

In 1898 Japan and Russia had made an agreement wherein the 
two governments recognized "definitely the sovereignty and entire inde- 
pendence of Korea" and pledged themselves "mutually to abstain from 
all direct interference in the internal affairs of that country." In the 
Anglo-Japanese treaty of alliance of 1902, "the high contracting parties, 
having mutually recognized the independence of China and Korea," 
declared themselves to be "entirely uninfluenced by any aggressive 
tendencies in either country." 

Three years later, however, in renewing the alliance, the British and 
Japanese Governments omitted mention of their devotion to the principle 
of Korea's integrity, mentioning only that of China ; while Great Britain 
recognized the right of Japan "to take such measures of guidance, control, 
and protection in Korea as she may deem proper and necessary to safe- 
guard [her] interests, provided always that such measures are not con- 
trary to the principle of equal opportunities for the commerce and 
industry of all nations." 

In the Portsmouth Treaty Russia likewise recognized Japan's para- 
mount interests in Korea and right to take such measures as those re- 
ferred to in the treaty just mentioned. 

When declaring war against Russia in 1904, the Emperor of Japan 
had issued a rescript, in the course of which he declared : "The integrity 
of Korea is a matter of gravest concern to this Empire. . . . The 
separate existence of Korea is essential to the safety of our realm." . . . 

Three months after the conclusion of the war, on November 17, 1905, 
the Korean Emperor was compelled to accept a convention which begins : 

Preamble: [The two governments], desiring to strengthen the prin- 
ciple of solidarity which unites the two Empires, have . . . concluded : 

Article I. The Government of Japan . . . will hereafter have con- 
trol and direction of the external relations and affairs of Korea. . . . 

In 1906 Marquis Ito was made (Japanese) Resident-General in 
Korea. 

In 1907 Japan prevented the representatives of the Korean Emperor 
from being given a hearing at Hague Conference. . . . 

In 1908 Prince Ito declared publicly that it was no part of Japan's 
purpose to annex Korea. 

In 1909 Prince Ito declared that Korea must be "amalgamated" with 
Japan. 

In the next year came the final act in the tragedy of the "Hermit 
Kingdom." The broken and bewildered Emperor accepted the dictum 
of superior force, applied by the representatives of the country which had 
five years before solemnly guaranteed the integrity of his domains and the 
security of his throne — and set the sanction of legality upon Japan's 
annexation of his realm by signing the following treaty : 

Article i. His Majesty the Emperor of Korea makes complete and 



) JAPAN A MENACE IN KOREA? 75 

permanent cession to His Majesty the Emperor of Japan of all rights of 
sovereignty over the whole of Korea. 

Article 2. His Majesty the Emperor of Japan accepts the cession 
mentioned in the preceding article, and consents to the complete annexa- 
tion of Korea to the Empire of Japan. 

This agreement was signed on August 22nd. On August 29, 1910, 
Japan formally declared Korea annexed to the dominions of His Majesty 
the Emperor of Japan. 

No power intervened, there was no offer of mediation, there was 
not a word of official protest. The inevitable — an artificially created 
inevitable — had happened. The Japanese had been working toward this 
end for more than a quarter of a century. They had carefully prepared 
for the final coup, and when at last they took possession there was not 
a court in the world to which the Koreans could appeal for a hearing, 
not an advocate to plead for their cause. No matter how worthy the 
objects of Japanese statesmen may be; no matter how much of admiration 
their cleverness, their perseverance, and their success may command; no 
matter how marvelous the work which they do in the regions to which 
they go — when viewed against the background of centuries of non- 
progress on the part of the indigenes; it is essential that the world — if it 
is really interested in the fate of further portions of regions in which 
Japan is busying herself, and while it is being offered Japan's soothing 
promises of self-denial — read for itself the record of Japan's diplomatic 
promises as set forth in the story of this passing of Korea. — Stanley K. 
Hornbeck, "Contemporary Politics in the Far East," pp. 210-212, 213, 
214. 

Japan . . . with the consent, or at any rate without the active inter- 
ference, of the Triple Entente, definitely annexed Korea in 19 10 — an 
extremely important step which attracted far less attention than it ought 
to have done both in England and in America. The independence and 
integrity of the Chinese Empire, to which Japan had pledged herself to 
the European Powers and the United States, was thus completely nullified 
and the "Open l3oor" was virtually closed in regard to Korea. 

That kingdom became thenceforth an integral part of the growing 
Japanese Empire, subject to its domination in every respect, and vastly 
increasing its power, in war as in peace. 

With the practical control of the Liaotung Peninsula Japan thus 
assumed a position on the mainland which threatened the independence 
of all northern China, unless the Chinese themselves should follow in the 
wake of the islanders, throw aside their peaceful policy, and imitate their 
rival by arming and training themselves efficiently on land and on sea 
according to the best European models. The appropriation of Korea 
showed more sharply than ever the real objects of Japanese statesman- 
ship and gave clear indication of the lines along which it would move to 
attain them. Moreover, the tyranny and cruelty which accompanied the 



76 AMERICA'S STAKE IN THE FAR EAST 

establishment of Japanese rule in Seoul and all over Korea proved con- 
clusively that, courteous and persuasive as she might be in her intercourse 
with Western countries, Japan was, and would remain, thoroughly Asiatic 
in her way of dealing with any overt resistance to her authority or even 
moderate criticism of her policy. — H. M. Hyndman, "The Awakening of 
Asia," pp. 147, 148. 

Exploitation versus Colonization 

The Japanese are exploiting Korea, Manchuria, and China. In the 
first they have a free hand, for it is theirs, and the immigration of 
Japanese is in every way encouraged. But the traveler landing in Fusan, 
a city which has been a Japanese headquarters for many centuries, finds 
all the humbler occupations in the hands of Koreans. The Japanese, 
more numerous here than elsewhere in the province, already form a 
caste in which the Japanese coolie can find no place. In Manchuria the 
same is true in a more pronounced degree. In China, the Japanese com- 
pete with many other nations for the privilege of organizing its vast 
human energies and developing its illimitable resources. The purpose of 
the recent unprecedented demands of Japan was to secure a paramount 
«^osition in China in this important work. 

But Japan is not colonizing China or Manchuria or even Korea to 
any appreciable extent. Her position as exploiter is one of immense 
significance to her, to China, to the world at large, and to ourselves ... a 
position comparable to that of Britain in India, and perhaps destined to 
be as influential, but it does not solve the problem of Japan's abundant 
population. The Japanese organizer and the Japanese capitalist find their 
opportunity, but the coolie must look elsewhere. — Harry H. Powers, 
"America among the Nations," pp. 217, 218. 

What Japan Has Done for Korea 

It must not be supposed for a moment that the Japanese administra- 
tion in Korea has been wholly evil. 

It will be recalled that there had been several decades of advice from 
Japan to Korea, and of the assertion of Japan's paramount position in 
the peninsula. It was not until 1904, however, that Japan, on the plea 
that Korea was not able to govern itself, began to take formal manage- 
ment of its concerns. By the treaty of November 17, 1905, the control 
of foreign affairs passed into the hands of Japan and a Japanese Resident 
General became practically governor of the country. Despite the bloody 
insurrections of the next two or three years the Japanese hold upon 
Korea was greatly extended, until in August of 1910 the annexation was 
proclaimed. 

Now, during the period of the protectorate, and the later period of 
full Japanese sovereignty, many excellent things have been brought to 



JAPAN A MENACE IN KOREA? ^jy 

pass under the auspices of the Government. For example, great areas 
of waste land have been reclaimed and improved; though I understand 
that there is little encouragement to individual citizens, because the law- 
provides that such reclaimed lands shall revert to the community after 
a period of eight years. Eighty per cent of the Korean population 
consists of farmers, and agricultural methods have been greatly advanced 
and the cultivation of new products developed. Cotton, silk worms and 
mulberry trees, live stock, hemp, tissue, apples, pears, grapes, peaches 
have been introduced. There is in this period a marked increase in the 
land under cultivation and in the products of the land. The country had 
under the old regime been largely stripped of its trees. The protection of 
forests and the afforestation of the denuded hills are already changing 
the landscape. Millions of trees are planted each year ; it is said that not 
less than 300,000,000 in all have been added to the country's store. 

Mining has been so increased that, whereas in 1910 the mineral 
product was valued at 6,000,000 yen, in 1916 it had reached a total of 
14,000,000 yen. Fisheries have been encouraged, factories have been 
built, and the beginnings of national industry are now perceptible; sub- 
sidies are granted for weaving, paper-making, pottery, etc. The result is 
an immense increase in exports, the foreign trade showing an advance 
from 53,000,000 yen in 1909 to 131,000,000 yen in 1916. 

Railroad communication has, of course, been extended, a fifty per 
cent advance in mileage being shown from 1910 to 1916, and an increase 
of over 150 per cent in passenger traffic. 

Highways have been built rather rapidly. Before the annexation 
there were of first, second, and third-class roads only about 500 miles. In 
March, 1917, there were more than 6,100 miles completed and more than 
8,000 miles projected, but not yet finished. Rivers have been improved. 
Harbors like those of Fusan, Chemulpo, and Wonsan have been de- 
veloped. Lighthouses and buoys have been provided and a thorough 
land survey has given definiteness to questions of ownership. 

Streets have been widened and paved in the principal towns. Hand- 
some public buildings have, in some places, been erected, and steps have 
been taken for the preservation of historic buildings and relics. 

Much attention has been given to questions of sanitation and public 
health. Water supply by public works has been taken up in twelve cities. 
Foods, drinks, and drugs are inspected. Public hospitals have been 
founded in each province. Vaccination has been insisted upon. Vigorous 
efforts have been made for the control of epidemic diseases, smallpox 
having almost disappeared. And provision has been begun for the care 
of the deaf, blind, insane, leprous, and orphans. Fire brigades give pro- 
tection in the larger places. 

Weights and measures have been standardized. System has been 
brought into the financial administration and the matter of taxation. It 
is claimed by some, to be sure, that taxes are four times as heavy as 



78 AMERICA'S STAKE IN THE FAR EAST 

before the annexation, but the official reports show that the government 
civil expenses, which were 9,500,000 yen in 1905, had also increased to 
52,000,000 yen by 1912, and to 63,000,000 yen by 1917. Of the total ex- 
penditures in the country for civil and military purposes, Japan con- 
tributed 27,000,000 yen in 1907 from the imperial treasury. That annual 
amount has been gradually reduced and this year the civil contribution 
from the Japanese empire has come to an end, though I believe the 
expenses for the maintenance of the military forces are still a charge on 
the imperial treasury. 

Honesty has marked the general administration. Encouragement 
has been given to thrift and savings. The laws have been codified; the 
penal code has been revised. A larger measure of peace and order had 
unquestionably prevailed previous to this revolution. Importantly the 
educational system has been vastly extended. From 1910 to 1917 common 
schools for Koreans were nearly trebled and the number of pupils nearly 
quadrupled. Under the old regime little had been done by the Govern- 
ment for public education. At the present time schools for Koreans dot 
the entire land, although it should be added that, according to the best 
estimates, only one tenth of the Korean children of school age are as 
yet provided with school accommodations. In addition to the primary 
schools, elementary agricultural and technical schools have been estab- 
lished, with a few higher schools, including colleges of medicine, tech- 
nology, and law. 

It is true that the Koreans feel that these improvements in the 
country are dictated by no unselfish motive on the part of the Japanese; 
that they are seeking to make the peninsula better for their own occupa- 
tion and benefit, rather than for the advantage of the Koreans themselves. 
One Korean statement puts it: "Their protection, their love and their 
care are no more than we give to our cattle; we are for them in order 
to butcher them." But I cannot help feeling that, whether or not the 
motives be purely altruistic, the sense of orderliness, the knowledge of 
modern life, the initiative and energy which have enabled the Japanese 
Government to bring about the present conditions are highly creditable to 
them, and that in these respects the Japanese Government has done an 
admirable piece of work, of which its officials have a right to be honestly 
proud. I regard this list of achievements during the last fifteen years as 
nothing less than impressive. 

On the other hand, when one sees the encouragement of the liquor 
traffic, when one sees systematized and legalized vice brought from 
Japan into Korea, when one remembers that tobacco is a government 
monopoly and therefore the trade one to be encouraged for public 
revenue, and when one hears that the growth of the poppy, although 
professedly for experimental or medicinal purposes, is being officially 
promoted in Korea, he cannot but recognize some of the moral stains 
upon this creditable record. 



JAPAN A MENACE IN KOREA? 79 

More than that, it is perfectly clear that the Japanese administration 
has failed in its colonial policy in two or three matters so fundamental 
and so far-reaching in their effects as to be almost fatal. — Bishop Herbert 
Welch, Christian Advocate, August 7, 1919. 

Underlying Causes of the Korean Agitation of 1919 

All of the reasons given have appeared in some form or other in 
declarations, petitions, and bulletins issued by the Koreans, and so may 
be taken as an expression of Korean opinion. The statement contains 
only what seem to some friends of Japan and Korea to be the most 
important of the causes involved. It should be said also that it does not 
embody the immediate causes of this outbreak such as the rumors in 
connection with the work of the Peace Conference, prevalent ideas of 
"self-determination," the activities of Koreans abroad, and the death of 
the ex-Emperor of Korea. 

The desire for independence. It must be remembered that the assim- 
ilation of an alien race is a difficult task at best, and that in this case 
it is made more difficult by the fact that the Koreans as a people have 
never in their hearts been reconciled to annexation. 

The rigor of the military administration. Koreans do not know what 
it would be like to be under a civil administration. Their whole idea of 
the Imperial Government is drawn from their experiences of military 
rule. 

1. The fact that the police have gendarmes and soldi,ers associated 
with them in the administration of the law leads the Korean to fear the 
police and to regard them not as civil servants and protectors but as 
oppressors. 

2. This impression is deepened by the harsh and indiscriminate 
manner in which laws are administered. In the report issued by the 
Government General in July, 1918 (covering the year 1916-1917) it is 
stated that out of 82,121 offenders dealt with in "Police Summary Judg- 
ment," 952 were pardoned, 81,139 were sentenced, and only 30 were able 
to prove their innocence. The unavoidable result of such a system is that 
a naturally peaceful and gentle-minded people are living in a state of 
constant terror. 

3. The spy system has added to the terrorization of the people. 
Spies, usually low-class Koreans, are everywhere. No one knows when 
nor in what form the most harmless acts or words may be reported to the 
authorities. 

4. The treatment of those arrested adds to the fear and hatred of 
the police. 

5. The show of force on all occasions adds to the irritation. Civil 
officials, even primary school teachers, wear swords. 

6. This system has brought the people to believe that the administra- 
tion has no idea of leading them, but only of compelling obedience. 



8o AMERICA'S STAKE IN THE FAR EAST 

Denationalisation. 

I. The Koreans are a different race, with different history, traditions, 
ideals, ethics, and customs. The present administration seems to aim 
at the elimination of many things traditionally Korean and the substitu- 
tion of things new and strange. There seems to be no systematic attempt 
to win the Korean's loyalty for Japan but to make over the Korean into 
a Japanese. 

2. The exclusion of the Korean language from schools, courts, and 
legal documents is a great source of irritation. It is recognized that 
the question of language presents a problem to the Government, but the 
effect of the present policy on the mind of the Korean cannot be 
minimized. 

3. The elimination of Korean history from school curricula is an- 
other source of irritation. The Koreans feel that the presentation of 
the subject of Korean history is neither as full nor as accurate as its 
importance would warrant. 

The Koreans have no real share in their government, either legis- 
lative or executive, and no hope of securing this has been held out to 
them. 

I. Some Koreans do hold office, but usually minor ones, and in the 
case of those holding an important office they can usually be overruled by 
Japanese officials of lower rank. 

The inferior education given to Korean students deprives them of the 
hope of securing positions by competitive merit in the future. 

Discrimination against Koreans. 

1. There is discrimination in salaries for the same services in 
government institutions, in business houses, and in labor. 

2. In government schools the curriculum is different for Japanese 
and Koreans. The latter have from two to three years' shorter course 
than the former. In the matter of English, also, which all desire to 
learn, the Japanese have four days a week for five years while the 
Koreans have only two hours a week for two years. Such differences 
in educational facilities may be accounted for by the Government's in- 
ability to provide full courses as yet, but it works an evident hardship 
and is resented by the Koreans. 

3. Corporal punishment can be legally administered only to Koreans. 

4. There is discrimination in many apparently minor but really 
significant matters. For instance, Koreans are rarely employed as train 
boys or akahos, and Japanese ricksha men are given the best positions 
at railway stations. 

No liberty of speech, press, or assembly. (Christian Koreans were 
arrested who were heard praying for a spiritual revival, the authorities 
insisting that this meant a political revival.) 



JAPAN A MENACE IN KOREA? 8i 

Limited religious liberty. 

1. Religion cannot be taught in private schools according to the 
Government Revised Educational Ordinances, which recognize no differ- 
ence between government and private schools. 

2. In the case of Christianity, the Bible cannot be taught in private 
schools opened since March, 1915, or in any schools after 1925. 

3. Ceremonies are required which seem to be a violation of con- 
science to Koreans. 

4. Local officials constantly intimidate Christians and those intend- 
ing to become Christians, in what appears to be an effort to discourage 
Christianity. 

Practical Prohibition of Korean Study and Travel Abroad. 

1. Koreans know that Japan's progress is largely traceable to 
foreign studies at the beginning of the Meiji Era and since, and desire 
the same opportunity for improvement. With the exception of certain 
specially favored cases, Koreans are not permitted to go abroad, and those 
who have received their education abroad are not permitted to return. 

2. Even Koreans who have been educated in Japan are so constantly 
watched by the police on their return to Korea that they can make no 
proper use of their education. 

Expropriation of Crown Lands. 

In many sections of Korea crown lands have been occupied and 
farmed by the Koreans for generations on the basis of a moderate rental. 
In many cases the leasehold of these lands had acquired a value almost 
equal to that of land held in full possession. These lands, however, were 
in many cases turned over to the Oriental Development Company, and 
the former occupants required to pay greatly increased rents, which com- 
pelled them to abandon the land in favor of government-assisted Japanese 
settlers. 

Demoralising Influences Newly Introduced. 

1. Licensed prostitution in all cities and towns has made this form 
of immorality more open and accessible, and hence has had a more demor- 
alizing effect as well as a more widespread influence upon the young men 
of the country. 

2. The persistent sale of the morphine needle has been unrestricted 
in many sections. 

Forced Migration to Manchuria. 

The extensive migration of Japanese farmers into central and 
southern Korea and their occupation of often unjustly secured lands has 
forced the migration of thousands of Koreans into the less desirable «nid 
undeveloped sections of Manchuria. 



82 AMERICA'S STAKE IN THE FAR EAST 

Many Improvements Benefit Japanese More than Koreans. 

1. Industrial. The lumber industry, for example, although exten- 
sively developed, brings no additional benefit to the Koreans. In fact, 
lumber costs more than formerly. 

2. Commercial. The Korean merchants lack modern business 
training and experience, which makes it difficult for them to withstand 
the unrestricted competition of Japanese merchants. 

3. In many cases licensed monopolies work great hardship to the 
Koreans and cause resentment, e. g., the cotton monopoly and the 
fertilizer monopoly in Sen Sen. — Commission on Relations with the 
Orient of the Federal Council of the Churches of Christ in America, "The 
Korean Situation: Authentic Accounts of Recent Events by Eye Wit- 
nesses," pp. 121-125. 

A Korean View of Japan's Colonial Policies 

If Japan is sincere and true in her professions of doing justice to 
the Korean people, she must do one of three things. She must give 
Korea : 

(i) Complete independence. 

(2) Autonomy. 

(3) A voice in making and administering her own laws and in 
selecting the executive and judicial officials for the country. 

The first would be the most magnanimous act — a deed that would 
remain in the world's history as a lasting tribute to the greatness of the 
Japanese people. But if Japanese statesmen are not farsighted enough 
to see the ultimate gain of generosity, then they should extend autonomy 
to Korea. It is the right of the Koreans to administer their internal 
affairs, even should this right be exercised under the suzerainty of Japan. 
If this right is recognized, Japan would be following the example of the 
most successful colonizer in the world — England. If the Japanese 
Government does not care to grant even this amount of justice, insisting 
upon its policy of assimilation — a policy which has met with complete 
failure so far, and which, in my opinion, will never succeed — it is only 
fair that the Korean people should have a real voice in their government. 
It is high time for Japanese statesmen to realize that "taxation without 
representation is tyranny," and that the soldier's rifle or the gendarme's 
swords will never make loyal Japanese citizens out of Koreans. . . . 

Japan took Korea as the prize of the greatest war in her national 
life and, according to the time-honored European doctrine of economic 
exploitation and territorial aggrandizement by the right of military 
conquest, she considered that she had a perfect right to absorb Korea. 
But the Wilsonian principle of self-determination declares that helpless 
nations are not to be considered as mere pawns in the international game 



JAPAN A MENACE IN KOREA? 83 

of strong powers. The tenet that "No people must he forced under a 
sovereignty under which it does not wish to live" is a distinct departure 
from the old school of political thought. It is a new principle of interna- 
tional justice.— Henry Chung, Asia, May, 1919, p. 467. 

The Korean Situation in 1920 

Two extreme views have been set before the American people : some 
Japanese press agencies have been inclined to state that the demands of 
the Korean people have been met, the crisis is past and everything is 
well; on the other hand Korean propaganda has represented that there 
has been no improvement over the conditions of last spring [1919], and 
that whatever seeming reforms have been accomplished are but camou- 
flage. As usual, the truth lies at neither extreme. . . . Some real 
progress has been made in the right direction, but nothing like a finality 
has been arrived at. Whether the plans initiated by the Government will 
be fundamental and far-reaching enough really to give Korea a satisfac- 
tory administration, remains to be seen. 

Meanwhile, on the Korean side the past year has unquestionably 
brought a further crystallization of opinion which is hostile to any Jap- 
anese government. The minds of many are fixed on complete national 
independence as the only goal, and they declare that they have no interest 
whatever in the question of reforms by the present or any Japanese 
administration. On the other hand many, including some of the most 
intelligent and far-seeing, are persuaded that there is no hope of speedy 
independence, and that they must settle down for a long period to build 
up the Korean people, in physical conditions, in knowledge, in morality, 
and in the ability to handle governmental concerns. If it is true that in 
the process of time Korea will have either national independence or such 
a large degree of local autonomy as will make her relation to Japan 
somewhat like that of Canada to England, then certainly the strategic 
thing to do at the present time is to prepare the people for those larger 
responsibilities which are sure to come to them in the future. 

It must be fully recognized that the Japanese Government has by no 
means as yet won the hearts of the Korean people; rather they are 
farther off from that today than fifteen months ago. We may have a 
period of years characterized by restlessness and uprisings here and there 
which will make it extremely difficult to do for the people the only things 
which it is possible and proper for us as foreigners to do.— Bishop 
Herbert Welch, Christian Advocate, May 13, 1920, pp. 649, 650. 



CHAPTER VIII 

WHAT ATTITUDE SHOULD AMERICA TAKE TO- 
WARD KOREA'S DESIRE FOR INDEPENDENCE? 

I. What do you know of the movements for a republic in 

Korea? Why do you sympathize with this movement 
for freedom from foreign control, or why do you fail to 
sympathize with it? 

II. How far are the Koreans justified in their opposition to 

Japanese control? 

1. What are the considerations which the Koreans set forth 
which are inimical to Japanese control? 

2. Why was Korea not able to maintain her own sovereignty as 
have Holland and Switzerland, on the borders of more powerful 
nations ? 

3. When a government seems hopelessly corrupt and inefficient, 
is a neighboring strong and stable nation justified in stepping in 
and assuming the reins of power? If not, why not? If so, for 
what purposes? Has the United States done this on any 
occasion? When and why? 

4. Is Japan's annexation and control of Korea justified? In 
discussing this, take into consideration the following which 
might lead you to justify or to question her action: 

a. Japan's previous declarations of purpose to respect Korean 
rights. 

b. Korea's weakness and corruption, 

c. The possibility and worth of maintaining Korean national 
life and independence. 

d. Japan's possible need of self-protection against Russia. 

e. The contribution Japan has made to the general welfare of 
the Korean people. 

f. The inherent rights of the weaker nations, as set forth by 
President Wilson. 

g. The desirability for the Koreans, if annexation must come, 
that their country be annexed to Japan rather than to Qiina 
or to Asiatic Russia. 

h. The rigorous treatment of the Koreans by the Japanese 
military government since annexation. 

84 



KOREA'S DESIRE FOR INDEPENDENCE 85 

5. How far do you feel the agitation against Japan on the part of 
the Koreans is due to prejudice ; how far to real patriotism of 
Koreans growing out of genuine love for their country? 

III. What attitude should America take toward Japanese con- 
trol and Korean desire for independence? 

1. If Korea were granted her independence, what hope do you 
feel there is that she would be able to maintain a republic? 

2. What policy do you really feel Japan should pursue in relation 
to Korea ? 

3. On what grounds would you urge an idealistic and altruistic 
policy upon her? How far, if at all, would you consider Chris- 
tian ideals as an essential to an altruistic policy by one nation 
toward a weaker people? 

4. Just how do you feel America could be of service to Korea 
and Japan in the solution of this problem? 

5. In very considerable measure the missionary work done in 
Korea has been carried on by American missionaries. Just 
what claim, if any, upon American sympathy and aid does this 
fact give the Koreans? 

REFERENCE MATERIAL 

Independence for Korea 

Ever since Korea lost her identity as a nation the people have never 
considered themselves subjects of Japan. Although the government 
regulations do not allow the children to study the language of their 
fathers in the schools, they gather in groups after school to study the 
Korean language secretly. Over a million and a half Koreans have 
emigrated, since the Japanese occupation of the peninsula, into China 
and Siberia to escape the military rule and economic exploitation of their 
conquerors. These Koreans, in strange lands, organized themselves into 
communities, had their own local governments, and refused in so far as 
it was possible to be controlled by Japanese consuls. . . . 

In 191 1 the Governor-General, Viscount Terauchi, instituted 
what is known in the church annals of Korea as the persecution of the 
Church. Prominent church men, leaders in Korean thought and educa- 
tion, were charged with conspiracy and put in prison. Prominent 
American missionaries were brought into the trial as being connected 
with the conspiracy to assassinate the Governor-General of Korea. Here, 
however, the Japanese overstepped themselves. Their charges against 
the Korean Church aroused considerable criticism in the West, and when 
they saw that their attempt was producing a reaction they stopped the 



86 AMERICA'S STAKE IN THE FAR EAST 

persecution of the Korean Christians and satisfied themselves with limit- 
ing the activities of the Church. 

The World War and the principle of self-determination as it has 
been pronounced by President Wilson, fanned the smouldering national- 
ism of the Korean people into a blaze. On March i, 1919, tv/o days 
prior to the funeral of the deceased Emperor Yi, Koreans all over the 
peninsula proclaimed their independence and put up what they considered 
passive resistance to the Japanese rule. They selected this date because 
it was the first occasion since Japan occupied the country that the Jap- 
anese authorities permitted the gathering of the Koreans in groups. . . . 

The Koreans residing outside of Korea were unanimous in respond- 
ing to the trumpet call sounded by their compatriots in Korea. The 
Korean students in Japan were arrested and convicted by the Japanese 
authorities for their revolutionary activities. . . . The Koreans in China 
presented petitions to the various foreign ministers in Peking, asking 
them to use their good offices with their respective governments on behalf 
of the struggle of the Korean people for independence. The Koreans in 
America have done, and are doing their "bit." The Congress of the 
Korean race, composed of the delegates from Korean communities in 
America, Hawaii, and Mexico, met in Philadelphia, Pa., April 14-16, 
1919. — Statement of Claim for Independence and Freedom from Foreign 
Domination, Prepared by Korean Information Bureau and The League 
of the Friends of Korea. 

The Japanese Point of View 

Realizing the island isolation and the limited area and productivity 
of their own land, the Japanese look upon Chosen on the adjacent main- 
land as necessary to afford an outlet for Japan's overcrowded population 
and to produce the additional food supplies that the nation needs. More- 
over, from a military and political point of view it is the most exposed 
portion of the empire, as Japan comes in contact with China and some of 
the powerful nations of Europe — a serious matter in this unhappy era of 
racial jealousies and strife. In these circumstances, the Japanese feel 
that they cannot be content with ruling Chosen as an outlying dependency, 
as America rules the Philippine Islands and Great Britain rules India, 
but that they must amalgamate Chosen with the empire and assimilate its 
people, teaching them the Japanese language, infusing them with Jap- 
anese ideals, and developing in them patriotic feeling for Japan as their 
country. The Hon. M. Komatsu, Director of the Bureau of Foreign 
Affairs of the Government-General of Chosen, wrote on November 4th, 
1915: 

"The administrative policy fixed by the imperial government of 
Japan for Chosen fundamentally differs in its aim from that taken by 
European and American governments toward their colonies. By taking 



KOREA'S DESIRE FOR INDEPENDENCE 87 

into consideration historical and racial relations between the two peoples, 
it is the purpose of Japan to assist, guide, and lift up the Korean people 
lagging in the race of civilization, and make them not only good and 
intelligent but also loyal subjects of the empire in name and reality. . . ." 
It is inevitable in such circumstances that the Japanese Government- 
General should be sensitive about any influences which they regard as in 
the slightest degree divisive or as coming between them and the people 
whom they are trying to assimilate and that they should feel that the 
carrying out of their policy, in the peculiar conditions which prevail in 
Chosen, justifies a closer and more complete governmental control. They 
understand as well as anyone the difficulty of changing the attitude of 
mature men who have been moulded by the traditions of their own race, 
and who have personal memories of the tumults and sorrows which 
attended the subjugation of their native land by the Japanese. — Arthur J. 
Brown, International Review of Missions, January, 1917, pp. 74, 75. 

Extracts from Korea's "Declaration of Independence** 

Victims of an older age, when brute force and the spirit of plunder 
ruled, we have come, after these long thousands of years, to experience 
the agony of ten years of foreign oppression, with every loss of the right 
to live, every restriction on freedom of thought, every damage done to 
the dignity of life, every opportunity lost for a share in the intelligent 
advance of the age in which we live. . . . 

We have no wish especially to find fault with Japan's lack of fair- 
ness, or her contempt of our civilization and the principles on which our 
state rests. We, who have greater cause to reprimand ourselves, need 
not spend precious time in finding fault with others; neither need we, 
who require so urgently to build for the future, spend useless hours over 
what is past and gone. Our urgent need today is the setting up of this 
house of ours and not a discussion of who has broken it down or what has 
caused its ruin. Our work is to clear the future of defects in accord with 
the earnest dictates of conscience. Let us not be filled with bitterness 
or resentment over past agonies or past occasions for anger. . . . 

Ought not the way of enlightened courage to be to correct the evils 
of the past by ways that are sincere, and by true sympathy and friendly 
feeling make a new world in which the two peoples will be equally 
blessed? . . . 

To bind by force twenty millions of resentful Koreans will mean not 
only loss of peace forever for this part of the Far East, but also will mean 
for that center of danger as well as safety — the four hundred millions of 
China — a suspicion of Japan and an ever deepening hatred. From this 
all the rest of the East will suffer. Today Korean independence would 
mean not only life and happiness for us but also it would mean Japan's 
departure from an evil way and exaltation to the place of true Protector 



88 AMERICA'S STAKE IN THE FAR EAST 

of the East, so that China, too, even in her dreams, would put all fear of 
Japan aside. This thought comes from no minor resentment, but from a 
large hope for the future. 

A new era wakes before our eyes. The old world of force is gone 
and the new world of righteousness and truth is here. Out of the experi- 
ence and travail of the old world arises this light of life's affairs. The 
insects stifled by the ice and snow of winter awake at this same time with 
the breezes of spring and the soft light of the sun upon them. 

It is the day of the restoration of all things, on the full tide of which 
we step forth without delay or fear. We desire a full measure of satis- 
faction in the way of liberty and the pursuit of happiness, and an oppor- 
tunity to develop what is in us for the glory of our people. 

We awake now from the old world with its darkened conditions in 
full determination and one heart and one mind, with right on our side, 
along with the forces of nature, to achieve a new life. May all the 
ancestors to the thousandth and ten thousandth generation aid us from 
within, and all the forces of the world aid us from without, and let the 
day we take hold be the day of our attainment ! In this hope we go 
forward. — Quoted by Bishop Herbert Welch in Christian Advocate, July 
24, 1919. 

Weighing the Korean Situation in the Balance 

Let us remember that there never was a dirtier Augean stable to be 
cleansed than that which they [the Japanese] found in the land of The 
Morning Calm, and that the mess required decisive measures. The 
historian of the next generation will be in better position to take an 
impartial view than men of today, who are in danger of having their 
judgment warped by the personal feelings that have been aroused. 

Trying to look at the matter as fairly as possible now, I believe that 
the balance inclines heavily in favor of the Japanese. I do not defend 
some of the things that they have done. I sympathize with the Koreans. 
They would be unworthy of respect if they did not prefer their national 
freedom. One can understand why the injustice of their own magistrates 
seemed less irksome than the stern justice of alien conquerors. Never- 
theless I confess to sympathy also with the Japanese. They were forced 
to occupy Korea to prevent a Russian occupation, which would have 
menaced their own independence as a nation. They are now struggling 
with their burden against heavy odds, with limited financial resources, 
and against the dislike and opposition of Koreans, Russians, Chinese, and 
most of the foreigners in the Far East. While we should as frankly 
discuss their methods as we would those of our own country in similar 
circumstances . . . we should avoid the error of assuming that we can 
help the Koreans by unjust abuse of their rulers. 

It would be narrow and unscientific to estimate the historic value of 



KOREA'S DESIRE FOR INDEPENDENCE 89 

the Japanese occupation of Korea solely by incidental defects of method 
or spirit, just as it would be to protest that a transcontinental line of 
railway should not have been built because the right-of-way injured 
some man's property, or a brutal foreman committed acts of violence 
against his person or family. We should view a movement in historic 
perspective, deprecating indeed the wrongs of the people concerned, and 
visiting full blame upon those who unnecessarily caused them, but recog- 
nizing nevertheless that results, even when achieved by imperfect human 
instruments, are to be measured rather by their worth to the country and 
the world than by the follies and crimes of some of the men who had a 
part in the effort. Looking at the question of Japanese administration 
as a whole, we must bear in mind that there are a large way and a small 
way of viewing it. 

The large way is to note that in the evolution of the race and the 
development of the plan of God, the time had come when it was for the 
best interests of the world and for the welfare of the Koreans themselves 
that Korea should come under the tutelage of Japan. All great move- 
ments in this world, however beneficent in general character and 
ultimate purpose, involve human agents with their full share of human 
infirmities. Some of these agents are apt to be selfish, some greedy, some 
cruel, some lustful. The development of a movement, therefore, is 
certain to be attended by many individual acts that are wrong. Historic 
illustrations will at once occur to every student. . . . 

The small way of considering a historical question is to fix our atten- 
tion on such acts of individuals or even on the policies of men temporarily 
in official position. We should not hastily conclude that, because a 
period of transition is turbulent and many of its agents are blundering 
or unscrupulous, the movement itself is bad. It is right that we should 
plainly and firmly protest against Japanese acts of injustice to the helpless 
Koreans, right to do everything in our power to remedy injustice; but it 
would be grievously wrong to act on the supposition that it is not best for 
Japan to be in Korea and to antagonize the general policy of reconstruc- 
tion. We sympathize with the natural aspirations of any people for an 
independent nationality; but the Koreans could not be independent any- 
way under present conditions in the Far East, and they are far better off 
under the Japanese than they were under their own rulers or than they 
would have been under the Russians. Nothing could be worse for Korea 
than plunging her back into the abyss of corruption, weakness, and op- 
pression of the old regime. A new order is being estabhshed. The 
Koreans are being given better opportunities for advancement. The Jap- 
anese are the political and economic agents through whom this uplifting 
movement is being developed. They have made some mistakes and they 
will doubtless make more; but on the whole their work in Korea has 
been beneficent in many ways. Of course it is hard for the Koreans, and 
for their foreign friends who came to the country in the old days, to 



90 AMERICA'S STAKE IN THE FAR EAST 

adapt themselves to the changed conditions; but there is no alternative, 
and it is the part of wisdom ungrudgingly to recognize the inescapable 
situation. . . . 

The Korean who philosophically accepts the new conditions finds that 
he can get steadier and more remunerative employment than he could in 
the old days of native rule. He can wear better clothing and have a 
more comfortable house. His alien masters are, as a rule, more just with 
him than the native officials were prior to Japanese occupation. If he 
is wronged by one of his own countrymen, he is more apt to get justice 
in the courts without bribing an official than he was in the old days of 
Korean "independence." — ^Arthur J. Brown, "The Mastery of the Far 
East," pp. 371-373. 

The Relations of a Dominant to a Dependent People 

In passing judgment upon the relations of a dominant to a dependent 
people, three main questions of ethical right arise: (i) The justification 
for holding an unwilling people in subjection; (2) the political and civil 
rights that should be granted to them; and (3) the regard that should be 
had for their material and cultural interests. What answers to the 
questions thus involved have the Japanese given by their dealings with the 
Koreans ? 

It may be asserted, without qualification, that no nation has an 
ethical right to subject another people, against their will, to its own 
political domination solely upon the ground that this overlordship is 
needed in order that its own political or economic interests may be 
advanced. To admit that there may be such a right of national selfish- 
ness is to take away the very foundation of international comity and 
morality. The principle of national self-defense may be carried to the 
extent of holding that one nation may object to the passing of a neigh- 
boring state under the political control of a third state if the result will 
be to create a power which will be a danger to the first state's national 
safety or domestic tranquillity. This principle is, indeed, implied in the 
Monroe Doctrine, and was appealed to when the United States demanded 
that the French Government should withdraw its military forces from 
Mexico. Japan was thus well within its right when it went to war 
with Russia to prevent her further increasing her political influence in 
Korea. But the annexation by Japan of that country, against the will 
of its people, was another matter. At the time this annexation was 
'effected, Korea was not in itself a menace to Japan, and, Russia having 
been defeated, and even her control to the north of Korea having been 
transferred to Japan, together with the lease of Port Arthur and Dairen, 
there was no discernible danger that Korea would pass under the control 
of another power who would thus be able to threaten the national security 
of nearby Japan. It is impossible, therefore, ethically to justify the 



KOREA'S DESIRF FOR INDEPENDENCE gt 

annexation by Japan of the Korean peninsula, on the ground that 
otherwise the independence of Japan would have been threatened. 

The Japanese have, however, sought to justify the annexation on 
the ground that they are an expanding people, with an already over- 
crowded territory, and in need of raw materials that their own soil does 
not provide. And also that, as a politically ambitious people, they need 
to increase their power in order to be able to take a more prominent 
place among the nations of the world. These are, of course, the same 
arguments as those upon which Prussia sought to defend her aggressive 
policies, and to uphold her right to subordinate the wis-hes and interests 
of other peoples to her own ambitions. We need not, therefore, stop to 
refute them. 

There is, however, one ground upon which a stronger nation is 
ethically entitled to subject another and unwilling people to its political 
domination. This ground exists when thus, and only thus, the subjected 
people may be given a regime of law and order which it has been made 
reasonably certain they are unable to provide for themselves. 

When annexation is justified upon this ground, it is clear that the 
dominant state is committed to the altruistic task of seeking, with single 
purpose, to advance the interests of the governed, and to prepare them 
as speedily as possible for the time when they will be able to govern them- 
selves with efficiency and honesty, and, when that time comes, to give 
them the option whether or not they will remain under the political 
sovereignty of the dominant state. 

The Japanese claim with reference to the Koreans that they are not 
qualified to govern themselves, though they have not sought to justify the 
annexation of the country, except in a minor measure, upon this ground. 
Certain it is that the native Korean government that existed prior to 
annexation was wretched in the extreme — dishonest, oppressive, and in- 
efficient. This fact the Japanese would be warranted in emphasizing 
except for the circumstance that they have been unwilling to recognize 
the obligation tq seek to correct, as speedily as possible, this political 
incapacity. Upon the contrary, . . . the Japanese have sought in every 
possible way to hinder the progress among the Koreans of even the 
ideas of self-government or aspiration for it. 

Having denied to the Koreans not only independence but administra- 
tive autonomy and even an equality of right of participation with their 
rulers in the enjoyment of offices of public trust, it would seem that there 
would rest upon the Japanese an especially great obligation to have regard 
for at least the private personal and property rights of the people thus 
placed wholly at their mercy. But this obligation they have not recog- 
nized, or at least given effect to. In general, as has been already said, 
the Koreans have, of course, profited by the relative efficiency of the 
Japanese administration. But even-handed justice "has not been dis- 
pensed to them, and civil rights have not been provided so that the 



92 AMERICA'S STAKE IN THE FAR EAST 

individual Korean is able to feel himself, in person or property, secure 
from oppression. . . . 

The policies which the Japanese have pursued in Korea have been 
dictated by their own political and constitutional ideals. In Japan itself 
there is little idea of popular or local self-government, or of individual 
rights as opposed to public authority. It is, therefore, not to be expected 
that the Japanese would grant to a subject people certain of the political 
and civil rights which the United States has accorded the inhabitants of 
the Philippine Islands. But there has been no reason whatever why 
private rights of property and person should not have been respected, 
why even-handed justice should not have been administered, and, above 
all, why the attempt should have been made to crush out the distinctive 
culture and civilization of Korea. 

It is not simply that the Koreans are a people of over seventeen 
millions, and inhabit a country nearly the size of Japan itself, but that 
they have had a long history of national independence, have created for 
themselves a language, a literature, and an art — in short that they con- 
stitute a nation in every ethnic, historical, and cultural sense of the word. 
Certainly it would seem that if the principle of national self-determina- 
tion has any validity at all, it should be applied to this people to the 
extent of at least guaranteeing to them the preservation of their distinc- 
tive civilization and the hope of a time when they shall have control of 
their own national development. And their case is rendered still stronger 
when consideration is had of the fact that their present rulers, in political 
philosophy as well as in political practice, are exponents of principles 
which the rest of the civilized world has agreed are false and pernicious. 
It is sufficiently serious that the Japanese should be willing to apply such 
doctrines in the government of themselves. It becomes a grievous matter 
when they apply them by force to another people. — Professor W. W. 
Willoughby, Johns Hopkins University, Unpartizan Review, January- 
February, 1920, pp. 37-42. 

What Is the True Estimate of Korean Character? 

The peaceful uprising of the people of Korea against Japan in the 
spring of 1919 came as a world surprise. Here was a nation that had 
been ticketed and docketed by world statesmen as degenerate and 
cowardly, revealing heroism of a very high order. 

The soldier facing the enemy in the open is inspired by the atmos- 
phere of war, and knows that he has at least a fighting chance against 
his foe. The Koreans took their stand — ^their women and children by 
their side — without weapons and without means of defense. They 
pledged themselves ahead to show no violence. They had all too good 
reason to anticipate that their lot would be the same as that of others 
who had preceded them — torture as ingenious and varied as Torquemada 
and his familiars ever practiced. 



KOREA'S DESIRE FOR INDEPENDENCE 93 

They were not disappointed. They were called on to endure all that 
they had anticipated, in good measure, pressed down and running over. 
When they were dragged to prison, others stepped into their place. 
When these were taken, still others were ready to succeed them. And 
more are even now waiting to join in the dreadful procession, if the 
protests of the civilized world do not induce Japan to call a halt. 

It seems evident that either the world made a mistake in its first 
estimate of Korean character, or these people have experienced a new 
birth. Which is the right explanation? Maybe both. 

To understand what has happened, and what, as I write, is still 
happening, one has to go back for a few years. When Japan, in face of 
her repeated pledges, annexed Korea, her statesmen adopted an avowed 
policy of assimilation. They attempted to turn the people of Korea into 
Japanese — an inferior brand of Japanese, a serf race, speaking the 
language and following the customs of their overlords, and serving them. 

To accomplish this better, the Koreans were isolated, not allowed to 
mix freely with the outer world, and deprived of liberty of speech, person, 
and press. The Japanese brought certain material reforms. They for- 
got to supply one thing— justice. Men of progressive ideas were seized 
and imprisoned in such numbers that a new series of prisons had to be 
built. In six years the total of prisoners convicted or awaiting trial 
doubled. The rule of the big stick was instituted, and the Japanese 
police were given the right to flog without trial any Korean they pleased. 
The bamboo was employed on scores of thousands of people each year, 
employed so vigorously as to leave a train of cripples and corpses behind. 
The old tyranny of the yang-ban was replaced by a more terrible, because 
more scientifically cruel, tyranny of an uncontrolled police. 

The Japanese struck an unexpected strain of hardness in the Korean 
character. They found, underneath the surface apathy, a spirit as de- 
termined as their own. They succeeded, not in assimilating the people, 
but in reviving their sense of nationality. 

Before Japan acquired the country, large numbers of Koreans had 
adopted Christianity. Under the influence of the teachers from America, 
they became clean in person, they brought their women out from the 
anpang (zenana) into the light of day, and they absorbed Western ideas 
and ideals. The mission schools taught modern history, with its tales of 
the heroes and heroines of liberty, women like Joan of Arc, men like 
Hampden and George Washington. And the missionaries circulated and 
taught the Bible— the most dynamic and disturbing book in the world. 
When a people saturated in the Bible comes into touch with tyranny, 
either one of two things happens— the people are exterminated or 
tyranny ceases. 

The Japanese realized their danger. They tried, in vain, to bring 
the churches under Japanese control. They confiscated or forbade mis- 
sionary textbooks, substituting their own. Failing to win the support of 



94 AMERICA'S STAKE IN THE FAR EAST 

the Christians, they instituted a widespread persecution of the Christian 
leaders of the north. Many were arrested and tortured on charges which 
the Japanese courts themselves afterwards found to be false. The 
Koreans endured until they could endure no more. , . . 

"What do you want us to do?" men ask me. "Do you seriously 
suggest that America or Great Britain should risk a breach of good 
relations or even a war with Japan to help Korea? If not, what is the 
use of saying anything? You only make the Japanese harden their 
hearts still more." 

What can we do ? Everything ! 

I appeal first to the Christian churches of the United States, Canada, 
and Britain. I have seen what your representatives, more particularly 
the agents of the American and Canadian churches, have accomplished in 
Korea itself. They have built wisely and well, and have launched the 
most hopeful and flourishing Christian movement in Asia. Their con- 
verts have established congregations that are themselves missionary 
churches, sending out and supporting their own teachers and preachers 
to China. A great light has been lit in Asia. Shall it be extinguished? 
For, make no mistake, the work is threatened with destruction. Many 
of the church buildings have been burned; many of the native leaders 
have been tortured and imprisoned; many of their followers — men, 
women, and children — have been flogged, or clubbed, or shot. 

You, the Christians of the United States and of Canada, are largely 
responsible for these people. The teachers you sent and supported taught 
them the faith that led them to hunger for freedom. They taught them 
the dignity of their bodies and awakened their minds. They brought them 
a Book whose commands made them object to worship the picture of the 
Emperor — even of the Japanese Emperor — made them righteously angry 
when they were ordered to put part of their Christian homes apart for 
the diseased outcasts of the Yoshiwara to conduct their foul business, 
made them resent having the trade of the opium seller or the morphia 
agent introduced among them. 

Your teaching has brought them floggings, tortures unspeakable, 
death. I do not mourn for them, for they have found something to 
which the blows of the lashed twin bamboos and the sizzling of the 
hot iron as it sears their flesh are small indeed. But I would mourn for 
you, if you were willing to leave them unhelped, to shut your ears to their 
calls, to deny them your practical sympathy. . . . 

Men say — and say rightly — that Korea is the key-land of north- 
eastern Asia, so far as domination of that part of the lands of the Pacific 
is concerned. Korea is still more the key-land of Asia for Western 
civilization and Christian ideals. Let Christianity be throttled here, 
and it will have received a setback in Asia from which it will take 
generations to recover. 

"The Koreans are a degenerate people, not fit for self-government," 



KOREA'S DESIRE FOR INDEPENDENCE 95 

says the man whose mind has been poisoned by subtle Japanese propa- 
ganda. Korea has only been a very few years in contact with Western 
civilization, but it has already indicated that this charge is a lie. Its 
old government was corrupt, and deserved to fall. But its people, 
wherever they have had a chance, have demonstrated their capacity. — 
Frederick A. McKenzie, "Korea's Fight for Freedom," pp. 5-8, 315-318. 

Extinguishing the Soul of Korea 

Something more than mere economic pressure and political domina- 
tion is needed to extinguish the soul of Korea. History and literature are 
the records of past achievements, and language is the medium of expres- 
sion that gives birth to genius. Japanese statesmen fully appreciate the 
importance of this triple support of national consciousness. They made 
a systematic collection of all works of Korean history and literature in 
public archives and private homes and burned them. This is undoubtedly 
the greatest injustice that the Korean people have suffered at the hands 
of the Japanese. Korean scholars consider this an irreparable loss 
second only to the destruction of the Alexandrian Library by Omar in 
640. Priceless treasures have been destroyed by this needless vandalism 
of the Japanese. All Korean periodical literature — from local news- 
papers to scientific journals — 'has been completely stamped out. . . . 

Under the pretext of unifying the educational system of Korea and 
bringing it up to a "higher standard," the Government passed educational 
regulations which forbid religious services and the teaching of history, 
geography, and the Korean language in all the schools in Korea. 
Furthermore, these regulations provide that all Korean schools shall be 
under the strict supervision of Japanese educators, and that the Korean 
children shall be taught to salute the Japanese flag and worship the 
Japanese Emperor's tablet. Korean students who go to Japan for their 
education are advised to attend trade or technical schools, but they are 
insidiously discriminated against in the higher educational institutions. 
This is an ironic inconsistency in the face of Japan's position at the 
Peace Conference, where she is demanding for her subjects rights from 
America and Great Britain equal to those enjoyed by natives of the 
countries against whom there is no racial discrimination. It is im- 
possible for a Korean student, who goes to Japan under government 
supervision, to specialize in such subjects as law, history, or economics 
in the Imperial University of Tokyo, and he may not go to Europe or 
America to finish his education. 

The tragedy in the case of the Korean is that he suffers the fate of 
a conquered race, alike with the Poles and the Bohemians before the 
World War, yet his plight is little known to the outside world. — Henry 
Chung, Asia, May, 1919, pp. 471-473. 



CHAPTER IX 

WHAT BEARING HAS AMERICAN CONTROL OF 

THE PHILIPPINES UPON THE DESTINY 

OF THE FAR EAST ? 

I. How does American control of the Philippines affect our 

responsibility for helping to secure a right solution of 
the Far-Eastern problem? 

1. Does our presence in the Philippines increase or decrease our 
solicitude as to what happens on the mainland of Asia? Why? 

2. Just in what ways does American control of the Philippines 
make our country a party to the Far-Eastern problem ? 

3. What is the significance of the Philippines as a commercial 
and naval base for the United States ? 

4. What bearing, if any, have American supremacy and Ameri- 
can policies in the Philippines on the growth of self-sustaining 
government in the Orient? 

5. How does American occupation of the Philippines affect the 
possibility of her taking a disinterested part in attempts toward 
the solution of the Far-Eastern problem? 

II. What do you think of America's record in the Philippines? 

1. How did the United States come to be in the Philippines? 

2. What has been the purpose of the United States with refer- 
ence to these wards of the nation ? 

3. How well has the United States succeeded in carrying out 
her declared purpose regarding these islands ? 

III. Is it or is it not possible for America to withdraw from 

the Philippines without menacing the future of these 
islands? 

1. How nearly are the peoples and tribes of the Philippines ready 
to govern themselves ? 

2. How much danger is there that Japan would seek to take the 
Philippines were the United States to withdraw ? In discussing 
this, take into consideration the ways in which the Philippines 
would be a desirable addition to Japan from the point of view : 

96 



AMERICAN CONTROL OF PHILIPPINES? 97 

a. Of achieving the domination of the trade routes of the 
western Pacific. 

b. Of securing an outlet for the excess of Japanese population. 

c. Of acquiring additional areas for commercial exploitation. 

3. Would the Philippines if independent be likely to be able to 
defend themselves against an aggressive Japan? What leads 
you to your opinion ? 

4. What considerations would lead you to feel that it would be 
to the interest of the Filipino people for America to with- 
draw? What considerations would lead you to feel that it 
would be to their interest for her to continue her administrative 
responsibilities ? 

IV. Should the nations of the East or those of the West have 

the dominating influence in the Philippines? 

1. Should the United States in pursuance of a benevolent over- 
lordship in the Philippines seek to relate the people of the 
islands as completely as possible to the developing types of 
Asiatic culture and life of the Far East, or should this guidance 
be in the direction of the fullest possible Occidental culture? 

2. If the Philippines are able to maintain their own independent 
government and if under such circumstances they should prefer 
Asiatic administrative affiliations, say with the Japanese or the 
Chinese, what should be the attitude of the United States? 

V. In general, what should be the future policy of the United 

States with respect to the Philippines? 

REFERENCE MATERIAL 

How America Came to Be in the Philippines 

The Philippines do not, like Porto Rico, stand guard at the gateway 
of our homeland. They guard the entrance to a remote and different 
world. To us here at home they are hardly a defense. They are rather 
a thing to be defended, and that at a distance and against possible 
claimants near at hand. Their value depends all upon our farther policy. 
If we are minded to push our battle line out to this front of the far 
eastern world, to plant our naval stations in every sea and police the 
planet with our sentinels, then the Philippines are a brave beginning. But 
we had not planned to do that. We had not thought we wished to do it. 
Nay, up to the very time when it all happened, we had not wished it. 
We had resolved to free Cuba and to abate a standing nuisance in our 
neighborhood. And lo, here we find ourselves in Malay land, deep 



98 AMERICA'S STAKE IN THE FAR EAST 

enmeshed in the tangled web of the East. It may all be fortunate, but it 
certainly was not intended. If in advance, any one had proposed to 
annex the Philippines we should have questioned his sanity. 

The decision once reached to annex the Philippines, the treaty was 
framed with intelligent regard to the true situation. Manila could 
not 'fail to be a naval station of importance, and all precautions were 
taken against its isolation. The commercial route to the Philippines is 
usually a roundabout one, for ships find it advisable to touch at Japanese 
and Chinese ports as well as at Manila. But for naval and military 
purposes a direct route is preferable. Hawaii lies on this direct route 
about three thousand miles from our shores. In the six or seven 
thousand miles from Hawaii to Manila an intermediate station was 
desired. This was supplied by the island of Guam, which Spain was also 
compelled to yield. With the annexation of Tutuila a year later, the 
United States completed its system of stepping stones across the Pacific, 
Hawaii for Japan, Hawaii and Guam for Manila, and Hawaii and Tutuila 
for New Zealand and Australia. Britain herself could not have chosen 
them better. She had been our teacher, and we had not sat at her feet 
in vain. 

It is all so natural, yet all so unexpected, so momentous. Two years 
before, ours was a republic, home staying and with no thought but to 
continue so. And now an empire had risen, an empire of which we had 
been the builders but not the architect. Harry H. Powers, "America 
among the Nations," pp. io6, 107. 

The American Record in the Philippines 

None can doubt the material benefits to the Filipinos of American 
rule during the first fifteen years of our occupation of the islands. But 
it is equally a fact that we held the people under a system of government 
contrary to the spirit and letter of American institutions. The violation 
of the dominating principle of our own Declaration of Independence that 
"all men are created equal" and of our belief that "taxation without 
representation" is inadmissible, was defended by the familiar pleas 
which uphold the doctrine of European eminent domain. President 
Roosevelt, who had said in 1904 that the Filipinos were "utterly in- 
capable of existing in independence at all, or of building up a civilization 
of their own," announced two years later that constantly increasing 
measures of liberty were being accorded to the Filipinos, and that in 
the spring of 1907, if "conditions warranted," their capacity for self- 
government would be tested by summoning the first legislative assembly. 
On July 20, 1907, election of delegates to the assembly was held. But 
suffrage was limited. There was a property qualification — a principle 
Americans had always refused to admit for themselves. Less than 
100,000 votes were cast. 



AMERICAN CONTROL OF PHILIPPINES? 99 

The repercussion of the nationalist feeling that swept Asia in 1910 
caused uprisings in several islands. Our troops were compelled to take 
the field again. The Democratic Party went before the country in the 
election of 1912 with a plank promising independence to the Filipinos at 
an early date. Congressman Jones of Virginia introduced a bill granting 
the Filipinos a provisional government from July 4, 19 13, and complete 
independence after eight years. The bill was accompanied by a joint 
resolution, requesting the President to negotiate the treaty with other 
world powers to neutralize the Philippines and guarantee their inde- 
pendence by international agreement. An eminent American, who had 
been an official of our government in the Philippine Islands for some 
years, wrote at the time : "The Filipino people believe that the platform 
of the Democratic Party promised them their independence at an early 
date. Rightly or wrongly, they have thus interpreted the declarations of 
the leaders of that party made publicly and privately. They are not 
sufficiently practiced in self-government to draw any distinction between 
promises and platform promises." 

But not until August 29, 1916, did the Congress of the United States 
provide an autonomous form of government for the islands, with both 
branches of the legislative body elective. By the terms of the present 
Organic Act, there are six executive departments, whose secretaries are 
appointed by the Governor-General with the consent of the Philippine 
Senate. Only the Secretary of the Department of Public Instruction 
is an American. Since the passage of this act, local municipal govern- 
ment has been instituted in nearly 900 towns. 

The glory of the American occupation of the Philippines is the 
public school system that has been organized in twenty years. There are 
nearly 5,000 schools with an enrolment of nearly 700,000 students, served 
by more than 12,000 teachers. English is taught in every school. To 
these imposing totals can be added 2,500 university students and 26,000 
pupils in 200 private schools. To realize what the Americans have suc- 
ceeded in doing Jn the Philippines, one has only to contrast their work 
in education with that of the French in Indo-China and the Dutch in the 
East Indies, the two neighboring colonial dominions. In Egypt, a richer 
country with larger revenue and about the same population, the British 
Ministry of Education has under its direct management schools for 30,000 
pupils. In the elementary vernacular schools of Egypt, the total enrol- 
ment is about 250,000 ! Illiteracy in Egypt is ninety-four per cent 
after nearly forty years of British occupation. This is one of the prin- 
cipal accusations of the Egyptians against British rule. Material benefits 
are given the natives in colonies administered by European powers. But 
nowhere in Africa or Asia, outside of the Philippines, can one see an 
honest effort being made to help the people toward a higher civilization 
through education. 

The complaint is rightly made by defenders of the European colonial 



loo AMERICA'S STAKE IN THE FAR EAST 

system that the results of educating the natives have been unsatisfactory. 
For political agitators who lead the movement for self-government are, 
without exception, the product of the schools. If only we could have 
textbooks for Asiatics without mention of the Magna Charta, John 
Hampden, the fate of Charles I and the Star Chamber, and the American 
and French revolutions ! 

The inevitable result of our efforts at education in the Philippines is 
the determination of the Filipinos to run their own affairs. It is fortu- 
nate that the United States went to the Peace Congress with the Organic 
Act of 1916 in active and effective operation. The American Govern- 
ment and the American people do not oppose the demands of the Filipinos 
for independence. During the Peace Conference, a delegation of repre- 
sentative Filipinos visited Washington to ask for independence. They 
received encouragement from officials and newspapers alike. The senti- 
ment of the American people was well expressed by Secretary of War 
Baker when he told the Filipino delegation that "Americans love liberty 
too greatly to deny it to others." — Herbert Adams Gibbons, "The New 
Map of Asia," pp. 137-141. 

The Philippines as a Trade Base 

Our fellow-Americans, the Filipinos, are going to be valuable lieu- 
tenants in our Far-Eastern trade drive after the war. The extent to 
which American manufacturers take advantage of the raw materials and 
the cheap and skilled labor available in the Philippine Islands and estab- 
lish branch factories there will have an important bearing upon the 
volume of sales of American goods in the Orient, according to a business 
man of Manila who is well posted on the commercial outlook in that part 
of the world. With rich iron deposits and coal equal to the best on 
Puget Sound, both widely distributed throughout the islands, and copper 
in the northern highlands of the archipelago, the exploitation of these 
resources will meet many industrial needs. 

"The Philippines are among the most progressive countries in the 
Orient and the question of skilled labor can be easily solved," says our 
Manila informant. "Those American manufactured products which 
would not stand Japanese competition might as well be made by American 
plants built in the Philippines. With labor as cheap as in Japan and raw 
materials accessible, the wisdom of erecting branch factories in our 
islands is self-evident. We would then be in a position to enjoy a reason- 
able share of Far-Eastern trade." . . . 

"Lying at the front gate of Asia, the Japanese will naturally use this 
advantage," remarks the Philippine merchant. "Add to this the cheap- 
ness of their labor and their rapidly growing number of skilled workmen 
and it is apparent that the United States cannot compete with them in 
many lines which they manufacture. This weakness in our commercial 



AMERICAN CONTROL OF PHILIPPINES? loi 

position in the Orient may be developed into an invulnerable strength. 
The Philippines offer the key to our problems." — Scientific American, 
December 7, 1918. 

Getting Out o£ the Philippines 

Philippine independence has been pledged by our Congress, and 
liberal opinion in Europe or in Asia desires neither to kick us out of 
the Philippines nor to keep us there against our will. But we can not 
get out of the Philippines, hastily or heedlessly, without endangeringthe 
entire Far-Eastern situation ; and we can not base upon a "scuttle" Philip- 
pine policy a general Far-Eastern policy that will be sustained by any of 
our Allies. This is a fact. I have discussed this matter with men in a 
position to talk authoritatively for Europe and Asia, and I have discussed 
it as one on record for many years for real Philippine independence. The 
reason why it is not feasible to turn the Philippines adrift at this moment 
is because that can not be done without setting up reactions all the way 
from Calcutta to Chemulpo, from Siningfu to Sandaken. We do not 
encourage, or justify, Japanese or British occupation when we multiply 
their difficulties in India, in Ireland, or in Korea. — Patrick Gallagher, 
Asia, September, 1919, p. 897. 

If conditions arise whereby other nations, in comparison with 
America, give people better advantages and opportunities under the 
changing circumstances of civilization and economic evolution, and 
better facilities to work, and better protection for their lives and property, 
then the tide will turn, and gradually people will drift away from America 
in their political allegiance, toward those better advantages and facilities 
and protection. It is not from accident or preference that many Ameri- 
cans now do business in China, and in other countries, as British and 
other foreign corporations. If the proposal to abandon the Philippines 
without making any provision for their stability and security is carried 
out, there will be some interesting manifestations of this principle. I 
never have met a superior type of business man or investor in the 
Philippines who has any faith in the ability of the Filipinos to conduct 
a stable government now, and to preserve their nationality without 
foreign aid. If United States authority and protection are withdrawn 
from the islands, the principal American interests and property there 
will be driven to seek protection, and the greater part of them probably 
will get under the British flag as soon as they can; and many Filipino- 
owned interests will do the same thing. — Thomas F. Millard, "Our 
Eastern Question," pp. 384, 385. 

The Filipinos Not Ready to Govern Themselves 

I am firmly convinced that the Filipinos are where they are today 



I02 AMERICA'S STAKE IN THE FAR EAST 

only because they have been pushed into line, and that if outside pressure 
were relaxed they would steadily and rapidly deteriorate. 

It is not necessary that there should be much retrogression to cause 
serious trouble. I have discussed the character and attitude of the pres- 
ent Filipino legislative body. I have shown indubitably what sort of a 
government the Filipinos themselves established while they had a free 
hand. I agree absolutely with Blout's contention that they would again 
establish precisely the same sort of a government if left to their own 
devices. There would follow first, aggression against the property of 
foreigners, and then attacks upon their persons, which would not only 
excuse, but would necessitate, intervention by other governments to 
protect their citizens. Some of the more intelligent Filipino leaders 
would set their faces against such conduct as firmly as they did during 
the rule of the so-called insurgent government, but now, as then, would 
be powerless to restrain either the more unprincipled among the in- 
telligent, or the great body of the ignorant rank and file, and nothing 
more than a fairly plausible excuse would be needed to start the ball of 
foreign intervention rolling. 

Many Americans may, in their present deep ignorance of the value 
of their most recently acquired possessions, agree with that distinguished 
representative who announced on the floor of the House of Representa- 
tives that the Philippines were "a lemon," but agents and spies of Japan 
have worked throughout the entire archipelago and she knows better. 
England and Germany have had their business men in the islands for 
many years, and they know better also. 

The Filipinos are not yet fit to govern themselves, much less to 
govern the Moros and other non-Christian tribes, even if let alone, and 
they would not be let alone should we turn their country over to them. 

Philippine independence is not a present possibility, nor will it be 
possible for at least two generations. Indeed, if by the end of a century 
we have welded into a people the descendants of the composite and 
complex group of human beings who today inhabit the islands, we shall 
have no cause to feel ashamed of our success. . . . 

We are giving the Filipinos a fair chance to develop every latent 
ability which they possess. In the very nature of the case, their future 
lies, and must lie, wholly with them. There is no royal road to real 
independence, much less is there any short cut. Our Filipino wards must 
tread the same long, weary path that has been trodden by every nation 
that has heretofore attained to good government. . . . 

After all is said and done, the real Philippine question is not what 
path they shall take. ... It is not whether they shall travel the old, 
old road a little faster, or a little more slowly. That will ultimately be 
settled, for them and for us, by the unanswerable logic of events, and 
we need not worry over it. The real question is, shall they make their 
long and adventurous journey, guided, helped, and protected by the strong 



AMERICAN CONTROL OF PHILIPPINES? 103 

and, kindly hand of the United States of America, or shall they be left 
to stagger along alone, blind in their own conceit, under the keen and 
watchful eye of another powerful nation, hungrily awaiting their first 
misstep? — Dean C. Worcester, "The Philippines Past and Present," pp. 
959, 960, 971, 973. 

Philippine Independence from the Point of View of the Fil- 
ipinos 

Now that the war is at an end, we feel that the time has arrived 
when the Philippine question should be settled by the Government of the 
United States. During the last three years the people of the Philippines 
have not discussed the question of independence. That has made some 
people feel that the Filipinos are satisfied with their government and do 
not want any change. That is a mistake. The people of the Philip- 
pines have ceased discussing the question of independence for several 
reasons. One is that the Jones Law emphasizes the promise that the 
independence of the Philippines shall be granted whenever stable govern- 
ment shall have been established. When that law was enacted, the 
Filipinos felt that it was time for them to do things and not to talk. 
Therefore, they proceeded to enact those measures which are the basis 
of the present stable government of the Filipino people. They put into 
effect the measures which were needed to secure the stable government 
upon which our independence was to be based. Another reason for not 
discussing independence was that the people felt that they should do 
nothing and say nothing which might embarrass the United States during 
the war. The Filipino people are happy today. They are happier than 
ever before in the history of the country. They are contented and are 
accomplishing much. But that they are happy does not mean that they 
would rather live under the present form of government. — Manuel L. 
Quezon, President of the Philippine Senate, Asia, May, 1919, p. 428. 

The Filipino people would not be just to themselves if, at this 
moment when their political separation from the sovereign country is 
proposed, they should fail to express in the clearest and most definite 
manner the sentiments and purposes that inspire their action. They 
therefore deem it their duty to affirm : That their independence, instead of 
destroying or weakening, will tend to strengthen the bonds of friendship 
and appreciation created by the gratitude of the Filipino people, not only 
for the final measure of complete justice and humanity that they confi- 
dently expect, but for all the previous disinterested work so splendidly 
performed for the benefit of the Philippines by so many faithful sons of 
America; that this gratitude will be the first fundamental fact in the 
future relations between the United States and the Philippine Islands; 
that in the present state of the international affairs the Filipino people 
merely aspire to become another conscious and direct instrument for the 



104 AMERICA'S STAKE IN THE FAR EAST 

progress of liberty and civilization ; that in the tranquil course of their 
years of constitutional development they will maintain for all people in- 
habiting their hospitable land the essence and benefit of democratic 
institutions; that they will continue to associate, in so far as this will be 
acceptable and their strength will permit, in the work of reconstruction, 
justice, and peace carried on by the United States in continuation of 
those other undertakings, the high purpose of which was the cause, ac- 
cording, to President Wilson, of the magnificent cooperation during the 
war ; and, finally, that in thus preserving their best traditions and institu- 
tions in the new situation which will strengthen and perfect them, the 
Filipino people will continue to make this country as heretofore a safe 
place of law and order, justice and liberty, where Americans and 
foreigners as well as Nationals may live peacefully in the pursuit of 
happiness and prosperity and safe in the enjoyment of their property as 
well as of their rights and their liberty. — Declaration of the Independence 
Philippine Commission. Quoted by Maximo M. Kalaw, "Self-Govern- 
ment in the Philippines," pp. 158, 159. 

Japanese Strategy and the Philippines 

If Japan has felt it necessary to drive the Germans from Shantung 
and the islands of the Pacific in order to remove a menace to her own 
security and to insure the peace of the Far East, may she not feel that 
she must drive the Americans from the Philippines to the same end? 

Must not the American possession of the Philippines be a menace in 
the eyes of Japanese strategists to the security of Japan and Japan's 
policies? Are not the Philippines the vulnerable spot at which the Jap- 
anese can strike the United States, either tentatively — in diplomacy — 
or actually — with armed force? It matters not whether the Japanese 
"want" the Philippines. The United States did not want them — but we 
took them. We did not need them, but we have them. If Japan feels 
that our possession of them is a menace to her, she will wish that menace 
removed. Should she conclude to strike us, she would as a matter of 
course seize them, and then it would be the unpleasant and difficult task 
of the United States to fight on the offensive for their recovery. It may 
or may not be true that we do not want the Philippines, or that we would 
profit by being rid of them; we would, nevertheless, resent and resist any 
efifort to take them away from us. — Stanley K. Hornbeck, "Contemporary 
Politics in the Far East," p. 376. 

The Philippines are fast assuming a position relative to the Jap- 
anese Islands, similar to that occupied by Korea before the Russo-Jap- 
anese war. ^ 

Japan's industries claim the markets of the Far East as peculiarly 
their own. They cannot, and most likely will not, even in the future, be 
able to compete with English and American or German merchandise 



AMERICAN CONTROL OF PHILIPPINES? 105 

under a regime of the open door — ergo, the advisability of closing the 
door. 

The Philippines — to a country, master of sufficient land and sea 
power to profit fully by the advantages they bestow — is the position from 
which the "open door" policy can be enforced. . . . 

The Philippines are, in foreign hands, a menace to the Japanese 
doctrine of exclusion in the Far East, but their possession with Hawaii 
would make Japan invulnerable against attack, on condition always that 
her militant forces were such as to be able to use those positions. 

The adjustment of these divergent interests is destined to test to the 
uttermost the relative forces, militant and diplomatic, of the powers on 
the opposed sides of the Pacific Ocean. — Prince Lazarovich Hrebeliano- 
vich, "The Orient Question," pp. 247, 248. 

No great national gain can accrue to Japan through the subjugation 
of the Philippines. The complete possession of the islands would 
scarcely compensate Japan for the probable cost of such a procedure. It 
is still an open question whether the Japanese can successfully settle in 
the tropics. The exceptional opportunities of Davao are at present draw- 
ing Japanese to that place, but even there Japanese immigration is still 
in an experimental stage. It is entirely uncertain whether Japanese 
laborers can thrive in the other parts of the islands. Many Japanese be- 
lieve that with Korea, Manchuria, and Formosa, Japan is sufficiently 
occupied with territorial dominions, and that in the long run it would be 
more advantageous for her to adopt a policy of righteousness and fair 
dealing with all nations than to seek new fields of conquest. An assur- 
ance to that effect would greatly strengthen her friendship with the Allies 
and, consequently, her own credit abroad. . . . 

Granting then — at least for the sake of argument — that Japan does 
not endeavor to colonize the Philippines, what are the principles upon 
which sound and friendly Filipino- Japanese relations can be built ? Japan 
will surely find the Philippine Republic a friendly neighbor and sister. 
The Filipinos themselves have nothing but admiration and good wishes 
for an Asiatic people who, by their own strength, have won the recogni- 
tion of a hitherto doubting world and have carved their proud name in the 
council-chamber of the great nations. The Philippines are asking only 
for an opportunity for free and unhampered development of their people 
and natural resources, so that they can in their humble way contribute to 
the civilization and progress of mankind. Is it not clear that both the 
Japanese and Filipino nations can work in harmony toward the further- 
ance of their common interests? — Maximo M. Kalaw, Asia, 1919, pp. 
430» 431- 

A Japanese Point of View 

The Japanese know the Philippine situation too well to fancy even 



io6 AMERICA'S STAKE IN THE FAR EAST 

for a moment that the islands can be had for the asking. They know 
that an attempt to acquire the territory will cause endless trouble and 
countless expenditure, for the Filipinos, who have been opposing Ameri- 
can rule, will more strenuously oppose Japanese rule. Certainly the Jap- 
anese are not foolish enough to think that such a game is worth the 
candle. . . . Cold calculation convinces us that it would be far more 
profitable for the Japanese not to tamper with the territorial autonomy of 
the Philippines, but to confine their activities there to the exploitation of 
resources and the development of trade, with the cooperation of the 
natives. 

The idea of converting the territory into an integral part of the 
Japanese Empire . . . seems highly impractical. But if Japan were ever 
to acquire the Philippines, the acquisition would be made only under one 
of two conditions. First, she would not decline to become the mistress of 
the country if the Filipinos would willingly place themselves under the 
rule of the Mikado. Business sense forbids Japan to fight for the absorp- 
tion of the islands at any considerable cost of blood and money. 
Secondly, Japan might be compelled to annex the country, even against 
her will, if its internal conditions after the withdrawal of American 
authority were such as to invite the aggression of ambitious European 
powers. — Kiyoshi K. Kawakami, "Japan in World Politics," pp. 211-216. 

The Philippines as an Outlet for China's Overpopulation 

Assuming that the neutrality of the Philippines could be secured and 
that the islands would be forever free from the danger of foreign aggres- 
sion, that would not solve the immigration problem which the independent 
Philippines would have to face. Six hundred miles north of Manila, 
connected by many steamship lines, is the port of Hong Kong and nearby 
the crowded city of Canton and the overpopulated provinces of Kwang- 
tung and Fukien. Here, within easy distance of the Philippines, is a 
population of hard-working Chinese almost equal to the population of 
the United States. Kwangtung province, with an area less than that of 
the Philippines and with natural resources much smaller, has a population 
of 31,000,000. These southern Chinese have developed to the utter- 
most the agricultural resources of their own country. To them the large 
undeveloped regions of the Philippines have been the promised land for 
centuries. They were kept out by the Spanish authorities and later were 
kept out by the Americans. It is inconceivable that with their newly 
awakened pride of race, the giant China would allow the puny Philippine 
Republic to bar or restrict the Chinese by either treaty or law. The 
independence of the Philippines would be the signal for the entrance of 
a stream of Chinese immigrants. The island could easily support a 
population of 50,000,000 Chinese, who would make it one of the garden 
spots of the world and the most prosperous place in the tropics. 



AMERICAN CONTROL OF PHILIPPINES? 107 

Perhaps not so many would come. But certainly the immigration 
of Chinese to the Philippines, following their unrestricted entry, would 
be numbered by the hundreds of thousands. With the Filipinos crowded 
from business and from the most profitable trades by the 50,000 Chinese 
now in the islands, what would become of them with from 500,000 to 
3,000,000 there? Neutrality agreements might prevent other nations 
from seizing the territory of the Philippines, but no agreement and no law 
the Philippine Government would be able to enforce would ever protect 
the Filipinos from this industrial invasion. Chinese would be dominant 
industrially in the Philippines within a decade after the granting of 
independence. — Carl Crow, "America and the Philippines," pp. 276-278. 

The Filipinos and the Non-Christian Tribes 

The Filipinos dislike and despise the non-Christians. They take 
advantage of their ignorance and helplessness to rob or cheat them of 
the fruits of their labor, and often hold them as slaves or peons. The 
non-Christians in turn hate them, and the more warlike wild tribes do 
not hesitate to take vengeance on them when opportunity offers. The 
Filipinos as a whole are afraid of the Moros, and with good reason. 
The Moros frankly assert that if a Filipino government were established, 
they would resume their long-abandoned conquest of the archipelago, 
and this they would certainly do. Although the non-Christians are 
numerically few, as compared with the Christians, they are potentially 
important because they have the power to make an amount of trouble 
wholly disproportionate to their numbers. The Filipinos could not rule 
them successfully, and the probable outcome of any attempt on their 
part to control them would be the inauguration of a policy of extermina- 
tion similar to that which Japan is following with certain of the hill 
men of Formosa. Because of the inaccessible nature of the country 
inhabited by many of the Philippine wild tribes, they would be able to 
hold their own for many years, and there would result a condition 
similar to that which has prevailed for so long in Achin, while the 
Moros, with their ability to take to the sea and suddenly strike unpro- 
tected places, would cause endless suffering and loss of life. — Dean C. 
Worcester, "The Philippines Past and Present," pp. 951, 952. 



CHAPTER X 

HOW FAR DOES THE NUMERICAL STRENGTH 

OF THE YELLOW RAGE CONSTITUTE A 

PROBLEM IN THE FAGIFIG BASIN? 

I. What is the population o£ the Far East? How does it 

compare in the aggregate with the population of the 
United States? How does it compare with that o£ 
the United States in density? 

II. Compare the two sections of the world as to increase of 

population, wages, standards of living, possibility of en- 
listment of industrial workers, potential military 
strength. 

1. What aspects of danger, if any, to the future of the United 
States do you see in the present and the probable future numer- 
ical strength of the nations of the Far East ? 

2. Of what race in the Far East do you feel America might have 
most to fear in the future from the military point of view? 
From the point of view of commercial and industrial competi- 
tion? From that of land hunger? Why? 

III. What advantage should America take of the supply of 

cheap labor in the Far East? 

1. Would you like to see American manufacturers start factories 
in the Far East in order to get the advantage of such labor? 
Why, or why not ? 

2. How far would you favor the reduction of the high cost of 
living in America by the extensive importation of goods made 
by cheap labor in the Orient ? 

3. In case of continued labor shortage in the United States, 
would you or would you not favor the admittance of a limited 
number of Oriental laborers to the United States ? If so, would 
you wish to admit enough really to make labor plentiful and 
cheap? If not, why not? 

IV. How can this vast population of the Far East best help 

the world? 

I. Given a great and growing population in the Far East, in what 

108 



NUMERICAL STRENGTH OF YELLOW RACE 109 

ways do you feel it could best be used to help the world, includ- 
ing of course, Eastern Asia? 

2. How much loss at present to the world does their lower 
standard of efficiency and production seem to you to represent ? 

3. Just how far should America concern herself with the stan- 
dard of living of the peoples of the Far East? In discussing 
this take into consideration : 

a. Their ability to buy from us. 

b. Their ability to sell to us. 

c. Their ability to produce for the world. 

d. Their possible competition in world markets because of 
cheap labor. 

e. Their desire to emigrate. 

f. Their possible tendencies toward unrest and revolution 
growing out of basal economic need, and the probable inter- 
national effects of such unrest. 

g. Our duty to maintain an altruistic interest in the welfare 
of other peoples. 

V. What can be done towards a solution o£ this problem of 
population? 

1. _ In what ways does the introduction of modern inventions and 
improvements help and in what ways hinder such a solution? 
How do the introduction of railroads and the extension of 
trade affect it ? 

2. _ Would you like to have the nations of the Far East fully 
instructed in modern science, including medicine and sanitation, 
chemistry, and the manufacture of explosives? 

a. If so, vwhy ? How would you go to work to prevent an 
ultimate destructive use of science by the yellow race against 
the white race ? 

b. If not, why not? Just how would you go to work to pre- 
vent the spread of scientific knowledge in the Far East ? 

3. In just what ways can missionary work affect the economic 
development and the standards of life of these peoples ? 

REFERENCE MATERIAL 

Overpopulation in Japan 

The Empire of Japan is composed of several thousand islands, only 
five of which are as large as the State of Connecticut, the others being so 



no AMERICA'S STAKE IN THE FAR EAST 

small that none of them is of any importance and hundreds are not 
inhabited. . . . The entire area of the Empire is only 600 square miles 
greater than the area of California. . . . 

However, while the area of this small kingdom is about the same 
as that of California, the extent of its fields is much less. In California 
one-third of the total area is under cultivation, while in Japan the culti- 
vated area is only one-eighth. . . . Mountainous Switzerland contains six 
times the proportion of agricultural land that is to be found in Japan, 
where the fields under cultivation cover but 20,000 square miles. That 
is the area from which the present population of 60,000,000 is fed, except 
as they are able to purchase food from other countries and supplement 
the produce of the farms with fish and seaweed from the neighboring 
waters. . . . 

It has often been pointed out that the population of Japan is not so 
dense as in Belgium or England. But Belgium and England are almost 
wholly arable; Japan is almost wholly mountainous. If we eliminate 
from the figures of area the unproductive lands of each country, the 
population per square mile works out, approximately: England, 466; 
Belgium, 702; Japan, 2,688. A population of 2,688 on every square 
mile of arable land — less than a quarter of an acre of land for each, 
person! There is more good farm land in mountainous Kentucky than 
in all Japan. . . . While we in America have the most liberal allowance 
of land on which to raise our food and the food of others, Japan has 
the most meager allowance. Japan might exist in luxury on the unculti- 
vated fence corners of America. — Carl Crow, "Japan and America," 
pp. 8-19. 

Japan has a population nearly double that of the whole United States 
west of the Mississippi. . . . Although she has a vast urban population, 
she manages by her intensive agriculture to raise nearly all her own 
food, while England similarly situated imports half to three-fourths of 
her own. . . . Despite the amazing frugality and admirable simplicity of 
Japanese life, Japan suffers acutely from congestion of population. Yet 
that population is on the increase, and the efforts of a solicitous govern- 
ment have thus far not availed to check the increase. Here is the first 
and most fundamental problem of the Japanese people. There are too 
many for their little land, and place and food must be found for the 
growing surplus. 

Overpopulation is one of the most serious dangers that ever con- 
fronts a nation. People do not know what is the matter. They are 
conscious of a vague malaise which expresses itself in many different 
forms and lends itself to the most diverse interpretations. Lack of em- 
ployment, low wages, high cost of living, and burdensome taxes — neces- 
sary concomitants of overpopulation — are charged to the iniquities of the 
industrial order, the rapacity of dealers, and the corruption of govern- 



NUMERICAL STRENGTH OF YELLOW RACE iii 

ment. No social order is perfect enough wholly to refute such charges, or 
strong enough to ignore them. All disturbing and disruptive forces are 
accentuated by this most fundamental of maladies. Relief in some form 
is a condition of national tranquillity if not of national existence. — Harry 
H. Powers, "America among the Nations," pp. 213, 214. 

China's Multitudinous Millions 

China has a problem of increasing population, which hitherto, ha^ 
been largely regulated during the centuries by constantly recurring 
famines, pestilences, and revolts, but with the adoption of sanitary and 
hygienic conditions resulting in the conservation of human lives, coupled 
with the introduction of labor-saving devices, this question must become 
formidable; such conditions, yielding overwhelming tides of human 
material for industrial slavery, must affect the economic destinies of other 
countries. — Prince Lazarovich Hrebelianovich, "The Orient Question," 
p. 208. 

No one knows just how many Chinese there are, but the number is 
probably not much less than 300,000,000 and it may be more. Careful 
estimates seem to indicate that in spite of famine, pestilence, and civil 
strife, it has not declined in the past hundred and fifty years. During the 
earlier more prosperous years of the Manchu dynasty it rapidly increased. 
Hand in hand with the practically universal ancestor worship has gone 
the conviction that there is no greater crime than to die without leaving 
male posterity to carry on the sacrifices at the graves of one's forbears. 
Marriage is early, usually before the bride and groom are twenty. Con- 
cubinage is common among the well-to-do, and for women respectability 
and marriage are practically synonymous. Under such conditions, if 
famine, pestilence, and civil war are once eliminated or considerably re- 
duced, population will multiply rapidly. Extensive civil war is not per- 
mitted by the powers; famine is being fought by Chinese and foreigners 
with all the zeal and skill of a humanitarian and scientific age ; disease is 
being reduced arid will be reduced much further by modern medical 
science; voluntary restraint of the birth rate can come only slowly. A 
rapid advance in population would seem to be inevitable. Eventually 
modern methods of agriculture, reclamation projects, improved methods 
of industry, transportation, and commerce will provide added food and 
wealth, but these will come slowly. The immediate future would seem 
to have in store increased poverty and unrest for the masses of the 
nation. China cannot find in unrestricted emigration a relief for the 
congestion. In Manchuria and Mongolia, it is true, there are great unoc- 
cupied fertile areas, and in many parts of China there is wild land that 
can be reclaimed. But the white race has preempted most of the vacant 
districts of the world and has forbidden other races to trespass. 
Australia, the United States, and Canada all have strict exclusion acts 



112 AMERICA'S STAKE IN THE FAR EAST 

directed against the Chinese. They are not permitted to share with their 
white brothers the virgin lands of the temperate zones. — Kenneth S. 
Latourette, "The Development of China," pp. 243, 244. 

The Struggle for Food Supply 

Of the three great nuclei of population in the world, Eastern 
Asia, Southern Asia, and Western (and Central) Europe, only one has 
been able to draw upon the surplus food of the world. Eight hundred 
million Asiatics have been forced to live on their own meager home 
resources. As China begins to export coal, iron, textiles, and other 
manufactured products, however, she will be able, whether politically 
independent or not, to compete with Europe for the purchase of this 
food supply. Not only will China's population probably increase with 
the advent of industrialism, but the standard of living of her population 
will rise, and her competition with Europe for the sale of manufactured 
products and the purchase of food will become intense. The cheap, 
patient, disciplined labor of China's hundreds of millions will be fighting 
with the Belgian, the German, and the Italian wage-earners to secure the 
food which it will be necessary to import. 

It is not a yellow, but a human peril : a mere addition to the hungry 
mouths that are to be fed. The supply of exportable food that can be 
raised in the world has of course not reached its maximum, but beyond 
a certain point every increase in agricultural production means a more 
than proportional increase in the cost of the product. To feed 800,000,000 
costs much more than twice as much as to feed 400,000,000, Even 
though China secure only a minor part of the exportable food, it will by 
just so much increase the strain upon the industrial populations of 
Europe. 

It is a crisis for European industrialism, a slowly preparing crisis 
with infinitely tragic possibilities. What it involves is not a mere redis- 
tribution of wealth and income, but an adjustment of populations to the 
available home and foreign resources in food. — Walter E, Weyl, "Ameri- 
can World Policies," pp. 286, 1897. 

Choked and Smothered Peoples 

When the masses of the East, crowded out of their own countries, 
seek breathing room in the yet undeveloped countries of the West, the 
West is ready to expel them even at the point of the bayonet. Try how- 
ever hard you may, you cannot escape the logical conclusion which must 
inevitably be drawn from the existing state of relations between the East 
and West. One of two things must eventually be done — either the 
freedom of migration of all peoples from one country to another must be 
recognized, or the great colonial powers, holding vast territories, rich 
with resources yet sparsely populated, must give up some of their holdings 



NUMERICAL STRENGTH OF YELLOW RACE 113 

in favor of land-hungry peoples, choked and smothered in their native 
countries. Without dispelling the potential cause of conflict, it is futile 
to speak of disarmament or permanent peace. The dove of peace builds 
its nest only in the haunts of justice. 

If the East still silently acquiesces in the present order of things, it 
is simply because the East is powerless to assert its rights. Most of us 
hesitate to look this question squarely in the face, because its magnitude, 
with all its portentous possibilities, appals us. Yet it is a question which 
must be met honestly and courageously, if we are to avoid a world 
catastrophe mightier than the upheaval which is now shaking Europe 
from its foundations. — Kiyoshi K. Kawakami, "J^P^^i ^^ World Politics," 
pp. xiii, xiv. 

While all the Powers of Europe were engaged in a desperate war 
of resistance to Teutonic aggression, and we were looking on, practically 
helpless, at the internecine butchery of the white race, there has been a 
steady revival among the vast populations which inhabit the territories 
extending from the Persian Gulf to the Sulu Sea, and from the Amur 
River to the Straits of Singapore. Nevertheless, we still talk with confi- 
dence of capturing more of Asiatic trade and influencing for all time 
Asiatic development. 

Not long ago, European nations were calmly discussing and deciding 
among themselves how much more of sleepy Asia they should appropri- 
ate, for the benefit, no doubt, of the peoples brought under this foreign 
rule. But now our sense of conscious superiority is being shaken, and 
when we find the inscrutable Asiatic learning to meet us successfully with 
our own weapons, we draw back a little. We even begin to see that he 
may have good grounds for regarding his white rivals as the uncultured 
and discourteous barbarians that, in many respects, we really are. — H. M. 
Hyndman, "The Awakening of Asia," p. 276. 

The Orient is acquiring a new life — a, new vitality. The motive 
power that will more and more direct its policies is twofold. The first 
factor is practical. It will come from the pressure of an increasing 
population — pressure that will grow mightily with every new decade. 
For Occidental hygiene, medical science, and ideals as to the value of the 
individual will rapidly multiply China's millions. Japan's population 
has doubled in fifty years. Will China's population do the same ? Where 
will they live ? Whence will they secure their food ? 

The second factor is psychological. Orientals are not lacking in 
pride, in courage, in determination, and in ideals. An armed Orient will 
resent discourtesy, humiliation, and unfair dealing. It will fight for 
honor — for equal treatment. If the West claims superiority and right 
based on might, the East when ready will challenge its claim and test 
its might. — Sidney L. Gulick, "American Democracy and Asiatic Citizen- 
ship," pp. II, 12. 



114 AMERICA'S STAKE IN THE FAR EAST 

Economic Significance of Asiatic Labor 

It is not likely that the Chinese will take up speedily the cooperative 
phase of industry. The economic circumstances and social environment 
have not yet reached the stage where this is possible. In all probability 
a considerable period of competition must come, as in Japan and Europe, 
before such a transformation can be brought about. During this period 
the Chinese will be themselves most formidable competitors on the 
markets of the world. More formidable even than the Japanese if they 
work independently. Most formidable of all if they work in combina- 
tion with those islanders — which is by no means unlikely. 

For the Chinese in their own country, as abroad, are the most 
persistent and indefatigable toilers the world has ever seen. Like the 
English, they are content to be wage-slaves, so long as they get what 
they consider to be good pay. They are ready to work long hours in 
factories at rates of wages which the European laborer of similar capacity 
would scoff at. By universal admission, in all grades of employment they 
are proving themselves little, if at all, inferior to their white compeers. — 
H. M. Hyndman, "The Awakening of Asia," pp. 113, 114. 

The migration in the course of a few years, into any single Occi- 
dental land, of millions or even of several hundred thousand Asiatic 
laborers would unquestionably cause serious economic competition for 
Caucasian laborers. Asiatic unmarried laborers would underbid, out- 
work, and outlive Caucasian laborers, especially those having families to 
support. Caucasian labor would doubtless be driven from any field to 
which Asiatic labor could enjoy free and unresisted admittance. 

The alleged danger, however, to Occidental manufacturing classes 
from the importation of articles manufactured by cheap Asiatic labor is 
not in reality such as is commonly asserted. For it is to be remembered 
that the West cannot purchase goods manufactured in Asia unless Asia 
purchases corresponding values from us. In proportion, however, as 
Asiatics purchase from us will they give us work. In proportion, more- 
over, as they sell to us will they be able to buy from us. 

There is, nevertheless, a second form of industrial competition with 
cheap Asiatic labor that merits serious consideration. Suppose the plans 
of Occidental capitalists succeed for the economic and political domina- 
tion of Asia. Let us assume also that the mining resources, railroad 
concessions, manufacturing establishments, and merchant marine of 
China are practically owned by Occidental capital. It will, of course, 
employ cheap Chinese labor at the cheapest possible rates. Occidental 
capital will not interest itself in raising the wages and the scale of life 
of its employes; for the greater the difference between the cost of Occi- 
dental and Oriental labor the greater the profits of capital on Asiatic 
manufactures purchased in the West. The purchase, moreover, by the 
West of articles manuf?ictured in the East will not be from Oriental but 



NUMERICAL STRENGTH OF YELLOW RACE 115 

from Occidental capitalists. The West will need, therefore, to send to 
Asia in payment only the amount needed for the actual wages and raw 
material of the cheap Asiatic labor. The profits will all remain in the 
hands of Occidental capitalists. It is not, indeed, impossible that the 
profits from the sales in Asia of Occidentally owned Asiatic factories, 
mines, and railroads could completely pay for the raw material and the 
low wages of such labor as is employed in manufacturing articles for 
export to the West. In that case Asia could export to the West in- 
definite amounts of manufactured goods without needing to purchase 
anything whatever from the West. The transaction would be entirely 
between Occidentals, the purchaser and the seller both being Westerners. 
Under such circumstances, the disastrous effect on Occidental fac- 
tories and factory laborers would be frightful. In other words, the final 
economic effect on both Asiatics and Caucasians of Occidental economic 
and political domination of Asia would be highly destructive of the true 
welfare of both East and West. It would prevent the real economic 
prosperity and social, mental, and moral development of Asia's millions 
and make it impossible for them to purchase much from the West. But 
the sale in the West of articles made in Asia, without a corresponding 
purchase from the West by the East, would reduce Occidental labor to 
serious economic straits, possibly even more serious than that of Asiatic 
labor itself. It would keep both Asiatic and Occidental labor in complete 
economic bondage. This condition, East and West, would inevitably 
produce corresponding mental and moral degeneration, and the final 
complete collapse of democracy in every Occidental land. — Sidney L. 
Gulick, "America and the Orient," pp. 21-23. 

Raising the Standard of Living of the Orient 

It is no longer possible for nations to shield themselves behind 
"Chinese walls" of seclusion and isolation, as we have tried to do 
hitherto. The Orient tried it and failed, and the same result is bound 
sooner or later to overtake a like attempt on the part of the Occident. 
The only solution, then, is to overlook no opportunity to extend a helping 
band to the Orient, to aid it in every possible way in its efforts to 
advance, to grasp the essentials of modern civilized life, and to assimilate 
its standards of living to our own. In this way, and only in this way, 
can the danger of future economic competition of a disastrous nature be 
avoided. The Oriental is quite as susceptible as is his Occidental brother 
to the pleasure to be derived from creature comforts and luxuries, and 
he is equally averse to having these taken away from him once he has 
become accustomed to them. The reason why our present standards of 
living do not exist in China is the same which explains their non-exist- 
ence in the Europe and America of only a few generations ago : modern 
means of communication, of transportation, and of the application of 



ii6 AMERICA'S STAKE IN THE FAR EAST 

machinery to the numberless processes of modern civilized life have not 
yet been introduced. The country is predominantly agricultural. Com- 
merce, manufactures, mining, and transportation have yet to be developed 
to the point where they can begin to afford a livelihood to any very great 
part of the population. Political ideals will have to crystallize in the 
shape of definite, well thought out, generally accepted and consistently 
followed policies, both domestic and foreign. Until these changes take 
place, standards of living and the crowding of population upon the limit 
of food supply will improve but slowly. — C. W. Bishop, Journal of Race 
Development, July, 1918, p. 70. 

The Fundamental Needs of Human Life 

The very countries which have been front and center of the world's 
later progress in civilization have been also the swarmers for peopling 
the earth. But the case of Europe does not stand alone. The most 
advanced of all Oriental nations, the Japanese, are still more prolific. At 
present this nation is said to be doubling its population in about fifty, 
instead of ninety, years. 

There are now undoubted signs that growth in civilization is to some 
extent a check on fertility, and consequently that such rapid increase of 
population of civilized countries as has characterized the later centuries 
will not be kept up. But, on the other hand, the staying of disease, 
famine, and infanticide, which in the past have been potent in keeping 
down population, are among the most prized and distinctive marks of 
progress. And now comes the possibility that the near future will see 
war, the fourth great check on population, shorn of its truly devastating 
power. All in all, the conclusion seems unescapable that high and ever 
higher world civilization implies large and ever larger world population. 

Having regard to these facts of population and to the limited size 
of the earth, and reflecting that advance in civilization is conditioned 
on nothing less than ever increasing richness of human life — improving 
physical health, and never ceasing intellectual, moral, and esthetic, and 
religious growth — and how avoid recognizing that in the future all 
economic endeavor and much of political endeavor will have to concern 
themselves far more positively and directly with the indispensable 
requisites of the great rank and file of populations than they have in 
the past? 

There can be no question that the demand for greater world de- 
mocratization, which has become the battle cry for all nations now fight- 
ing German autocracy and militarism, is also the watchword of a great 
forward move in world civilization, and that one element in the success 
of the movement would be the death knell not only of irresponsible 
political rule but as well of irresponsible economic exploitation. 

The indubitable needs of civilized peoples which in future will be the 



NUMERICAL STRENGTH OF YELLOW RACE 117 

great inspiration of political action will have to oppose ambition for 
material wealth hardly less stoutly and vigilantly than it will have to 
oppose ambition for dynastic and militaristic power. And this will 
bring a change over nearly the whole of economic theory, purpose, and 
method. — Professor William E. Ritter, "The Resources of the North 
Pacific Ocean: Their Extent, Utilization, and Conservation," pp. 5, 6. 

Reckoning with the Unity o£ the World 

Hitherto and always the workers of the world have been dis- 
tinguished by their international outlook. I think they have been more 
full of thought and consideration for men and women of other countries, 
climes, and colors than their own than most of the citizens of this 
country. But I doubt whether that outlook has yet sufficiently embraced 
the great future industrial powers of the Eastern nations and of the 
inhabitants of the great continent of Africa. And I do not think it has 
been sufficiently realized up to now how close in aim, desire, and, there- 
fore, as it ought to be, in effort the missionary cause of the Church and 
the true aspirations of labor really are. . . . 

The world, for good or evil, is one. The unity of the world is not 
a dream of the poet ; it is a factor with which politicians and industrialists 
alike have to reckon. The dreamers — the people who are hopelessly out 
of touch with facts — are the people who confine their lives' interests to 
their own nation, and consider still that the world is divided up into a 
number of separate nationalities. The men who have their hands upon 
facts are those who recognize that now, and from this time on, the 
world everywhere is one body. The war proved it without any doubt, 
and showed that you cannot have a great evil in one part of the world 
without the remotest part of the world shaking in response. The con- 
sequences of the war are proving it. . . . We cannot escape the industrial 
unity of the world. The nations that command raw materials and the 
cheapest possible labor will command the markets of the world, and it is 
impossible for any sensible man to shut them outside. The consequences 
of your having great new nations such as Japan or China, or vast 
masses of backward peoples such as central Africa — where raw materials 
are being accumulated in abundance, and labor, for want of any restrain- 
ing standard, is being exploited — may be great disaster to the industries 
of the world and great hindrance to the workers of civilization. . . . 

As Lord Bryce very rightly said, the future of China is of immense 
significance to the whole of mankind. There you have a great territory 
containing a population of about 400,000,000 of people strong in body, 
quick, intelligent, and adaptable in mind. It has been said that the 
Chinaman has all the cleverness of the Japanese, and the plodding 
patience of the .German. He can turn his hand to almost anything. 
There is great truth and significance in that. I read the other day 



ii8 AMERICA'S STAKE IN THE FAR EAST 

of a notice in Shanghai : "Furnaces and umbrellas mended. Any mortal 
thing can do." I think it can be said of that enormous population that, 
when put to it, it would say : "Any mortal thing can do." It is a territory 
fertile of food and of every material under the sun. It possesses vast and 
unexplored mineral resources. I am told that the coal fields of South 
Shansi could supply at the present rate of consumption sufficient coal to 
the whole world for thousands of years. There are vast quantities of 
iron and of copper. There are great waterways and, as soon as railway 
facilities can be produced, there are literally no limits to the industrial 
possibilities of China. It is awakening, as you all know, a great giant 
after these centuries of sleep, stretching its limbs, rubbing its eyes and 
opening them on a new world and its possibilities. . . . All this immense 
possibility of industry will be most certainly utilized either by Chinese 
intelligence and enterprise itself, or by foreign capitalists and merchant 
adventurers. They will be able to command a practically vast and 
unlimited supply of labor, ready to work for almost nothing. . . . With 
a nation of such labor to draw upon, China would be on the eve of a 
manufacturing development which would act like a continental upheaval 
changing the trade map of the world. Now picture to yourselves, if 
China be dominated with an entirely material conception of civilization, 
and is simply thrust into the maelstrom of industrial pressure, you can see 
at once how it will affect the workers of the world. ... I speak with the 
greatest possible sympathy and friendliness of Japan, because she is our 
tried and proved ally, but one cannot ignore the fact that, until recently, 
the cotton mills of Japan were worked with an army of indentured female 
labor, and I am told that of lOO women who are brought in on these 
conditions 80 never return home. They either die or are driven to an 
immoral life. That is only what happens wherever female labor is not 
safeguarded. . . . 

How are you going to get the driving power of conscience that will 
sustain the efforts of the League [of Nations] and make it everywhere a 
movement which cannot be resisted, that one's personality is respected 
and human labor is not exploited? Or, if I turn to these backward races, 
where are you going to get the power that is really going to restrain the 
inevitable lust of profit? Where are you going to get the power that is 
going to give to these backward races sufficient self-respect to respond 
to the efforts of the mandatory powers on their behalf; without their 
cooperation and self-respect, how can they be industrially or socially 
raised? That is the question for the world to find an answer, for, until 
we have found an answer to that question, where is the driving power of 
conscience that is going to lie behind these efforts to standardize work 
throughout the world on a right human basis? Until we have got the 
answer to that we can get little further. . . . 

Therefore, unless you have at work in the world now a great force 
of spiritual ideals which is rooted and based upon the intrinsic dignity of 



NUMERICAL STRENGTH OF YELLOW RACE 119 

every human personality, you will not be able to protect vast numbers of 
human beings from being exploited at the hands of trade and commerce ; 
you will not be able possibly to protect the workers of the West from being 
overthrown and overrun by the ill-equipped and half-starved workers. 
That is the situation which we find, and I ask you, with confidence as to 
your answer, where are we to find some world standard rooted upon the 
inherent dignity of human personality? I know of no answer, and I 
know of no thoughtful person who can give any answer but one, and 
that is — the power and the prerogative of the Faith given by Jesus Christ. 
There is no other, and, therefore it is that I would say with all my heart 
that labor and the Church of Christ have got to come together for the 
saving and uplifting of the workers of the world. Do not let me be mis- 
understood. I am not suggesting for a moment — 'God forbid — ^that we 
should say we need all this in order that the workers of the West may 
be protected against the workers of the East, or the backward races. 
No, I am sure that is not the sort of appeal that will touch the hearts 
and consciences of the workers of this country. I believe that they 
will listen to the call because of every honest desire, not for their own 
sakes, but for the sake of humanity, to raise the standard of human 
freedom and dignity all the world over. — The Archbishop of York, 
Address at Sheffield, England, November, 1919. 



CHAPTER XI 

WHAT CHANCE IS THERE THAT THE YELLOW 
RACE WILL EQUAL OR SURPASS THE WHITE 
RACE IN LEADERSHIP IN THE WORLD ? 

I. Why has the white man assumed that his race should rule? 

Why has he assumed that the yellow race is inferior? 

II. How does the yellow race compare with the white race in 

possibilities o£ leadership? 

1. How far is the white man's assumption of superiority justi- 
fied? Given an equal opportunity, what chance is there that 
the yellow man might prove as able as the white man? 

2. What do you think of Japan's progress in the last half 
century ? Do you think that a nation of Anglo-Saxon stock, but 
recently come out of age-long isolation from the rest of the 
world, would have done better or worse than the Japanese have 
done in intellectual and commercial achievement? 

3. What do you feel, as a result of these studies, is the basal 
weakness in Japan's political and social life? Can this be 
remedied ? How ? 

4. What considerations would lead you to expect that the yellow 
race will share equally with or even surpass the white race in 
the political, intellectual, and commercial developments of the 
future ? What considerations would lead you to doubt such an 
outcome ? 

III. To what extent is the future leadership in international 

affairs to be decided on a basis of race ? 

1 . To what extent do you feel the uneasiness in America regard- 
ing the growing Japanese ascendency in the Far East is due to 
American race prejudice or even to race fear? 

2. To what degree is the white man willing to give the yellow 
man a fair chance to develop to the fullest racial capacity ? 
What evidence do you have of this ? 

3. Just what is it that pertains to your own race that seems to 
you most worthy of preserving and handing on to the next 
generation ? Why ? 

120 



YELLOW OR WHITE RACE IN LEADERSHIP ? 121 

4. What procedure, in your judgment, will best provide for the 
largest possible development of each people in accord with its 
own peculiar genius and at the same time enable each race or 
nation to make its largest contribution to the life of other races 
and nations? 

5. In your judgment, just what qualities and conditions are 
most likely to be determinative of leadership in international 
affairs in the future ? How far are these qualities or conditions 
racial in nature? If they are racial, which race seems to you 
to be best endowed for the test of the years to come? Why? 

IV. What is the probability as to the full recognition o£ 
equality as between the white and the yellow races? 

1. The Japanese representatives at Paris tried to have racial 
equality written into the Peace Treaty. Just what would you 
say racial equality is ? Equality in respect to what ? 

2. Is racial equality something to be asserted or to be achieved ? 

3. If it is something to be asserted, just how or where and how is 
acknowledgment to be made or recognition to be granted so as 
to make the assertion effective in a changed attitude on the part 
of other races which have hitherto claimed superiority? 

4. If it is something to be achieved, just what achievement 
would, in your judgment, suffice to win the desired status? 

a. Just what would you be willing to say to a Japanese, 
Korean, or Qiinese school friend that it is necessary for his 
race or nation to do before you would be willing to acknowl- 
edge his people as on a level with your own? 

b. Just what bearing would another successful war on the part 
of a yellow people against a white people, like the Russo- 
Japanese war of 1904-1905, have on your point of view? 

5. If such a declaration of racial equality had been incorporated 
in the Peace Treaty, would this fact, in your judgment, have 
helped to command for the races of color that world-wide 
recognition of equality which makes for national and racial 
self-respect? If so, in just what ways? If not, why not? 

REFERENCE MATERIAL 
From the Oriental's Point o£ View 

What embitters the Oriental, is the Westerner's assumption of 
superiority, his presupposition of a right to rule, his arrogance, his 
unconcealed contempt of the yellow man as an inferior social being. 
Moreover, he condemns the cynical materialism of the white races, and 



122 AMERICA'S STAKE IN THE FAR EAST 

the white man's unnatural and hypocritical assumption, in his eyes, of 
moral excellence. Japan's exhibition of what an Oriental nation can do 
in a struggle with Western civilization has awakened new interests and 
ambitions in every Eastern people. — "The Problem of Japan," by an 
Ex-Councillor of Legation in the Far East, pp. i86, 187. 

Dropping the White Man's Burden 

During the greater part of the nineteenth century the peoples of 
European race claimed to have a manifest superiority over Asiatics. But 
history demonstrates conclusively that such superiority does not exist. 
Nor was this the attitude of European travelers and adventurers in the 
East in the first instance. Most of these men, persons of ability, knowl- 
edge, and repute in their own countries, were amazed at the civilization, 
wealth, and magnificence of the courts they visited and the general 
well-being of the populations under native rule, which also they admired. 
For many a long day deference rather than arrogance was the tone of 
the white men towards the Emperors and Kings, Maharajahs and 
Nawabs, Viceroys and Mandarins whom they encountered. The high 
qualities and great attainments of these potentates and their ministers 
then obtained due consideration. The arts and sciences, philosophy and 
jurisprudence of these remote societies were appreciated and respected. 
The infinite obligations of the West to the East were still recognized: 
the capacity of Asia, in war as in peace, was not forgotten. 

Then the Eastern world lay dormant for a time. Europe advanced 
rapidly in material development and scientific knowledge and acquire- 
ment, while Asia ceased to discover, or invent, or even to adopt and 
absorb. Improved weapons and the new great machine industry gave 
Europeans the temporary advantage in war and in trade. But how long 
will this last? What security have we of the permanence of this super- 
ficial predominance? . . . 

Japan herself, whose leadership of Asia afield and afloat may yet 
unless we are very careful teach white men a lesson all over the world, 
was driven into close contact with Europe and America against her will, 
first, by Commodore Perry's dexterous diplomacy, supported by the power 
of the United States, and then by the much less justifiable measures of 
other white nations. Japan was, in fact, compelled to enter upon foreign 
commerce with Europeans by the familiar process of bombardment and 
butchery, which their immensely superior weapons of offense rendered 
merely a passing amusement for the civilized aggressors. That was but 
yesterday. It would be a desperately dangerous experiment to repeat 
today. Well for us if it is forgotten tomorrow. Asia raided and 
scourged Europe for more than a thousand years. Now for five hun- 
dred years the counter-attack of Europe upon Asia has been going 
steadily on, and it may be that the land of long memories will cherish 



YELLOW OR WHITE RACE IN LEADERSHIP ? 123 

some desire to avenge this period of wrong and rapine in turn. The seed 
of hatred has already been but too well sown. 

The continent which has long regarded itself as the home of the 
progressive peoples and the hope of the entire planet is beginning to 
forfeit its assumed supremacy. The warlike and industrial potentialities 
of the near future are passing slowly but surely to the Far East. How- 
ever the recent stupendous war may finally end, the whole of educated 
Asia can read its meaning written across the map of the world. If all 
those portions of the globe which are inhabited or dominated by the white 
races are seriously taking account at the present moment of their 
strength, their population, and their possibilities for the increase of their 
wealth on a larger scale than ever before, we may be sure the ablest men 
in Asia are not blind to what can be achieved in their own countries in 
peace and ih war. It is true that the differences between the Asiatic 
peoples are as acute as any which exist in Europe. But against the white 
man they are practically all at one. 

Yet the white man still holds control over nearly half of Asia and its 
vast population. Asia comprises, including its islands, little less than 
1,000,000,000 of the human race. England, France, Russia, Holland, and 
the United States are all deeply concerned in the future of this mass of 
people, in view of the scope of territory and population they control. All 
will be greatly affected by the general political, economic, and social 
movement of Japan, China, and India. In a word, the position of Great 
Britain foremost, and of the other powers in their degree, is now being 
steadily undermined. The determined effort to secure Asia for the 
Asiatics, once begun as earnestly in action as it is now being seriously 
considered in thought, might spread with a rapidity which would paralyze 
all attempts at reconquest, if, indeed, such attempts could ever be effec- 
tively made. The West deprived of British India, the Asiatic provinces 
of Russia, French Tonkin and Cochin China, Dutch Java, Sumatra, and 
the Celebes, the Philippines under the United States, would be a very 
different Europe ^ from that to which we have been accustomed. 

That is a possibility of which the West, with forces now weakened 
and depleted to a wholly unprecedented extent, must soon take account. 
Unconsciously, but none the less certainly, it is making way. Where fifty 
or even twenty years ago the continuous expansion of Western domina- 
tion over the East was taken for granted, now an uneasy but not yet 
openly admitted feeling is growing that the tide has turned and that ere 
long the area of European influence in the East will be considerably 
reduced. — H. M. Hyndman, Asia, October, 1919, pp. 995, 996. 

What Is the West Thinking of the East? 

Unless the peoples of the West learn to view their relations with the 
East in a new light, it is futile to expect their governments to deviate 



124 AMERICA'S STAKE IN THE FAR EAST 

from the path they have been following. What, then, is the West think- 
ing of the East? 

Speaking in general terms and disregarding exceptions, the West, the 
powerful, imperialistic West, looks upon the feeble, resigning East as an 
entirely different world which must occupy an inferior position in the 
scale of world communities. To extend a helping hand to the East, 
to guide its unsteady steps into the paths of progress and civilization, 
to lift it from sloughs of despondency and accord it a place of equality — 
such a task is not given to the West to undertake. Look at India and 
China, and all the rest of Asia, with the lone exception of Japan. Here 
you have a concrete example of the Occident's attitude towards the 
Orient. Japan has saved herself from the common fate of her unhappy 
neighbors because she was quick enough to see that the only way to win , 
the respect of the aggressive Occident was to "beat it at its own game." 

When Socialists in Europe and America pledge themselves to inter- 
nationalism they are thinking only of Europe and America, forgetting 
that across the oceans teeming millions are crying for greater fields of 
activity and for redemption from bondage to Western capital. When 
the trade unionists of Europe and America speak of the brotherhood of 
workers, they are thinking only of their own race. When the pacifists 
of Europe and America advocate world peace, they seem to mean main- 
tenance of peace by sustaining the status quo of the relations of the East 
and West — ^by permitting the West not only to continue its occupation, in 
all parts of the world, of more territory than it is justly entitled to possess 
but to exclude from such territories all dark-skinned races whose over- 
crowded home lands not only offer scant opportunity to their natives but 
are themselves subject to untrammeled exploitation at the hands of the 
West. Even Christianity has abruptly stopped and struck its standard 
before the racial wall, and has no courage to advance. A Western 
nation may declare a Monroe Doctrine, but is reluctant to accord an 
Asiatic nation a similar privilege. The West expects the East to open 
its doors to the exploitation of the white race, but reserves the right to 
slam its own doors in the faces of Orientals. 

It all comes to this, that to the Western mind, the East is a neg- 
ligible quantity to be dealt with as whim or fancy may direct. — K. K. 
Kawakami, "Japan in World Politics," pp. x-xii. 

The Question of the "Yellow Peril'* 

As regards the whole question of the relations of the present 
dominant races to the rest of the world, two schools of thought are 
fighting desperately — the old and the new. One represents the convic- 
tion of innate superiority involving the right to acquire and exploit with- 
out any reference to the desires and feelings of the exploited. The 
other . . . represents the new spirit, and the one upon which the future 



YELLOW OR WHITE RACE IN LEADERSHIP ? 125 

welfare of the world must depend. It embodies the recognition of the 
right — not merely of every Western nation — but of every nation to 
what the former German Kaiser used to call "a place in the sun." It 
represents the honest attempt to make realities of the cant phrases and 
party catchwords of the last century, and as it grows and develops it will 
come to include the recognition of the right of every race, whether great 
or small, to follow along orderly lines of progress its own destiny in 
accordance with its own desires and propensities. At present it has its 
limitations, but it carries within it the germ of mankind's political and 
social salvation, because its conceptions are deeply rooted upon the 
eternal bedrock of justice. 

The great question is — Will it triumph at this juncture? Or is it to 
be submerged by the older, grosser, more selfish conception? If it is, 
let the world beware. If the West decides to reject the new light — ^to 
uphold still its ancient claim of a right to annex, control, and exploit the 
rest of mankind, irrespective of their wishes and feelings, a time will 
come when the nations of Europe and America will have to face, not only 
a yellow peril, but the peril of all the races whose feelings and rights they 
have outraged through the centuries. It will not be in our day; it may 
not even be in the days of our grandchildren; but it will surely come. 
The rest of mankind will rise in indignation, and with a might which 
justice gives the wronged, and ask, "By what authority do you arrogate to 
yourselves the right to parcel us among yourselves, to force us into 
treaties against our wills drawn up to your gain and our loss ? You have 
denied us the right of entry into your own countries, while claiming the 
right of entire freedom to do what you like in ours. Not only have you 
refused in your own lands any of the privileges you have claimed for 
yourselves in ours, but even in the lands of our birth you have denied 
us the rights which are ours by every moral law. In what lies your 
justification when you force us to destroy our own systems of life and 
social economy so that we may adapt ourselves to your needs? We do 
not admit your right ; we refuse in future to live at your dictation. Be 
gone ! We will have no more of you." 

We do not believe that such a situation will arise. We cannot 
believe that the old dark point of view will conquer. But if it does, and 
if as a result the world is plunged into such a sea of devastation and 
distress as it has never seen before, upon whom will the guilt lie ? Surely 
not upon those races who, after suffering coercion and wrong for a long 
period of years, rise to defend themselves and to win that freedom which 
every true Englishman and American values more than life. 

No; there is no "Yellow Peril," and if the West be true to its highest 
ideals, earnestly endeavoring to give the less powerful nations those 
rights and opportunities which it values for itself, such a peril will never 
arise. 

But if the counsels of the reactionaries prevail, this Peril must always 



126 AMERICA'S STAKE IN THE FAR EAST 

be taken into consideration and recognized as a potent factor of the 
future. Yet in justice it should be called not the "Yellow Peril," but 
the "White Peril," for those who inflict the wrong must be held re- 
sponsible for the result. — Samuel Evans Stokes, Modern Review, August, 
1919, pp. 131, 132. 

The Marvel of the Modernization of Japan 

When an American squadron arrived to break down her isolation, 
she did not possess even the beginnings of a national fleet or a national 
army; of an ocean-going mercantile marine; of a telegraphic or postal 
system; of a newspaper press; of enlightened codes, of a trained judi- 
ciary, or of properly organized tribunals of justice; she knew nothing 
of Occidental sciences and philosophies; was a complete stranger to 
international law and to the usages of diplomacy; had no conception of 
parliamentary institutions or popular representation; and was divided 
into a number of feudal principalities, each virtually independent of the 
other, and all alike untutored in the spirit of nationality or imperialism. 
In thirty years these conditions were absolutely metamorphosed. Feudal- 
ism had been abolished ; the whole country united under one administra- 
tion; the polity of the State placed on a constitutional basis; the people 
admitted to a share in the government under representative institutions; 
an absorbing sentiment of patriotism substituted for the narrow local 
loyalties of rival fiefs; the country intersected with telegraphs and rail- 
ways, and its remotest districts brought within the circuit of an excellent 
postal system ; the flag of the nation carried to distant countries by a large 
mercantile marine ; a powerful fleet organized, manned by expert seamen, 
and proved to be as capable of fighting scientifically as of navigating the 
' high seas with marked immunity from mishap ; the method of conscrip- 
tion applied to raising a large military force, provided with the best 
modern weapons and trained according to Western tactics; the laws 
recast on the most advanced principles of Occidental jurisprudence and 
embodied in exhaustive codes; provision made for the administration of 
justice by well-equipped tribunals and an educated judiciary; an extensive 
system of national education inaugurated, with universities turning out 
students capable of original research in the sciences and philosophies of 
the West; the State represented at foreign courts by competent diplo- 
matists; the people supplied with an ample number of journals and 
periodicals ; the foundations of a great manufacturing career laid, and the 
respect of foreign powers unreservedly won. Such a record may well 
excite wonder. . . . 

If that were all she had done, it might not be fair to say that any 
intelligent people would have acted with less vigor under similar circum- 
stances. But Japan did not confine herself to adopting the externals of 
Western civilization. She became an eager pupil of its scientific, political, 



YELLOW OR WHITE RACE IN LEADERSHIP ? 127 

moral, philosophic, and legislative systems also. She took the spirit as 
well as the letter, and by so doing differentiated herself effectively from 
Oriental states. It has been objected that this wholesale receptivity was 
limited to a few leaders of thought — to the literati and the military 
patricians whose will had always been law to the commoners. Certainly 
that is true as to the initiative. But it is unimaginable that such 
sweeping changes could have been effected in a quiet and orderly manner 
had not the hearts of the people been with the reformers. In Japan no 
railways were torn up, no machines wrecked, no lines of telegraph 
demolished by laborers who feared for their own employment or fanatics 
who saw their superstitions slighted. Rapid as was the pace set by the 
leaders of progress, the masses did not hang back. That tribute at least 
must be paid to the nation's intelligent liberality by any honest writer of 
its modern history. We may deny that other peoples might not have done 
as well, but we can scarcely affirm that any would have done better. — 
Captain Frank Brinkley, "Japan: Its History, Arts, and Literature," 
pp. 9, 12, 13. 

Japan*s Greatest Need 

In my conversations with prominent Japanese during my two visits 
to Japan, I was accustomed to bring in the query : "What do you regard 
as the chief need of modern Japan ?" After collating the answers at the 
end of my tours, I found that the consensus of opinion was that Japan's 
most urgent need is a new basis of morals; that the nation has broken 
loose from its old religious moorings and has not yet made new 
ones. . . . 

We of the West have given the Japanese our weapons to increase 
their military efficiency, our inventions and discoveries to increase their 
manufacturing and commercial efficiency, our educational and scientific 
methods to increase their intellectual, our medical and surgical equip- 
ment to increase their ability to treat disease; are we not under equal 
obligation, to say, the least, to give them the Gospel that will increase 
their spiritual efficiency and enable them to make right use of all their 
other powers? 

The Japanese already have a political vision. They covet the leader- 
ship of Asia, and they are preparing for it with a skill and energy which 
elicit the wonder of mankind. They already have a commercial vision, 
and they are strenuously trying to realize it. They already have an 
intellectual vision, and they have built up one of the best educational 
systems in the world. What Japan now needs is a spiritual vision which 
will purify and glorify these other visions. — A. J. Brown, "The Mastery 
of the Far East," pp. 654, 655. 

Making World Democracy Real 

A "square deal" ! That is just what every man and woman, every 



128 AMERICA'S STAKE IN THE FAR EAST 

nation and people, every culture and civilization, needs to have if democ- 
racy (real in contradistinction to sham democracy) is to be made a 
reality. If every individual, every nation, every culture, be given an 
opportunity to prove what good qualities it possesses and what task for 
society as a whole it is capable of performing; if every individual assume 
a place in the social scale in accordance with his or her proved qualities 
and capabilities ; if mankind realize once and for all that to a social posi- 
tion which is lofty because its holder is a person of high ability there 
attaches an added obligation to be courteous, generous, upright, honest, 
unselfish, considerate, temperate in language and in act, brave, and self- 
sacrificing, and that to a position which is humble because the holder's 
abilities are modest there attaches no disgrace or shame whatsoever; if 
these things and others of a kindred sort become social realities, then we 
shall begin to have real democracy. The anti-democratic forces at large 
in the world today are not inequality in social and political rank, pater- 
nalism, wealth and the possession of wealth, titles in recognition of merit, 
and kindred things; rather, the real anti-democratic forces are the 
hereditary principle, nepotism, unkindliness, materialism, Marxism, Bol- 
shevism, Teutonism, race-contempt, color-lines, cultural exclusive- 
ness. . . . 

As every human being should have a "square deal," so should every 
culture and civilization; as every man or woman should have ample 
opportunity to prove himself or herself, so should every society and every 
human institution. When we of the white race of Europe humbly confess 
that we do not possess all the excellence in the world, and when we 
acknowledge that others may be able to teach us much that will help us, 
just as we teach them much that aids them, then, with the introduction 
of such race-appreciation, will come real world democracy. The planet 
will become a social constant, and a social whole. . . . 

The lack of a sympathetic understanding that shall transcend boun- 
dary lines has been the basic cause of the multitudinous wars which 
fill the pages of history. How can democracy win a true victory if 
there is no democracy between nation and nation? 

Similarly, to extend the matter beyond the bournes of our own race 
and culture, how can real world democracy ever come into being so long 
as one race looks down upon, exploits, and exterminates all the rest, 
obliterating both the evil and the good in their cultures by the enforced 
introduction of both the evil and the good in its own? How can a true 
democracy be created for the world unless every one of the world's 
peoples be given an equal chance to prove what degree of political, social, 
and cultural virtue it may possess? — P. A. Means, "Racial Factors in 
Democracy," pp. 233, 234, 235, 238. 

Causes of Racial Misunderstanding and Conflict 

The greatest and most difficult problem of the modern world is to find 



YELLOW OR WHITE RACE IN LEADERSHIP ? 129 

the right adjustment of the relations between the progressive nations 
of the West and the peoples of Asia and Africa, whose development 
until recently has been largely stationary. Its solution demands a fuller 
exercise of the imagination, a larger measure of disinterestedness, and a 
more sustained moral effort than any people has attained to in the past. 

The difficulty is increased by the possibilities of misunderstanding 
that are rife in the divergent standpoints of those who have to cooperate 
with one another. Whereas in the earlier contacts of Europe with 
Africa and the East the superior energy, technical knowledge, and moral 
force of the Western peoples led in many instances to an easy acquies- 
cence in their leadership, we now witness everywhere a growing reaction. 
A strong national consciousness is awakening not only among the peoples 
of Asia but also among the tribes of Africa, and is certain to^ increase 
in volume and intensity. The superiority of Western civilization is no 
longer undisputed among the educated classes in Asia. Its weaknesses 
are being discovered, freely exposed, and often exaggerated. The right 
of the white man to dominate the world is repudiated with growing 
vehemence. Unless there is a general awakening to the gravity of the 
situation, we may speedily drift into a state of misunderstanding, distrust, 
and antagonism from which there will be no outlet or escape except 
through seas of blood, the sacrifice of much that is best in life, and the 
loss of that cooperation of different races which, successfully pursued, 
might lead to the enrichment of all. 

The causes of racial misunderstanding and conflict are many and 
complex. Economic factors play a large and important part. The objec- 
tion to Asiatic immigration on the Pacific Coast of America and in 
Australia arises from the desire to prevent a depreciation of existing 
standards of life. This demand is in itself just and reasonable, and so 
long as it is made and maintained in a spirit of fairness and consideration 
it need not provoke bitterness or lead to conflict. But unhappily it has 
often found expression in inexcusable acts of violence and unreasoning 
selfishness, which have aroused feelings of passionate resentment. 
Again, where different races are brought into contact with one another 
we frequently witness determined efforts on the part of professions, 
trading communities, and labor organizations to keep the field of oppor- 
tunity as a strict preserve for members of their own race, and to resist 
violently any attempt by representatives of the other race to enter it. 
This attitude is often due to a social instinct which seeks to preserve the 
standards of life from depreciation ; but it is sometimes simply an expres- 
sion of that class or personal selfishness which is everywhere the enemy 
of the real interests of the commonwealth and which must be combated 
by every true friend of humanity. While the white man thus seeks 
strictly to protect his own interests against the competition of other races, 
he has few scruples in invading the life of other peoples or in exploiting 
their needs and resources for his own benefit. This selfish exploitation 



I30 AMERICA'S STAKE IN THE FAR EAST 

and the acts of injustice and violence which have been associated with it 
cannot fail to arouse feelings of resentment and antagonism in those who 
have been the victims of the spoliation. All these forces are economic 
rather than racial, but they exert a powerful influence wherever different 
races are brought into contact with one another and profoundly affect 
their mutual relations. 

Where the races differ widely in their modes of thought and habits 
of life, economic rivalry is aggravated by the difficulty of mutual under- 
standing. There is, in many people, a natural antipathy to what is un- 
familiar, and this can readily be fanned into a flame of violent dislike. 
It is easy to depreciate virtues which are not our own and to exaggerate 
the objectionable nature of vices to which we ourselves are not prone. 
Thus each race may quickly come to believe the other to be worse than 
it really is. Differences in color and in speech are the obvious marks of 
a separate class, and hence members of each race come to think of those 
of the other as belonging to a class; they are apt, in consequence, to 
attribute the faults of a few to the class as a whole, instead of judging 
each individual, as he ought to be judged, by his personal qualities. The 
same conspicuous differences tend to obscure the common humanity 
which underlies them, and consequently, when disputes arise, there is a 
smaller fund of human kindness and fellowship on which to draw for 
composing them. 

It is perhaps necessary to recognize, besides the forces which have 
been mentioned, a deep-seated protective instinct at work to preserve 
racial integrity and purity. Mr. Maurice Evans, who has given many 
years of study to the relations of Black and White in South Africa and 
in the southern states of America, holds that this is the only explanation 
of the rooted and unbending determination of the white race to withhold 
from the Negro any share in its own social life. This determination is 
found even among those who are the true friends of the black man, and 
who sincerely desire the education and progress of his race. It would 
be folly to ignore a factor so significant and vital as race, or in practical 
measures to leave out of account those "vast accumulated and entrenched 
realities of emotion and conviction, of social instinct and historic tradi- 
tion," which race implies. . . . 

It is evident that the interaction of powerful economic forces and 
strong racial instincts gives rise to a situation which must tax the re- 
sources of statesmanship and the moral capacities of mankind to the 
uttermost. The chief hope of a solution is that the problems should be 
taken in hand in time. When passions have become inflamed and 
prejudices have taken root, questions that might once have been settled by 
compromise and good will may become insoluble and statesmanship be 
left helpless in the face of invincible misunderstanding and deep-seated 
mistrust. The influence of reason and reflection must be brought to bear 
on questions that have hitherto been left to the play of untutored instinct 



YELLOW OR WHITE RACE IN LEADERSHIP ? 131 

and blind prejudice. Lord Bryce has pointed out how largely national 
and racial antagonism has been fostered by historians and poets who have 
fed the flame of national pride by glorifying the ancient exploits of the 
race and dwelling on its virtues and achievements. If the dangers in- 
volved in racial misunderstanding are to be overcome, we require a policy 
of education which will aim at stimulating and strengthening the in- 
stincts of honor, chivalry, and generosity towards other races. The 
public mind must become imbued with the Idea that the world Is a com- 
munity of nations and races, none of which can be made perfect apart 
from the others, and that just as a good man finds his highest satisfaction 
In the service of the community to which he belongs, so the true glory of 
a nation Is to be found In the service It renders to humanity. The 
Instinct of nationality needs to be converted, so that the chief desire of 
those who love their country will be that It should make the largest 
contribution that it can to the good of the world. — ^J. H. Oldham, "The 
World and the Gospel," pp. 185-191. 



CHAPTER XII 

WHAT ATTITUDE SHOULD AMERICA TAKE 
TOWARD THE YELLOW RAGE? 

I. Did you ever have the experience of genuine and hearty 

friendships with Orientals? 

1. If so, did you find it harder to establish such friendships with 
Japanese than with Koreans or Chinese ? Were the friendships 
equally rich and lasting ? 

2. Would you like to try to establish such friendships if oppor- 
tunity offered ? Would you feel like going out of your way to 
show yourself friendly ? Why or why not ? 

3. If you could choose the race with which to begin, which would 
you choose? Why? 

II. How far is it possible for the East and the West to under- 

stand each other and to work together? 

1. "Oh East is East and West is West, 

And never the twain shall meet." 
To what extent are there inherently different qualities which 
make it difficult for the East and the West to work together? 
How far do you feel that color is and must continue to be a 
divisive factor among the races of men? Do you feel that 
racial differences are likely to be determinative of the possi- 
bilities of wholesome, helpful, and cordial relationships between 
nations and peoples in a rapidly narrowing world ? 

2. So far as you have had opportunity to come to know other 
races, what seem to you to be the basal characteristics and in- 
stincts in human nature which make the whole world kin ? Just 
what human values are to be appraised for their own sake, as 
of universal significance, and without regard to the particular 
racial group in the midst of which they may perchance emerge ? 

III. Where would the nations o£ East and West help and 

where hurt each the other? 

I. What is there in America that you would wish to preserve 
from the impact of other nations and races living around the 
Pacific? What is there in our national life from which they 
should be protected ? 

132 



AMERICA'S ATTITUDE TO YELLOW RACE? 133 

2. What is there in our national life worth passing on to these 
other nations and races ? What do they have worth our learn- 
ing or securing? 

3. Upon the whole, would a greater contact between the nations 
around the Pacific be beneficial or otherwise to the national life 
of each? 

IV. What restrictions, if any, do you feel there should be on 
the relations of America with the nations of the Far 
East? 

1. Why have the Chinese been excluded from the United States? 
How far is this exclusion act justified today? 

2. What should be done with reference to the feeling against the 
Japanese on the Pacific Coast ? 

a. If the Pacific Coast states were to prove insistent in anti- 
Oriental agitation and were to go beyond Congress and the 
executive department of the national Government in their 
direct activities of protest, what would be your attitude in 
the matter? 

b. How far should the Pacific Coast be bound by action taken 
for the good of the whole American-Far-Eastern relations, 
even if this action seemed likely to be really disadvantageous 
to the coast states? Consider this question both from the 
national and from the Pacific Coast viewpoints. 

3. How much need is there for additional immigration into the 
United States ? In what regard do you feel the Orientals would 
make desirable immigrants and fill real needs? In what re- 
gard would you consider them undesirable? From just what 
in the races you would prohibit do you wish to protect the 
United States? 

4. Is it possible and practicable to make our laws relating to im- 
migration and naturalization apply to all peoples and races 
alike ? What advantage or disadvantage would there be if this 
were brought about : 

a. In maintaining friendly relations with all nations and 
peoples ? 

b. In securing the right kind of immigrants for the best na- 
tional development of America ? 

c. In relieving pressure upon population in those parts of the 
world most needing relief? 

5. Do you want the United States to have commercial relations 



134 AMERICA'S STAKE IN THE FAR EAST 

with these nations, the immigration of whose people we pro- 
hibit? If so, what privileges would you ask for Americans in 
the home-lands of these races? Are you willing to have the 
nations of the Far East apply to Americans exactly the same 
principles of restriction of immigration, residence, land owner- 
ship, and citizenship that you wish to apply to their nationals ? 
Why or why not ? 

6. What attitude should America take towards Oriental immi- 
gration to Mexico, Central America, and South America? 

a. What danger is there, if any, that groups of Japanese im- 
migrants would be manipulated from Japan for imperialistic 
purposes ? 

b. What right, if any, has the United States to protest against 
the oncoming of land-hungry folk from the Orient, in whatso- 
ever numbers, provided they are received by the Latin- Ameri- 
can republics and do not seek to establish spheres of Japanese 
political influence on the eastern side of the Pacific? 

V. Just what processes are likely to bring about on the part 
of Americans a worthy appreciation of the racial values 
to be found in the non-Anglo-Saxon peoples — and espe- 
cially in the peoples of color? 

REFERENCE MATERIAL 
The Barrier between Asia and the West 

Until the student of East and West lays firm hold on the basic fact 
that Asia is a mystery to the West and that the West is a mystery to 
Asia, he cannot get very far. When the barrier of language is overcome 
there is the barrier of tradition and custom, but above all of distrust. 
What is at the root of this distrust? As I have so often written, the 
distrust is a distrust of each other's morality, and, added to it, the delusion 
that the distrust is on one side only. ... 

America, which has neither grabbed nor tried to grab bits of China, 
and has returned indemnities to both Japan and China, has given both of 
them substantial tokens of good will and disinterestedness. But however 
well placed geographically, however enterprising, and however liberally 
capitalized American business men may be ; spend money as they may on 
travelers and agencies, and advertise as they may, they cannot at present 
build soundly in the Far East or in Asia. They cannot do it because 
they lack a firm foundation. They are building in conditions of mutual 
distrust between Japan and America and in uncertain conditions in Japan 
and China, India and Siberia. The commercial problem in the Far East, 
in Asia generally is, then, first and foremost a political and moral prob- 



AMERICA'S ATTITUDE TO YELLOW RACE? 135 

lem. It calls for that thorough knowledge, that lively imagination, that 
enlightened sympathy with the position of the other man and how he is 
placed, which alone furnish the power to appeal with success to the 
conscience, to the honesty and sense of fair play, to that decent human 
feeling which is universal. Because the problem of Asia is a mental 
problem it must be tackled by informed and thinking men, — ^J. W. Robert- 
son Scott, Japan Society Bulletin, January 31, 1920. 

The Significance of Color 

Why is it that one group of foreigners is isolated, tortured, and 
legislated out of the country, while at the same time there are deliberate 
efforts to educate, adopt and assimilate other groups . . . equally (if not 
more) obnoxious? ... How are we to explain that there has been 
proposed no definitively Slavic exclusion or Latin exclusion or Jewish 
exclusion law in the United States ? How is it possible for the collective 
mind of a nation to discriminate between two communities of the same 
mentality, same economic status, and same socio-civic outlook ? 

The reason is not to be sought in the religious difference between 
Asia and Europe. For the states as well as the Federal Government 
tolerate every "ism" on earth. . . . Besides, in modern times the laboring 
classes are not, as a rule, fanatical enough to examine people's articles of 
faith before entering on social intercourse. Confucianism, Buddhism, 
and Sikhism, as such, are not balanced against Christianity or Judaism in 
the mind of the masses in the twentieth century. 

Do the physical features, the physiognomic expressions, then, account 
for the differential treatment of the Asian and European immigrants by 
the laborers and their leaders in America ? One might be tempted to say, 
"Yes." But, humanly speaking, native Americans themselves are too 
often familiar with the accidents of embryology to demand an ideal grace 
of line and proportion of limbs as the sine qua non of friendships, unions, 
or communal gatherings. And surely their esthetic repugnance is not 
daily aroused by every instance of deviation from the anthropometrically 
perfect cephalic index or by every aberration from the Venus of Melos 
type. 

What, in the last analysis, is the fundamental differentium between 
the Asian laborer and the European laborer? The Asian is yellow and 
brown, the European is albino, i. e., colorless or white. It is the com- 
plexion of the skin that is ultimately responsible for the exclusion of Asia 
from the labor market of America. It seems almost ridiculous that so 
much should depend on so slight distinctions. 

Race-prejudice, especially as it has developed in the United States, 
is at bottom practically tantamount to skin-prejudice. According to 
humanitarians this may indeed be a regrettable phenomenon, but as long 
as it exists it is impolitic to be blind to the fact or minimize its social 



136 AMERICA'S STAKE IN THE FAR EAST 

significance and explain it away by ethnological investigations. It is an 
open question, moreover, if color-prejudice or race-prejudice in any of its 
forms is ever likely to disappear from the human world. Until, however, 
the prejudice is removed or modified and mitigated "by conscious educa- 
tional and social service agencies, it is reasonable to recognize that the 
anti-Asian animus of America would remain a most powerful casus belli 
between the East and the West. — Professor Benoy Kumar Sarkar, 
Bengal, India, Journal of International Relations^ July, 1919, pp. 45-47. 

Here is the real root of the racial difficulty throughout the world. 
There exists a widespread racial antipathy founded on color — an animal- 
like instinct, if you will, but an instinct which must remain in existence 
until the world becomes Utopia. It is this instinct which seems to forbid 
really frank intercourse and equal treatment. How this is to be mini- 
mized in each separate region should be one of the first studies of states- 
men, for the day is surely come when common sense demands that the 
line of least resistance should be sought for and gradually approached. — 
B. L. Putnam Weale, "The Conflict of Colour," pp. no, in. 

Racial Differences 

It is not legitimate to argue from differences in physical character- 
istics to differences in mental characteristics. The physical and mental 
characteristics observable in a particular race are not permanent, modi- 
fiable only through ages of environmental pressure ; but marked changes 
in popular education, in public sentiment, and in environment generally, 
may, apart from intermarriage, materially transform physical and espe- 
cially mental characteristics in a generation or two. 

The status of a race at any particular moment of time offers no index 
to its innate or inherited capacities. . . . 

We ought to combat the irreconcilable contentions prevalent among 
all the more important races of mankind that their customs, their civiliza- 
tions, and their race are superior to those of other races. In explanation 
of existing differences we would refer to special needs arising from 
peculiar geographical and economic conditions and to related divergences 
in national history; and, in explanation of the attitude assumed, we 
would refer to intimacy with one's own customs leading psychologically 
to a love of them and unfamiliarity with others' customs tending to lead 
psychologically to dislike and contempt of these latter. 

Differences in economic, hygienic, moral, and educational standards 
play a vital part in estranging races which come in contact with each 
other. These differences, like social differences generally, are in sub- 
stance almost certainly due to passing social conditions and not to innate 
racial characteristics, and the aim should be, as in social differences, to 
remove these rather than to accentuate them by regarding them as fixed. 

The deepest cause of race misunderstandings is perhaps the tacit 



AMERICA'S ATTITUDE TO YELLOW RACE? 137 

assumption that the present characteristics of a race are the expression 
of fixed and permanent racial characteristics. If so, anthropologists, 
sociologists, and scientific thinkers as a class could powerfully assist the 
movement for a juster appreciation of races by persistently pointing out 
in their lectures and in their works the fundamental fallacy involved in 
taking a static instead of a dynamic, a momentary instead of a historic, a 
local instead of a general, point of view of race characteristics. — G. 
Spiller, "Papers on Interracial Problems," pp. 38, 39. 

A Single Problem for Great Britain and the United States 

It is of the utmost importance . . . that England and America and 
the white races generally should form a serious judgment upon the course 
they intend to pursue towards China and the Chinese. England and 
America, especially, are allowing matters to drift after a fashion that 
can scarcely fail to be dangerous. While both are crying aloud for the 
"open door" and proclaiming the necessity for Chinese independence, 
neither the British Empire nor the United States is taking any definite 
steps to secure either the one or the other. At the same time the 
British Empire, by the action of its colonies in Australia and British 
Columbia, and the United States, by its surrender to the agitation in 
California, are putting themselves completely in the wrong by their policy 
of excluding the civilized Mongolians from their respective countries. 
Especially is this policy untenable when both powers are demanding the 
fullest rights of entry and settlement in China itself against the wishes 
of the overwhelming majority of the Chinese people. In my opinion it 
will be impossible in the near future to keep the yellow races permanently 
out of British and American territory, should they continue to wish to 
immigrate and settle there. But it is most important that, if this is really 
the case, the two nations most directly concerned in the attempted solu- 
tion of this difficult problem of Asiatic emigration and immigration should 
hold close conference on the question. To drift is to move towards war, 
as we have seen' recently in European affairs. — H. M. Hyndman, "The 
Awakening of Asia," pp. 197, 198. 

Need for a Sound Policy 

The writer has everywhere contended that a real difficulty has arisen 
in the new contact of the East and the West. California and the Pacific 
Coast states are right in contending that free immigration from Asia 
would be disastrous; but so also is Japan right in contending that 
invidious and humiliating race legislation is not friendly or Christian, 
Some solution accordingly must be found that recognizes and provides 
for the right on both sides. . . . 

America needs a sound policy for dealing comprehensively and con- 
structively with all the closely interrelated problems, arising out of our 



138 AMERICA'S STAKE IN THE FAR EAST 

enormous and varied immigration legislation, fitted to take the place of 
existing incomplete, disconnected, and piecemeal laws and methods. The 
legislation needed should deal with : The regulation of immigration ; the 
registration of aliens; the distribution of immigrants; the education of 
aliens for American life ; the protection of aliens by the Federal Govern- 
ment ; the naturalization of aliens. 

Legislation dealing with these matters should be controlled by the 
following principles: (i) The United States should so regulate and, 
where necessary, restrict immigration as to provide that only so many 
immigrants of each race or people may be admitted as can be wholesomely 
Americanized. (2) The number of those individuals of each race or 
people already in the United States who have become Americanized 
affords the best basis of the measure for the further immigration of that 
people, (3) American standards of living should be protected from the 
dangerous economic competition of immigrants, whether from Europe or 
from Asia. (4) Such provisions for the care of aliens residing among 
us should be made as will promote their rapid and genuine Americaniza- 
tion, and thus maintain intact our democratic institutions and national 
unity. (5) The Federal Government should be empowered by Congress 
to protect the lives and property of aliens. (6) All legislation dealing 
with immigration and with resident aliens should be based on justice and 
good will, as well as on economic and political considerations. — Sidney L. 
Gulick, International Review of Reviews^ April, 1918, pp. 174, 175. 

The Question of Inferiority 

The Japanese question illustrates the whole problem of immigration 
in such a way that it ought to be studied carefully on both sides of both 
oceans. Our Nipponese friends seem to think they are badged as in- 
feriors when we express a desire to exclude them from our stream of 
immigration or refuse to naturalize them; and the way in which the 
matter is discussed often seems to justify this belief on their part. 

But their inferiority or superiority is not involved in the case at all. 
Our theory of immigration is that the immigrant is a lump of humanity 
thrown into the American melting pot, and that every incomer is an 
ingredient which must melt or fuse or it should not be admitted. The 
immigrant must be suitable for intermarriage actually or potentially with 
our people, so that the pure strain of the first generation will in a few 
generations disappear by dilution. This has happened with the British, 
the Scotch, the Irish, the Dutch, the Germans, the Danes, the Swedes, 
the Norwegians, the French, the Swiss, the Bohemians, and the Poles. 
It is only when we reach the Italians, who are mainly recent comers; 
the Greeks, for the same reason; and the Balkan people and those of 
hither Asia that we find the strains more resistant to amalgamation by 
intermarriage. And though intermarriage is perhaps the most powerful 



AMERICA'S ATTITUDE TO YELLOW RACE? 139 

agent of amalgamation there are other traits growing out of historical 
environment which make amalgamation more and more difficult as we 
draw our immigrants from points farther and farther east. . . . 

In many respects the Japanese are superior to us. They are in- 
dustrious and enterprising and intelligent, and in the matter of producing 
food from the soil they are superior to Americans. They are more frugal 
than we, and can live on a smaller proportion of their product. The 
Japanese has no difficulty in mastering our literature and our science. 
But why does he come to America? To become part of this republic? 
To express his admiration for us as a people and for our institutions? 
To intermarry and blend his racial strain with the American strain? 
And if he really wished to do these things — if he had no racial pride and 
no racial exclusiveness — is he a man who would be received among us 
and taken into our racial blend by our own people? It is not a case of 
inferiority or superiority on either side, but of racial attractions and 
racial repulsions. 

A bit of firebrick in the melting pot, too refractory to be melted — 
such is the Japanese, and such are many other would-be immigrants. 
Whether the fault be in the nature of our people or of theirs, the inter- 
fusion cannot take place, as it must if this nation is to live and fulfill its 
democratic destiny. — Herbert Quick, Saturday Evening Post, June 28, 
1919. 

Chinese Wanted in California 

Chinese workmen . . . local opinion holds, are essential to give 
California the labor she needs for immediate industrial and agricultural 
requirements. This requirement cannot be met by her own white popula- 
tion, partly because there is not enough of it and partly because the white 
American citizens in California are becoming less and less inclined to do 
all the work that must be done. . , . 

Chinese are wanted because they are more patient and therefore more 
efficient workers \than the Americans themselves in the great gardening 
and agricultural expenditures of the state. The Chinaman does not care 
how many hours he stoops to do the work that cannot be done without 
stooping in an asparagus bed. He is not overcome by the monotony of 
picking fruit for somebody else. California is going to try once more to 
get Chinese labor. She will urge Congress to suspend the exclusion act 
for three years and let a million Chinamen come in. They are going to 
be needed in the new cotton fields. California is not afraid that a great 
mass of womanless Chinamen will become discontented and furnish 
converts to I. W. W. doctrine. They cannot conceive of a Chinese Red. 
California promises that if she can have a million Chinese workers in the 
next three years she will cut her own cost of living by thirty-three per 
cent and reduce the cost of her products which she ships to other parts of 



I40 AMERICA'S STAKE IN THE FAR EAST 

the country by the same amount.— Charles A. Selden, New York Times, 
January 25, 1920. 

Mr. Selden's report of California's desire to have a million Chinese 
workers is exceedingly interesting. Only thirty to forty years ago 
California insisted that Chinese were intolerable. Anti-Chinese agitation 
led at times to extreme violence. 

Yet now important Calif ornians are actually advocating the admit- 
tance of a million Chinese coolies — ^because they would be so docile, 
obedient, without family encumbrances, and without ambition to own 
land or do business on an independent competitive basis ! If their pro- 
posals should be accepted and the needed laws be passed by Congress, 
the writer has no doubt that in less than a decade the disastrous conse- 
quences of that policy would be evident and a new and bitter anti- 
Chinese agitation would arise. — Sidney L. Gulick, New York Times, 
February 8, 1920. 

Economic Advantages of the Japanese in America 

The real objection to the Japanese is that he is willing to accept life 
and labor on less favorable terms than we are. If he stays he gets our 
job, our farm, our place in the sun, by the working of an inexorable 
economic law, and the instinct of self-preservation compels us to resist. 
The more of a case we can make out against him, the easier it is to rouse 
the necessary spirit of opposition. So he is "dishonest," "tricky," "un- 
American," "immoral" — objections too often urged by those not qualified 
to cast the first stone, and not more true of him than, of other men. But 
the one thing that is true and that is enough, if not to justify our opposi- 
tion, at least to create it among any virile people on earth, is the fact 
that he can underbid us and so displace us and take our birthright. 
Perhaps this does not justify us in excluding him, but the point is not 
worth discussing. We shall exclude him — if we can. — ^H. H. Powers, 
"America among the Nations," pp. 218, 219. 

The Oriental Influx into Latin America 

"When you have filled up Korea and Manchuria," I said to Count 
Okuma in Tokyo the day after the annexation of Korea, "whither will 
the increase of your people go? Your population tends to double every 
thirty or forty years, and Japan is crowded. Will you not be obliged to 
quarrel with France for Indo-China, with England for Australia, or with 
the United States for the Philippines ?" 

"No," replied the veteran statesman and sage; "South America, 
especially the northern part, will furnish ample room for our surplus." 

I recalled his prophecy when I noted how the Japanese are sifting 
into Peru. The statesmen of the west coast [of South America] lie 
awake nights dreading lest the Orient should overflow in their direction. 



AMERICA'S ATTITUDE TO YELLOW RACE? 141 

They may exclude the Chinese for the present; but every one foresees 
that new China will in time launch a navy, and will then be able to exact 
for Chinese the same treatment that other immigrants receive. As for 
the Japanese, no South American government or possible combination of 
governments dares discriminate against them. Japan's navy is too 
strong for the South American navies. 

This Asiatic anxiety is not confined to the countries fronting on the 
Pacific. The nations of the east coast, from Venezuela to Argentina, 
realize that it will not be long . . . before Oriental immigration becomes 
a problem for them, as it already is for the west coast. Not long ago the 
immigration authorities at Buenos Aires, confronted unexpectedly with 
a shipload of Hindus, promptly turned them back as "undesirable." 
Their action was high-handed, for there is nothing in the immigration 
laws of Argentina to warrant discrimination against Asiatics, but it met 
with general approval. 

Provided that no barrier be interposed to the inflow from "man- 
stifled" Asia, it is well within the bounds of probability that by the close 
of this century South America will be the home of twenty or thirty 
millions of Orientals and descendants of Orientals. . . . 

But Asiatic immigration of such volume would change profoundly 
the destiny of South America. For one thing, it would forestall and 
frustrate that great immigration of Europeans which South American 
statesmen are counting on to relieve their countries from mestizo un- 
progressiveness and misgovernment. The white race would withhold its 
increase or look elsewhere for outlets ; for those with the higher standard 
of comfort always shun competition with those of a lower standard. 
Again, large areas of South America might cease to be parts of Christen- 
dom. Some of the republics there might come to be as dependent upon 
Asiatic powers as the Cuban republic is dependent upon the United States. 

In any case, an Asiatic influx would seal the doom of the Indian 
element in these countries. The Indians have excellent possibilities, but 
it will take at least three generations of popular education and equal 
opportunity to enable them to realize these possibilities. At present they 
are depressed, ignorant, and unprogressive. Outside the larger towns, 
virtually nothing is being done for their children, who will grow into 
men and women just as benighted and hopeless as their parents. As they 
now are, the Indians could make no effective economic stand against the 
wide-awake, resourceful, and aggressive Japanese or Chinese. The 
Oriental immigrants could beat the Indians at every point, block every 
path upward, and even turn them out of most of their present employ- 
ments. In great part the Indians would become a cringing . . . caste, 
tilling the poorer lands and confined to the menial or repulsive occupa- 
tions. Filled with despair, and abandoning themselves even more than 
they now do to pisco and coca, they would shrivel into a numerically 
negligible element in the population. 



142 AMERICA'S STAKE IN THE FAR EAST 

Strange to say, whether such is to be their fate depends upon the 
policy of the United States; for this is the only power in the Western 
hemisphere strong enough to "speak in the gate" with the armed Japan of 
today or the armed China of tomorrow. When the South American coun- 
tries, especially those of the west coast, beseech the United States to 
back them up in discriminating against Asiatic immigrants, we shall face 
a decision of tremendous import to mankind ; namely, whether or not the 
Monroe Doctrine shall not only protect the South American republics 
against the Old World powers, but shall also be held as a buckler between 
the South American peoples and the teeming Orient. Then we shall be 
obliged to consider, for one thing, whether the race possibilities of the 
millions of upland Indians are such as to warrant our shielding them for 
a time from the annihilating competition of the capable Orientals. — ^E. A. 
Ross, "South of Panama," pp. 91-93. 

Most of Latin America is tropical and therefore little suited 
to Japanese colonization. Very much of it is peopled by an in- 
ferior race, and is therefore a field for exploitation rather than for 
colonization, for the same reasons that hold in China and Korea. The 
most attractive part of it, on the other hand, is in the possession of 
Europeans who will almost inevitably have the Anglo-Saxon's reasons 
for excluding the Oriental. Possibly Mexico offers the most favorable 
opportunity, and possibly here or elsewhere in Latin America Japanese 
settlement may be attempted. 

Curiously enough, -even here the Anglo-Saxon interposes his veto. 
There can be no question that the American people would look with 
extreme disfavor upon the establishment of Japanese colonies anywhere 
in the Western hemisphere and especially in any proximity to our own 
boundaries. Nothing could at first sight seem more churlish than this 
attitude of universal opposition to the Oriental. Not content with keep- 
ing him out of our own territory, we threaten to pursue him far beyond 
it. We segregate him as we do the pestilence, drawing our cordon 
around his narrow domain. . . . We object to the Japanese in California 
on economic and social grounds. In Mexico that objection does not hold. 
If the Mexicans do not object to Japanese competition, that is quite their 
affair. We do not object to the Japanese in Mexico. 

But we do object to Japan in Mexico. If we knew that the Japanese 
settler in Latin America did not in any sense bring his country with him, 
that he would never claim its aid and it would never claim his allegiance, 
any objection on our part to his settling there would be an unpardonable 
impertinence. But there is an increasing tendency on the part of modern 
nations to retain the allegiance of those born under their flag, who take up 
their abode in other lands. The doctrine that the fatherland has a per- 
petual claim upon the allegiance of its sons, even when permanently 
domiciled under a foreign flag, has been asserted of late with growing 



AMERICA'S ATTITUDE TO YELLOW RACE? 143 

emphasis, and has given to emigration a sinister political significance. A 
settlement of aliens, therefore, becomes a foreign outpost and potentially 
a foreign fortress. All this is perfectly in keeping with the instinct of 
nationality. . . . There is something that is dearer than the welfare of 
the individual — dearer to those who stay, and dearer to those who go — 
and that is the welfare of the nation and of the culture and life of the 
race. It is a degenerate and unworthy people that can expatriate itself 
without a pang — without serious reservations. As the culture and spir- 
itual life of the race find more and more perfect expression in the develop- 
ing organ of the nation, we must expect the nation to make an ever 
stronger appeal to the individual whose spiritual heritage it holds in its 
keeping. We must expect, too, that the nation, ever more delicately 
equipped, will grapple to itself with hooks of steel all those who can 
serve its purpose in the strenuous competition of civilization with civil- 
ization. Each culture will claim its own and seek its own over land and 
sea. — H. H. Powers, "America among the Nations," pp. 219-221. 

Two Warnings to America 

There are two warnings we should take to heart with utmost serious- 
ness. 

One of them is that we must face our special problems in a spirit 
broadly fair and international. We must shape our relations with 
Mexico, with Latin America, with China and Japan, in a spirit of true 
and full Christian internationalism, seeking no selfish advantage, de- 
termined to do as we would be done by — asking not what we have the 
power to do, nor what is to our interest to do, nor even what we have 
the right to do, but what our international duty may be, how we may 
best insure justice and good will in increasing measure throughout our 
relations with these nations that touch us most nearly, and that watch 
us with that jealous care inevitable when one knows that another is 
stronger than himself and is not quite sure that he is just and generous. 
We must fear tounflict injury even more than to suffer it; we must covet 
the respect paid to just and generous character even more than the 
respect yielded to obvious power; we must be, in all our relations, con- 
spicuous for that Christian internationalism for which we have fought 
against Germany. 

The second warning is that we citizens of America must look for- 
ward and not back. We have set our hand to the plow. To look back 
is to prove ourselves unfit for the Kingdom. To fail to go to the end 
of the furrow is to be unworthy of our past heritage and of our present 
position. There is danger that ... we shall be content to lapse into our 
isolation again, shall make a fetich of Washington's" warning against 
"entangling alliances," shall be content to make America great and 
forget to make America the great servant of mankind. — William P. 
Merrill, "Christian Internationalism," pp. 92, 93. 



CHAPTER XIII 
WHO WILL CONTROL THE PACIFIC BASIN? 

I. Who will control the Pacific Basin from the point of view 

of the carrying trade? 

1. Would you prefer to invest money at this time in American, 
British, or Japanese shipping ? Why ? 

2. Which nation seems hkely to have the largest interest in the 
carrying trade of the Pacific ? 

a. Which can produce the ships to best advantage? 

b. Which can best man the ships ? 

3. Do you or do you not wish to see America achieve supremacy 
in the Pacific carrying trade once more ? Why ? Why not ? 

II. Who will control the Pacific Basin from the point of view 

of naval supremacy? 

1. Which nation has the most advantageous positions with re- 
spect to home shores and the distribution of possible naval 
bases ? 

2. Which nation is in the strongest position with respect to need- 
ful material for naval construction work ? 

3. Which has the greatest stakes in people and realms which 
might seem to require naval protection ? 

4. Would you like to see the American fleet in the Pacific in- 
creased in strength ? Why ? Why not ? What would you like 
to see done with it? 

III. Who will control the Pacific Basin commercially and 

industrially? 

1. Which nations have the richest stores of raw material as a 
basis of manufacture and world commerce? 

2. Which is most likely to develop the technical processes neces- 
sary to great industrial and trade expansion ? 

3. Which is showing the finest development of social and 
economic justice for the working classes as a basis for future 
industrial peace and high productive power ? 

144 



WHO WILL CONTROL THE PACIFIC BASIN? 145 

4. Which has the greatest supply of cheap labor ? 

5. Just what ambitions do you have for American participation 
in the developing trade in the Pacific area ? Why ? 

IV. Who will dominate the Pacific Basin culturally? 

1. Is the Occidental or the Oriental type of culture likely to 
become dominant throughout the Pacific area? Why? 

2. Are the two types of culture likely long to retain practically 
all their respective outstanding differences, because of racial 
inertia and the lack of close contacts between any considerable 
groups of yellow and white inhabitants ? 

3. Is there likely to be a fairly rapid interpenetration of the 
varying cultural standards and ideas, each borrowing from the 
other, as travel and the intercommunication of ideas increase? 

V. Will geography or race be likely to be the more influential 

on the trend of history in this general area? 

1. To what extent is history likely to be conditioned by funda- 
mental geographical facts, such as mountain ranges, a broad 
ocean, favorable or unfavorable ocean currents, island groups, 
temperate, tropical, or frigid zonal conditions, and natural 
resources ? 

2. To what extent is it likely to be conditioned by national and 
racial ideals, prejudices, abilities, and purposes? 

VI. Just what should be the attitude of America toward the 

control o£ the Pacific Basin? 

1. Just how does this question affect America? 

2. Of the various elements which seem to you to enter into the 
process of getting and maintaining such a control, which would 
you regard as of most importance? Which as of the greatest 
present urgency? 

3. What, in your judgment, would be a reasonable share for the 
United States to have in the control of the Pacific ? How far 
do we now have such a share? 

4. Should the United States seek its fair share in the control of 
the Pacific through competition or through cooperation with 
other powers? If through competition, what powers are likely 
to be our chief competitors? Why? If through cooperation, 
then with what powers? Why? 



146 AMERICA'S STAKE IN THE FAR EAST 

VII. If you wish to preserve the best in American life for the 

period of your lifetime and that of your children, just 
what civilization-insurance would you seek to provide 
within the Pacific Basin? 

VIII. What hope is there that Christianity, originating in 
Asia, and now long the dominant type of religion in the 
West, will be accepted and become dominant also in the 
Far East? 

1. What contribution to the life of America seems to you to have 
been made by Christianity ? 

2. Has Christianity been fairly put to the test in America as a 
basis for the religious life of the nation ? 

3. Just what needs of the peoples of the Far East seem to you 
most likely to be met through the acceptance of the Christian 
faith?- 

4. What is your expectation with reference to the progress of 
Christianity in the Far East? What are likely to prove the 
greatest obstacles to its acceptance? 

5. In what measure do you feel that such progress should be 
promoted through missionary agencies and activities ? 

REFERENCE MATERIAL 
America and the Trans-Pacific Carrying Trade 

Japan has, perhaps more than any of the other Allies, taken ad- 
vantage of the War to further her own political and economic interests. 
She has resisted attempts of the War Trade Board to place restrictions 
on her imports to the United States, and has driven shrewd bargains with 
the Shipping Board for vessels purchased from Japanese yards. In 
particular, Japanese lines have almost monopolized the carrying trade of 
the Pacific. American vessels were transferred to the Atlantic because 
of the larger profits to be earned in the war zone, and British vessels 
were withdrawn from the Canadian and Oriental routes because of the 
war needs of Europe. In this situation the Japanese have extended their 
carrying trade at the expense of both Great Britain and the United States. 
Without any corresponding increase in the cost of operation, they have 
benefited by the enormous increase in freight rates. Their lines have 
prospered and expanded, and a powerful group of new shipping million- 
aires has arisen in Japan. 

With the return of normal conditions, the United States will unques- 
tionably wish to utilize part of her merchant marine in trade with the 
Orient. The shipyards on the Pacific Coast are turning out a large 



WHO WILL CONTROL THE PACIFIC BASIN? 147 

tonnage, and vigorous efforts will be made in that section of the country 
to employ a considerable number of these vessels in trade that will develop 
the Western seaports. The Japanese will no doubt try to retain the 
favorable position they now occupy in the carrying trade of our Pacific 
Coast. — Raymond Garfield Gettell, Atlantic Monthly j February, 1919, pp. 
255, 262. 

Most of our fears of competition on the Pacific are based on the 
past — conditions which we had to meet before America woke up. The 
future, with America fully awake in all her strength and energy, is bring- 
ing us a great modern ocean transportation plan, something which cannot 
be measured by anything in the past. It is not competitive trade that we 
are going into but creative trade — the systematic development of custom- 
ers and service on regular trade routes through salesmanship, banking, 
investment abroad, and the development of other nations' resources for 
their benefit as well as our own. And it will be trade, not so much in 
competition with the cheap labor of Oriental countries, as in helping 
them to reach the higher living standards which they so much need, and 
which are already beginning to be realized in the case of Japan, which 
has made the best start in industrial development. — Edward N. Hurley, 
Asia, November, 1918, p. 909. 

Japan in International Trade 

As she [Japan] becomes more and more conscious of the similarity 
of her position to that of Britain, she naturally inquires where the 
British live who back this tremendous power and on what fields they reap 
their harvests. The answer is the sea. The British red upon the map 
tinges the ocean's blue from pole to pole and drowns all other tints. Upon 
the sea many millions of Britons win their livelihood, and here are 
invested thousands of millions of British capital whose dividends put 
the world under tribute to Britain. Why may not Japan share this 
opportunity? This is, in fact, her most hopeful outlook and her most 
immediate ambition. It is one, too, which we have unintentionally done 
all we could to help her to realize. . . . We have enacted legislation 
which has handed our Pacific commerce to Japan on a silver platter. The 
commerce of Japan has gone forward by leaps and bounds, profiting 
enormously by her shrewd rather than disinterested attitude in the present 
struggle. Her vast fleet, supplemented by recent acquisitions from our 
own, is kept in safe and lucrative employment which it will doubtless 
continue to enormous advantage in the early years of peace. There 
seems to be no reason why Japan should not dominate, not to say monopo- 
lize, the trans-Pacific commerce. — H. H. Powers, "America among the 
Nations," p. 234. 

Japan has everything in her favor for immediate achievement in the 
Pacific Ocean ; she has an overflowing population with a high birth rate ; 



148 AMERICA'S STAKE IN THE FAR EAST 

she has the singular advantage of entering upon a new career in the wide 
world with the heredity and faculties and sinews of a vigorous past 
career; in this she is like a tree that has been kept pot-bound till its 
roots have absorbed most of its vitality and is then transferred to an 
unlimited range of soil in the open — it is bound to luxuriate in its new 
sphere. Japan is both old and young; she has her roots far into a 
distinguished past and she is stretching out in all directions, as capable 
of development and as full of ambitions as a youth just entering on the 
world. Still more, she has a great continent beside her to exploit, a great 
market for her goods, and a great quarry of labor. But perhaps the 
most striking feature of reborn Japan is her passion for education and 
especially for Western education. 

Were Japan to jettison that Prussian model of government which she 
deliberately adopted at her revolution not much more than a generation 
ago, she would go far to remove all suspicion of her designs in the 
Pacific and all fear of her following in the footsteps of her model. — 
J. MacMillan Brown, LL.D., Vice-Chancellor of the University of New 
Zealand, Journal of Race Development, April, 1919, pp. 369-371. 

China's Bearing on the Future of the Pacific 

The Pacific Ocean is becoming the center of human interest and 
commercial activity, and China with her four hundred million people, 
is its true axis. From whatever undermines China's independence and 
integrity the United States cannot hope to escape unaffected. For with 
their economic progress and their advance as a Pacific power, and also 
as a nation determined to keep alive the spirit and forms of democracy in 
the world, the future peace and prosperity of the American people are 
bound up in the satisfactory solution of the present precarious situation in 
the Far East, more particularly in China. . . . 

If in solving the Chinese Question the great Allied countries choose 
to continue the old selfish and disruptive policy of subjugating China and 
exploiting her for their own chief benefit, thereby keeping her in a state 
of political and economic semi-paralysis, rather than to apply the prin- 
ciples which they all have been vociferous in announcing as their objects 
in the War, then China will surely be the scene of approaching com- 
mercial jealousies among nations, the arena of coming diplomatic 
wrangles, and the seat of future world wars. If, instead of being handled 
justly and equitably, the problem is simply glossed over, as of old, with 
the fallacious and mischievous idea widely prevalent among foreigners 
that anything "goes" in China and that anything will do for the 
Chinese, the evil day cannot be long averted. Now that the War is over 
the acid test will be applied to all professions of disinterestedness and 
humanity. . . . 

The destiny of China and the future peace of the Far East, and 



WHO WILL CONTROL THE PACIFIC BASIN? 149 

hence of the world, lie in the decision of the big treaty powers as to 
their policy vis-a-vis the young Oriental republic. Their choice is a 
simple one. They may choose to obstruct and destroy, as they have been 
doing since the middle of the last century, or they may choose to restore 
and cooperate, as the new world order demands. The first violates and 
cripples China's autonomy, diminishing her power of resistance against 
the constant foreign aggressions, aiming at her subjugation and at the 
wresting of exclusive commercial privileges within her territory, and so 
leads to the clash of antagonistic ambitions and designs among the 
powers. The second stimulates the development of China into a strong 
and progressive nation, capable of holding her own position in the world 
and of maintaining, without outside help, the open-door policy of equal 
opportunity for all, thereby eliminating internatidnal jealousies and 
intrigues from the Far East. The one creates international rancor and 
race hatred, and is destructive alike of foreign trade and other foreign 
intercourse. The other is conducive to good will and comity among 
nations, and permits the unlimited expansion of all foreign intercourse, 
commercial and otherwise. The one is productive of evil, the other of 
good. The one leads to war, the other to peace. The one is for the 
misery and downfall of mankind, the other for its happiness and advance- 
ment. Which shall it be? Obstruction and Destruction, or Restoration 
and Cooperation? — Chong Su See, "The Foreign Trade of China," pp. 
383, 38s, 387, 388. 

Control of the Pacific Ocean. 

Few political questions have been more befuddled by shibboleths than 
those of the Orient and the Pacific. The Pacific is the largest ocean. Its 
"mastery" has a Nietzschian flavor that is compelling. But let us 
analyze it. 

In time of peace it is hard to conceive of any mastery of an ocean 
except on the part of the nation that ships the most goods across it. 
It is the goods, not the nationality of the carriers, that counts. American 
commerce all over the world before the European war, was great and 
increasing, in spite of the fact that it was carried largely in foreign 
bottoms. The Japanese have recently awakened to the fact that their 
heavily subsidized Pacific steamship lines carry the larger percentage of 
their freight, not from Japanese ports, but from Hongkong, China, to 
America and back, so that, as their subsidy covers a prospective loss, 
they are taxing themselves for the empty glory of carrying foreign goods 
under the Japanese flag ! 

It is otherwise, of course, in time of war. The United States has 
discovered to its consternation that its trade may suffer from lack of 
American ships. On the other hand, there is no real analogy between 
Europe and Asia, the Atlantic and the Pacific. It is possible for England 



I50 AMERICA'S STAKE IN THE FAR EAST 

with her powerful fleet and the possession of Gibraltar and the English 
Channel in a measure to control the Atlantic so far as Germany is con- 
cerned. Such a condition would be out of the question in the vast 
expanse of the Pacific. The exploits of the will-o'-the-wisp Emden in 
the autumn of 1914 are a striking commentary upon the inability of the 
great Japanese fleet adequately to patrol that waste of waters. No 
nation can dominate the Pacific, so long as any other nation can maintain 
a fleet there. — J. F. Abbott, "J^P^^^se Expansion and American Policies," 
PP- 95-97- 

The Far Eastern and Pacific situation are intimately linked into a 
single problem, which, from being a race for commercial and colonial 
expansion in the early nineteenth century, has with the first years of the 
new century become a question of which the dominating factor is Japan 
and Japanese interests, in conflict with those of various Western nations 
in the course of their trade expansions in that region. 

The dynamic elements of that situation are: the vast agglomeration 
of buyers called China; the approaches to that still unpreempted market 
of supposedly unlimited absorptive capacity; the exigencies of national 
defense imposed upon Japan by her geographical conditions; and her 
necessity of securing her position against any pressure which the West 
could bring to bear, to force the subordination of her own vital economic 
interests to those of other nations. . . . 

The Monroe Doctrine and the defenses of the United States' shores, 
the shores included within the limits set by that doctrine, the western and 
eastern shores of both Americas, and the island character of that land 
[Japan] demand that the United States do not consider the shores of 
the Americas as the limits, but that the limits of the dominion com- 
promised by that doctrine are the shores of the continents to the east 
and west, imposing upon the United States the necessity of controlling 
the Atlantic in the east and the Pacific in the west. That control is the 
conditio sine qua nan of the enforcement of the Monroe Doctrine. — 
Prince Lazarovich Hrebelianovich, "The Orient Question," pp. 202, 203, 
245, 246. 

The Conflict o£ Civilizations 

At this juncture the East, with its swarming hordes living a listless 
life from century to century, and the West with its energetic, individual- 
istic impulses, but without any consistent philosophy of civilization, meet 
face to face. That this threatens to accentuate the reactionary forces, 
to strengthen autocracy and brute force, and to weaken everything that 
bases itself on reason, reflection, and individual right is natural and 
evident. While some presaging spirits cherish the hope that Eastern 
thought will yield a harmonizing principle to the life of the West, others 
abandon themselves to the fear that we are destined to be driven back 



WHO WILL CONTROL THE PACIFIC BASIN? 151 

into another period of darkness in which intelligence will slumber and 
brute force reign supreme. 

The unfavorable influences that are to be expected from Oriental 
civilization may be summarized briefly as follows : a pessimistic view of 
life; an undervaluing of individual rights and the power of individual 
initiative; a caste spirit which looks upon men as mere incomplete por- 
tions of a larger unity in which their existence is entirely swallowed up.; 
the degradation of women, whom Western ideals have placed on an 
equal intellectual and moral footing with men; a lack of sympathy; . . . 
and absolutism. It is paradoxical that, with all its individualism, the 
West is, nevertheless, more sympathetic than the East. This sympathy is 
largely a result of the Christian religion ; for before the growth of Chris- 
tianity the Roman world was dominated by the Stoic spirit, to which pity 
for the sufferings of fellow-beings was entirely foreign. Throughout the 
Orient, man is singularly apathetic and untouched by the woes of his 
fellows. It may be said, indeed, by apologists of Eastern thought, that 
sympathy merely increases human suffering a thousand-fold by making 
every individual carry the burdens of thousands of fellow-sufferers, and 
that it leads to a perpetuation of deformities and disease by protecting 
from extirpation the victims of these evils. Even so, it cannot be doubted 
that, when we come to consider the feelings and ideals which make our 
life endurable, the bond of sympathy with fellow-beings is to be counted 
among the first of these, and that the introduction of Oriental apathy 
regarding the well-being of others would impoverish our civilization. . . . 

Some favorable influences that may be exercised by the meeting of 
the older and younger civilizations are the gaining by the latter of a 
deeper insight into the mystic elements of life, more serenity, and greater 
quiet and self-possession. Our civilization is too materialistic, and lays 
too much emphasis on mere machinery. The Oriental may well ask. 
Why do you hurry and struggle and make inventions and reduce life to 
an endless scramble, when you have not time left to think about the 
deepest questions of the human soul ? 

If Chinese i)artition should be made the stepping-stone to world 
control. Western nations would be forced to fight for their civilization, 
and a century of terrible conflicts would be imminent. Such a struggle 
could only end in the final preponderance of one power in a world abso- 
lutism more deadly than that of Rome, in that there would be left no 
vigorous elements to revive a dying civilization. It is not strange, then, 
that many should be looking forward to a time which will try men's 
souls, and insisting that we make sure of rallying about only the best in 
our civilization and of struggling, not for material gain and the vulgar 
glory of the hour, but for the permanence of our highest ideals, in order 
that the world may retain an abiding-place for truthfulness and honesty 
in life and thought. No one who sees the seriousness of the present 
situation will rashly cry for war and headlong national aggrandizement. 



152 AMERICA'S STAKE IN THE FAR EAST 

— Paul S. Reinsch, "World Politics at the End of the Nineteenth Century 
as influenced by the Oriental Situation," pp. 243-245. 

It is no wiser to speculate upon the great powers around the Pacific 
Basin a hundred years hence and leave China out of the reckoning than 
to write a treatise on oceans and leave the Pacific Ocean out of the 
account. If the Chinese and the Americans preserve their moral sound- 
ness, we venture the prophecy that in the twenty-first century the two 
peoples which will loom largest on the globe will be the Chinese and the 
Americans — or, perhaps better, the Chinese and the Anglo-Saxons. 
Whatever course human history takes, therefore, China will bulk large 
in the coming centuries. If the United States follows a statesmanlike, 
just, and Christian policy, she, too, will bulk large in the coming 
centuries, and despite her lesser numbers she may possibly bulk even 
larger than China in the moral leadership of the race. Moreover, if 
Russia fills up her large areas of tillable land, and if the Russians make 
the advance in political institutions and Christian civilization which we 
all hope and pray for, then, with Canada and the United States and such 
white populations as may be in South America on the east, and with 
the Russians upon the west, and with such moral influence as Great 
Britain and the Netherlands and France may exercise in Malaysia, the 
influence of the white race and of Christian civilization around the Pacific 
Basin may be maintained. On the other hand, with the rapid advance 
which the Japanese, the Chinese, and the people of India are now making, 
the influence of the yellow races in the Pacific Basin is certain to increase. 
In a word, the influence of each race and each civilization will last so long 
as it deserves to last. The influence of the white races will pale before 
the influence of the yellow races if the latter surpass us in intellectual and 
moral power. If we read aright the principles of evolution or the unfold- 
ing moral and spiritual history of the race or the teachings of the New 
Testament, Christ is set for the rise and fall of nations. If the Christian 
forces of the world respond to the divine summons, and Christianity takes 
deep root and spreads widely and rapidly around the Pacific, we may be 
sure that all will recognize that each race and nation has its providential 
work. — ^James W. Bashford, "China : An Interpretation," pp. 443-445. 

Forces That Make for Unity 

In the last century and a half the United States has made three great 
contributions to the political advancement of the world. The first was 
the adoption of the constitution, an experiment in federalism on a scale 
larger than ever before known in history. The second was the adoption 
of a policy by which the vast territories of all the states were held in 
common, and these new territories admitted to statehood upon exactly 
the same terms as the original commonwealths which formed the Union. 
Our third contribution was the Monroe Doctrine, which removed two 



WHO WILL CONTROL THE PACIFIC BASIN? 153 

continents from the field of foreign conquest and guaranteed to each 
American nation the freedom to determine its own form of government 
and its own sovereignty. 

Today the nation is again in a position to contribute to the political 
progress of the world. It stands before a fourth decision. Either it 
can cling hopelessly to the last vestiges of its policy of isolation, or it 
can launch out into imperialistic ventures, or finally it can promote, as 
can no other nation, a policy of internationalism, which will bind together 
the nations in a union of mutual interest and will hasten the peaceful 
progress of the economic and political integration of the world. — ^Walter 
E. Weyl, "American World Policies," p. 295. 

If national ambitions and economic rivalries are often dividing 
forces, there are also in the modern world a great number of unifying 
forces more and more coming into play. There is law. Three great 
systems of law cover together half of the human race. A great French 
jurist has declared that by the end of this century there will inevitably 
be one joint code of law for all Europe. There is science. . . . How 
much has steam done to bring about similarity in the social problems of 
all nations? How much electricity is doing to put a girdle about the 
earth. It would need all the genius of Mr. H. G. Wells ... to portray 
the future of these and other unifying tendencies. Then there is aviation. 
Already the estranging sea has become the all-uniting; what then may 
we not expect from the air ? International law sprang out of the absolute 
need to have some rules for the sea ; but the air is to the sea what three 
dimensions are to two. The air knows no frontiers; it must be inter- 
national. 

Democracy, too, must help. . . . Democracy has a strongly idealist 
quality. A mass of men always respond best to an appeal to their sense 
of justice and moral right, for two simple reasons : One is, that appeals to 
their interests tend to divide them just as their interests are divergent. 
The other reason is that broad and simple moral issues are the questions 
they can understand better than matters of intricate policy or technical 
detail. Democracy in the modern world had a religious origin. It 
sprang up in that wonderful army of Cromwell, an army of "godly" men, 
where an oath was punished by a fine and where the watchword was 
"tender consciences." It was this spiritual quality which was the under- 
lying inspiration both of the French Revolution and the American Revo- 
lution. Without this spiritual quality Democracy will be a failure, but 
with it we can look with some hope to Democracy to be a potent spirit 
in the future consensus of nations on such a great moral question as war. 

But the greatest and at the same time the most feasible of the recon- 
ciling influences is and will be Christianity. ... It has now become 
manifest that Christian principles have to be applied to the industrial 
relations between individuals, to the life of corporate bodies, and to the 



154 AMERICA'S STAKE IN THE FAR EAST 

relations between states. This alone can set our social life, our com- 
mercial life, our international life on a firm basis, the basis which corre- 
sponds to the deepest relations, i. e., moral relations. This is no longer 
to be called Utopian, now that the alternative is seen to be war, war 
between individuals, between classes, between nations. Utopian it is, in 
the sense that it must be a long process, one to which each generation of 
men, each individual must consciously and patiently contribute. Already 
there are signs among the working classes, in the student world, even in 
the world of business and commerce, that such a spirit is springing up. — 
A. L. Smith, "International Relationships," pp. 134-136. 

The Naturalization o£ Christianity among All Races 

The period of this third and greatest expansion of Christendom has 
. . . been a little less than four hundred years. The area of expansion 
is not now the basin of the Mediterranean. It is not the northern and 
western part of the little continent of Europe. In this epoch the area 
has been literally the whole of the habitable earth. The effort for the 
spread of Christianity has been ... but an episode in a far larger world- 
movement, a movement which has resulted in bringing the whole earth 
under the influence of Europe. ... In the sense merely of the proclaim- 
ing of the Gospel in all lands the work is entering upon its later stages. 
An arrest of this mere evangelizing process parallel to that which we 
have already twice observed in Christian history seems near. There 
will soon be comparatively few men anywhere who have not had a chance 
of listening to the word of the grace of God as revealed in Jesus Christ. 
How much that avails is another question. How far we still are from 
the real Christianizing of the world is brought home to us with terrific 
force in these days of war. It sometimes seems as if we were so far from 
that goal within Christendom itself that we have little to say to the rest 
of the world. Yet even that dissemination of the word of Christianity 
of which we spoke and the beginning made of the transformation of men 
by its spirit have put practically all the nations of mankind in a position 
to judge between Christianity and Christendom. How vast is the task of 
this naturalization and nationalization of Christianity among all the races 
of the earth, including our own, must be obvious to anyone who thinks. — 
Edward C. Moore, "The Spread of Christianity in the Modern World," 
pp. 14, 15. 

Christianity's Opportunity in the Orient 

Throughout Asia there is in process a complete transformation of 
social institutions, habits, standards, and beliefs. The movement is 
unceasing; it will as little wait on our convenience as the tides of the 
sea. The moral and spiritual forces at work are as inexorable in their 
operation as the movements and energies of war. The new institutions 



WHO WILL CONTROL THE PACIFIC BASIN? 155 

and habits which are being formed will bear the impress of the spiritual 
conceptions of life held by those who consciously or unconsciously are 
shaping them. If in a spiritual crisis so great and so real we know 
of a Gospel that floods life with meaning, strengthens and ennobles 
character, and makes men free sons of God to serve Him in His world, 
we cannot keep it to ourselves. 

That we of the West should give to the peoples of Asia in this day 
of their awakening the best that we have — the knowledge that has been 
slowly accumulated by the labor of generations, the conceptions of liberty 
and the free institutions which we have won through long struggles, and 
above all the Gospel of Christ, which first came to us from the East — and 
that we in our turn should receive from them the gifts and treasures of 
their ancient civilizations, and the fruits of their distinctive powers of 
spiritual insight and apprehension, vitalized by the touch of Christ, so 
that we and they together may understand more deeply and truly what 
He is and what He would have us do — this surely is a dream that may 
make the blood run quicker in our veins, and an object of endeavor that 
may claim our utmost devotion, — J, H. Oldham, M.A., "The World and 
the Gospel," pp. 106, 107. 

At the Turning Point o£ History 

The situation is grave in the Far East and not only in the Far East 
but throughout Asia. A little careful and patient labor in the work of 
mutual understanding may help to avoid a great conflagration. . . . We 
are faced by a great problem. To try to minimize the gravity of the 
problem is vain, for the facts lie before the eyes of every investigator. 
We are at a great turning point in the history of the world. At such a 
juncture it is not always easy to see our full duty. But a few things are 
plain, and one of them is that, in the present state of the relations 
between East and West, no labor can be spared from the task of bringing 
about a better understanding. Workers in many spheres will be re- 
warded by saving the world from an interracial conflict, a war of conti- 
nents, by which the bloodshed, suffering, and waste of the past five 
terrible years would be overshadowed. . . . 

There must be no question of struggling with a resentful and bris- 
tling Asia or of "licking the Japanese." There have been wars in the 
history of the world, there have been fights in America in which civiliza- 
tion has seemed to "Git forrard, sometimes upon a powder cart." But 
civilization will go down for centuries if half the world flies at the other 
half's throat. It will not be the fighting of men but of machinery. It 
will be crime on the earth, in the air, and on the sea. It will be annihil- 
ation by starvation and poison, by unimaginable cruelties. Unless prog- 
ress is a dream and civilization an illusion we must be finished with war. 
— ^J. W. Robertson Scott, Japan Society Bulletin, January 31^ 1920. 



CHAPTER XIV 

WHAT IS THE SOLUTION OF THE FAR 
EASTERN PROBLEM? 

I. What is the Far Eastern question? 

1. From the study thus far, what would you say are the main 

issues in the Far Eastern problem? 

2. What is America's relation to this problem ? 

II. What is the solution of the Far Eastern question? 

1. As a result of these studies do you believe the Far Eastern 
problem is soluble? Why? Why not? 

2. If it is soluble, what solution seems to you to be most promis- 
ing? 

3. How will America be affected by the solution or non-solution 
of the problem ? 

4. What part ought America to take in the effort to solve the 
problem ? 

5. Which of the following would you consider essential if the 
Far Eastern problem is to be solved? 

a. Just and equitable immigration and naturalization laws, 
impartially enforced, 

b. A wise, vigorous, and sustained Far Eastern policy on the 
part of the State Department at Washington. 

c. An able diplomatic and consular personnel. 

d. An intelligent public opinion supporting the State Depart- 
ment in its diplomacy and Congress in its legislation. 

e. A capable and trustworthy personnel representing American 
commercial interests in the Far East. 

f. A navy fully able to protect all legitimate American interests 
in the Pacific. 

g. Courtesies and hospitality shown to students, business men, 
diplomatic and other leaders coming to America for longer 
or shorter stay from the nations of the Far East. 

156 



SOLUTION OF FAR EASTERN PROBLEM? 157 

h. The multiplication o£ personal friendships between Ameri- 
cans and representatives of the races of the Far East. 

i. The opening up of cultural privileges in the United States, 
such as normal and technical schools, colleges and univers- 
ities, in the largest possible measure to Far Eastern students. 

j. The mutual interpretation of racial and national values and 
progress by exchange professorships and lectureships. 

k. The encouragement of trans-Pacific tourist travel, so that 
the visits by intelligent nationals from one to the other side 
of the Pacific — East or West — may be multiplied. 

1. A great enlargement of foreign mission work on those lines 
of development which have most approved themselves to both 
Occidental and Oriental enlightened judgment. 

m. The American agencies of public information and guidance 
such as the news bureaus, the daily press, the weekly and 
monthly periodicals, fully related to the various aspects of the 
problem, and providing publicity on sound informative and 
interpretative lines. 

n. The achievement of a more truly Christian private and 
public life in America, so that the commending of Christian 
ideals to the people of the Far East by our missionaries may 
be better understood and appreciated. 

o. The development among Christians and others of a clearer 
sense of world brotherhood, of the essential unity of the 
human race, and of the inescapable and multiplying contacts 
of its various peoples as they sojourn on the earth, and, there- 
fore, of the urgent duty to find ways whereby the nations may 
live together in peace and amity. 

p. A full participation in the League of Nations. 

q. A hearty sharing by great American financial interests in 
the development of natural resources and of systems of trans- 
portation in the Far East, especially in China, in order to 
hasten the enlargement of industrial processes and the raising 
of the standards of living, and so to increase the ability of 
the yellow peoples to provide for their own economic needs. 

III. What further responsibility, i£ any, should America as- 
sume in the Far East? 

I. Are we, as Americans, to rest our cases as to our own ideals 
for the treatment and guidance of the less favored or backward 
peoples and races on our record with respect to the Filipinos, the 
Porto Ricans, and the Cubans? 



158 AMERICA'S STAKE IN THE FAR EAST 

2. Have we further and possibly still greater responsibilities in 
the Far East? If so, just what are those responsibilities? 

IV. What can be done to ease the international and interracial 
strain and tension in the world growing out of economic 
need? 

1. The white races now control vast areas of potentially food- 
producing land which is not used by any means up to capacity 
and these races purpose to monopolize those areas, by way of 
protecting their own standards of living and their racial in- 
tegrity and for the use of the oncoming generations of white 
descendants. The yellow races, hard pressed for life's neces- 
sities, with multiplied millions living below the scale of effi- 
ciency, and with rapidly increasing populations, have awakened 
late to world conditions and find the areas of possible spill-over 
for their peoples already largely preempted by the white race. 
What, if anything, should be done about it? 

2. Is the principle of loving our neighbor as ourselves a valid 
principle in the matter of relationships between the larger social 
units, such as nations and races? Why? Why not? 

3. If we are to love our neighbors as ourselves, nationally and 
racially speaking, just what is involved in this for America? 

4. If we are not to love our neighbors as ourselves, nationally 
and racially speaking, what would seem to you to be the prob- 
able outcome of the competitive, and perhaps increasingly bitter, 
international and interracial struggle for control of the sustenta- 
tion resources, developed and undeveloped, of the earth? 

5. Jesus laid down the principle, "Seek ye first the Kingdom of 
God, and his righteousness; and all these things [needful for 
physical maintenance] shall be added unto you." To what 
extent is this principle valid in national and racial affairs? 

a. Is character or upkeep more important for humanity? 

b. In the larger economic order of the world will individual, 
national, and racial righteousness so react upon human life, 
and through it upon nature, that the human family may eat, 
drink, and be clothed as a byproduct of the search for God 
and His Kingdom? If so, in what ways? If not, does the 
principle have any validity whatsoever and just where does 
the validity end ? 

6. If the principle just enunciated is valid in the widest sense, 
of what importance is it that it should become effective in all 
nations and among all peoples ? 



SOLUTION OF FAR EASTERN PROBLEM? 159 

a. What effect will areas of non-acceptance have upon social 
and economic conditions and practices elsewhere ? 

b. What is essential if this teaching of Jesus is to be accepted 
as basal for all of life everywhere ? 

REFERENCE MATERIAL 
Aspects of the Far Eastern Problem 

Fifty years of contact with the West have taught Japan that she 
can secure her rights, and even her political sovereignty, only as she 
is prepared to argue with the white man with bayonets and battle-ships. 

Can we doubt that China will follow the same course of development 
as Japan has taken ? China has definitely abandoned her ancient systems 
of education, government, and communication, and is acquiring as 
rapidly as possible the practices and the instruments of Occidental coun- 
tries. This enormous change has been entered upon in consequence of 
European military aggression, and as a means whereby to oppose it 
ultimately and maintain independence. 

Can we doubt the development in China, as in Japan, of deep moral 
indignation and resentment at the arrogance of other races in their 
assumption of inherent superiority and right to own the earth and to 
exploit all races, keeping them in economic and political inferiority and 
subjection? 

Would not the above described anti-Asiatic policy produce such a 
feeling of pride, of rivalry, of ambition and indignation as would ulti- 
mately render inevitable a world-war of the races, in comparison with 
which, as many believe, the . . . tragedy in Europe would pale into 
insignificance? — Sidney L. Gulick, "America and the Orient," pp. 18, 19. 

On the rim of the Pacific an issue has appeared which opens up 
difficulties far greater than those which have hitherto troubled diplomacy. 
The imperial cla'shes of today, the intrigues and competitions and wars 
that harass our world, revolve about the spread of Western commerce 
among backward peoples. But a new problem has arisen in California, 
Canada, Australia, infinitely more painful than the struggle of empires. 
It is a real friction of peoples who do not know how to live together and 
are forced therefore to compete for territory. The Hindus who cannot 
settle in Canada, the Japanese and Chinese excluded from the United 
States, are the first symptoms of a world problem to which no man has 
proposed a satisfactory answer. — Walter Lippman, "The Stakes of 
Diplomacy," pp. 175, 176. 

Those who imagine . . . that the whole question of Asiatic emigra- 
tion to North America and Australia has been more than temporarily 
settled are, in my judgment, deceiving themselves altogether. It is pos- 



i6o AMERICA'S STAKE IN THE FAR EAST 

sible, of course, that the internal development of Japan, and behind her of 
China, may afford a full outlet for the ill-paid labor of the industrious 
millions in Japan and the tens of millions of China. But this does not 
seem in the least likely for many a long year to come. When, conse- 
quently, the vast populations of eastern Asia move in earnest towards a 
peaceful colonization of the European settlements bordering on the 
Pacific Ocean, and when they do this with the support and under the lead- 
ership of the Governments of Japan and China, it is difficult to see how 
their demand for free access to such sparsely-peopled territories as 
southern California, British Columbia, and western Australia can be 
effectively resisted. — H. M. Hyndman, "The Awakening of Asia," p. 175. 

China . . . contains as yet no extraordinary difficulties, as the case 
of Russia does; no conglomeration of national and racial problems, as 
middle Europe does; no such festering caldron of jealousies and hatreds, 
as the Balkan question does. Yet in the last twenty years China has 
been developing into a combined Russia, middle Europe, and Balkans, 
with the antagonistic ambitions of several powerful nations concentrated 
on a struggle to control her or to possess the lion's share of her remains. 
What this situation leads to in international affairs has been sufficiently 
demonstrated by recent events. If China's case does not get sympathetic 
attention and just treatment by the world, it will not be possible for any 
one who knows the realities of international politics hereafter to hear 
their altruistic professions with any confidence or respect. — Thomas F. 
Millard, "Democracy and the Eastern Question," pp. 357, 358. 

Japan is a mighty potential force in the world. When every quali- 
fication has been stated, she is today the outstanding native power in 
Asia. She is the one determined and intelligently constructive force 
in all the lands that border the western Pacific. Her shadow is, indeed, 
over all Asia. . . . The lines of her policy are clear and far-reaching. 
Her prevision is astute; her will determined. She will be the shaping 
power of the East and the question which remains is simply this : Shall 
that power be Christian or pagan, theistic or agnostic, egoistic or altru- 
istic, autocratic or popular? It is not conceivable that civilization any- 
where in the world can placidly accept this uncertainty as a matter of 
insignificant concern. 

But even this is a mere fragment of the story. Eastern Asia is the 
unexplored El Dorado of potential trade for all the nations of the world. 
There are not a few who believe that the real cause of the present Euro- 
pean war is to be found in the exhaustless prizes of commerce which are 
offered in the western Pacific littoral. Indeed in some large sense this 
must be true, for back of all strivings of a thousand years has been the 
desire to reach the coveted riches which are concealed beyond these 
mysterious curtains. In any case, the opportunity to appropriate the 
mineral and agricultural riches of China and vicinity and the trade of 



SOLUTION OF FAR EASTERN PROBLEM? i6i 

unnumbered millions will be the irresistible magnet which shall draw all 
the great races of the world into competition such as the world has never 
seen before. Here there is certain to come the gathering ambition of the 
world's dominating nations. Here will be another melting pot of inter- 
national eagerness and struggle. To exaggerate is not necessary; but 
there are many who, knowing the East, look out upon the coming impact 
of the races in Eastern Asia with most solemn concern. And in all this 
Japan, as a nation, will be the sponsor. Her faith and her ideals will be 
influential beyond our power to anticipate. With what faith and what 
ideals shall she exercise her efficient sway in this hour, when, lifted so 
suddenly out of the isolation of the past, she becomes the arbiter of such 
world destinies? — American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Mis- 
sions Deputation to Japan, "The Kingdom of God in Japan," pp. 71, 72. 

America's Relation to the Far Eastern Problem 

The United States has a unique role to play in this realignment of 
world politics and in the remaking of China. The Pacific Ocean is fast 
becoming the basin of political and commercial activities, and what 
affects one side of it is bound to affect the other. The United States 
cannot afford, for the safety of its own interests, to have China dominated 
by an aggressive and militaristic nation, European or Asiatic. The 
effete notion of splendid isolation is out of date, and America can no 
longer hold herself aloof and keep away from the entangling alliances of 
the old world. The world is being too closely unified for two incompatible 
political ideals to exist together — imperialistic autocracy based upon 
militarism, and representative democracy founded on political liberty. . . . 

The United States fought for her own freedom in the Declaration of 
Independence. She was willing to fight for the freedom of the peoples 
of the Western hemisphere in declaring the Monroe Doctrine. In the 
European War she fought for the freedom and democracy of the whole 
world. China, if unselfishly aided and wisely guided, can revive her 
ancient genius and develop her vast potential resources, and will eventu- 
ally take her place among the powers of the world as a strong, demo- 
cratic nation. Will the United States of America, true to the new prin- 
ciples of her political conviction, perform her mission toward China in the 
consummation of this noble task?— Henry Chung, "The Oriental Policy 
of the United States," pp. 108-110. 

If we are to grapple with the issues which distract the world, we 
have got to enter the theaters of trouble. If the United States is to be 
a leader, or even an important factor, in the stabilizing of mankind, it 
must create interests which will justify its participation in world politics. 
It must invest and trade in the backward countries. This will give our 
diplomacy a leverage on events. And to be effective that diplomacy will 
have to be weighted with armaments of sufficient power to make it heard 



i62 AMERICA'S STAKE IN THE FAR EAST 

by the great powers. Moreover, we shall have to abandon our traditional 
dislike of European alliances. If we enter the arena of the world, we 
cannot stand entirely alone; we shall have to work in coalition with the 
powers whose policy is most nearly like our own. 

That is, I reaHze, a terrifying program to most Americans. It 
terrifies me, and disturbs every prejudice of my training. We have all 
of us been educated to isolation, and we love the irresponsibility of it. 
But that isolation must be abandoned if we are to do anything effective 
for internationalism. Of course, if we wish to let the world go hang, 
we may be able to defend our coasts against attack and establish a kind 
of hermit security for ourselves. But even that security will be pre- 
carious in such a world arranged as this one has come to be. Less and 
less is it possible to remain neutral, to stay out of the conflicts. — Walter 
Lippman, "The Stakes of Diplomacy," pp. 226, 227. 

The Work of the Missionaries 

The world is now one in fact. Untold miseries, and cataclysms 
worse far than that from which we are emerging, lie in store for us unless 
the world becomes one also in heart. . . . 

The hope of the world lies, in sober truth, with those who preach 
peace to them that are afar off as well as to them that are nigh. Those 
shuddering possibilities of wreckage and horror can be averted by the 
breaking down of spiritual barriers, and by religious union among nations 
and races, for the silly nineteenth-century habit of ignoring the religious 
factor is contrary to all the record of history: religion is the ultimate 
motive of mankind, in all its forms; it is the great fundamental power 
that frames civilization and that moves men in their masses to great 
decisions and abiding achievements. 

No doubt much of the surviving prejudice against fpreign missions 
is due to actions which reflected the utmost possible credit upon them. 
But the missionaries have succeeded. ... In every part of the world they 
are leavening society. They have a power beyond that of even the 
European official, who is just, able, hard-working, and very honorable, 
but a little cold and aloof. They are building everywhere the spiritual 
bridges, and bridges are what are needed everywhere; they are showing 
everywhere the fatherhood of God and the brotherhood of man. They 
are making men of all, or almost all, nations and races see a glimpse of 
a better ideal than preying upon one another and fighting against one 
another. They are bringing us to realize that the better the ideals of 
each race the more those ideals coincide . . . ; because the nearer we 
are to God the nearer we are to one another. In a quite definite way they 
are becoming the inner statesmen of the new world ; and the wisest rulers 
and administrators nowadays take ample counsel of them. — Percy Dear- 
mer, "The Call of the Far," East gnd West, July, 1919, 207-209. 



SOLUTION OF FAR EASTERN PROBLEM? 163 

The Spirit of Greed and Conquest 

The ultimate fact behind the recent world-conflict is that the work 
life of the world is organized around the spirit of greed and conquest. 
No stable and enduring peace can be created without reckoning with this 
fact. If mankind would save itself from wasting death by a continued 
series of conflicts, it must find a new manner of living in times of peace. 
It is a choice not simply between two principles of government, but 
between two philosophies of life. The world must choose between life 
organized around the principle of strife, and life organized around the 
principle of good will. The way out of war and its horrors is not by 
paper pacts merely, but by the creation of a new world. It is not merely 
a question of new political constitutions or of new forms of social organ- 
izations ; it is also a question of motives and organizing principle. Shall 
civilization seek property or life, the creation of goods or the develop- 
ment of humanity? Shall its organizing principle be strife or love, 
service or exploitation, the right of the strong, as individuals and a class, 
to rule, or the duty of the strong to serve ? — Harry F. Ward, "The Oppor- 
tunity for Religion," pp. 14, 15. 

You cannot have a social Christianity in China and an individualistic 
Christianity at home — not permanently, that is. You cannot say Japan 
ought to treat China unselfishly, care for the welfare of the young girls 
in its cotton factories, and make place for the teaching of religion in its 
schools, and yet allow America to make national selfishness the controlling 
principle of its foreign policy, treat disputes between capital and labor 
as private quarrels between individual groups, and divorce the teaching 
of the churches on Sunday from the practice of their members on the 
other six days of the week. . . . 

This missionary consciousness, then, that we wish to develop is some- 
thing much bigger than a belief in foreign missions. It is the belief that 
Christian principles ought to be consistently applied in all human rela- 
tions beginning with those which lie nearest ourselves. The man who 
believes this and acts accordingly has the missionary consciousness. 
The man who does not, has not. — William Adams Brown, International 
Review of Missions, October, 1917, pp. 501, 502. 

Brotherhood in international economic relations is still in the clouds. 
No systematic attempt has as yet been made to apply the principle of the 
Golden Rule to the economic relations between peoples. . . . Every 
country, like every merchant and manufacturer, has certain material 
possessions or resources which the world needs, and which it has a duty 
to make available to the world on fair and honorable terms. . . . The 
last half-century has taught us that the ordinary "commercial induce- 
ments" which actuate individual traders do not promote a fair division 
of the world's resources; and also that the adoption by governments, 



i64 AMERICA'S STAKE IN THE FAR EAST 

socialistic or otherwise, of the same commercial standard leads to no 
better result. Two self-interests cannot between them create a common 
interest: a self-interested seller in Britain and a self-interested buyer in 
Germany or Canada do not between them add to the total of human 
good will. This simple truth . . . spells the doom of all attempts to im- 
prove international economic relations whilst leaving the motives by 
which it is ordinarily guided unchecked and uncriticized. It is as true of 
nations as of individuals that they cannot serve both God and Mammon. 
Till this is realized in all its implications . . . economic policy is likely 
to remain, what it is at this moment, the storm center of international 
politics. — Professor Alfred E. Zimmern, Student Movement, February, 
1920, pp. 66, 67. 

We are standing today on the greatest watershed of human history. 
We look around and we see the wreckage wrought by selfishness. A 
distracted and stricken world is thundering in our ears its need of Christ. 
Selfishness at last stands unmasked, and we see the end of it. Of course 
it is the enemy in politics. Twenty years ago we proved it when a 
statesman said: "I guide my country's policy by my country's interests." 
Today we are witnessing something which might almost be called a 
nationalist mania, of new boundaries drawn by nationalist lines. Are 
they going to give us a united world or a fresh crop of selfish patriotism ? 
Unless and until the Lord Jesus Christ fills the hearts of men with 
the love of the great human brotherhood we can have no vision of 
world citizenship. Look at industry. There is no escape from the 
selfish strife of competition — man against man and class against class — 
except by a Christian motive of love, service, and cooperation. Industry 
has got to remain competitive and selfish until it becomes Christian. 
Today we are witnessing a new danger. The old perpendicular lines of 
cleavage between race and race are being supplanted by horizontal lines 
of cleavage between class and class and only one thing can save us from 
a class war, and that is a community of mutual service — fellow-members 
with different functions, fellow-members of the same body, organizing 
for the good of all. But, if we witness the exposure of selfishness in its 
horror, we have also seen it in its weakness. Do you see how selfishness 
is revealed by this world war as essentially self-destructive? It has 
raised man against man and nation against nation in mutual destruction. 
We have seen the doom of selfishness. It is written there. Selfishness 
cannot be the basis of society. Life is this — ^it means a world of mutual 
service. — Rev. W. E. S. Holland, Address at Sheffield, England, 
November, 1919. 

There can be no question which is the Christian way, the way of 
ruthless competition, or the way of generous cooperation ; the way of the 
jungle, or the way of humanity. When God said, "Thou shalt love thy 
neighbor as thyself," He meant it to govern not individuals and families 



SOLUTION OF FAR EASTERN PROBLEM? 165 

only, but nations. He meant it to apply to Germany in her relations with 
Belgium, to Austria in her relations with Serbia, to the United States 
in her relations with Mexico and China. When the apostle gave as the 
law of Christ the great principle that "We that are strong ought to bear 
the infirmities of the weak," he set forth a principle which must be in 
eternal conflict with the law of self-advantage and exploitation, till it 
drive it out of the social life of mankind.— William P. Merrill, "Christian 
Internationalism," pp. I35» 136- 

Organizing the Will o£ God in the Life o£ All Peoples 

The appraising eyes that look out on the affairs of the earth today, 
however, will find that a . . . dominant characteristic of the world situa- 
tion is interdependence. It is, indeed, a curious paradox that a world 
of such unparalleled disquiet should, at the same time, be a world of 
universal interdependence. Yet a survey of the life of all four continents 
reveals the fact that, not only are all peoples now inescapably "bound up 
in the bundle of life" together, but the uniting bonds are being woven in 
swiftly increasing closeness and complexity. . . . 

The world today is one body, in which the cable, wireless telegraphy, 
and telephone are the nerves carrying the messages that are the impulses 
to action ; and the steamship lines, the intercontinental railways, and the 
air routes are the arteries carrying to and fro the pulsating blood of 

humanity. ... .,...,. 

We are interdependent also in all the raw material of our civiliza- 
tion; we starve, our mills and factories close, our whole industrial, 
political, social life is paralyzed, if there is cessation of the flow of our 
products from one to the other. The common things that we handle or 
wear every day— the soap, the tea, the cocoa, the rice, the coffee, the 
cotton or wool clothing, the gold, come out of everywhere to us. Indeed 
the very fabric of our ordered life reposes on world-wide intercom- 
munication. There is today a world-interdependence. 

All this has its bearing on moral interdependence. If the cotton 
factories of Japan are run— as they are— on cheap female labor which 
lives under such atrocious conditions that every bale of cotton that comes 
thence to us is— morally speaking— saturated with the blood of Japanese 
womanhood, we are involved in blood-guiltiness. If cocoa or rubber or 
gold are procured for us anywhere under conditions where men die like 
flies, and as they die are replaced from supposedly inexhaustible reser- 
voir's of cheap labor, the brand of Cain is ultimately upon us all. 

Distance does not break the chain of moral responsibility. Ignorance 
of the facts cannot be put forward today as a valid defence at the judg- 
ment bar of a Christian conscience. The world is one. And we, while 
we are in it, are inextricably involved in its collective sins of oppression, 
tyranny, commercial extortion, and the rest. 

There is no way out. The only open way is through the wrong 



i66 AMERICA'S STAKE IN THE FAR EAST 

to the right. The bad old order of life must be changed into the good 
new order of life. And it cannot be changed anywhere without changing 
it everywhere. As a body can suffer no disease in any limb save at the 
expense of the whole, so a world bound up as one can afford no slum or 
tyranny anywhere. . . . 

In the lives of this generation there lies dormant the power to lay the 
foundations of a transformed world. That world will come, if it does 
come, through the rebuilding and renewal of human life in a civilization 
where order will reign without tyranny and freedom be exercised without 
anarchy, a world-commonwealth of good will. Such a commonwealth 
can come, as Lord Bryce has declared, only through "a change of heart 
in the peoples of the world." And such a change of heart can emerge 
only through the sustained labor of a manifold moral leadership rooted 
in spiritual reality. 

We must have the will of God organized in the common life of all 
peoples, if we are not ultimately to have the will of Mammon driving all 
races over the precipice of greater wars into the abyss of barbarism. 
There is, indeed, only one standard so universal in its range, so complete 
as a solution of the evils that have oppressed man, that all races and every 
civilization can find in it a final and unifying aim that at once creates 
personal character, develops national strength, and gives power for united 
progress. That standard is expressed in the program of the world King- 
dom of God. 

To state that issue thus is to divide all who face it into those who on 
the one hand believe that the Christian program has been tried and found 
wanting and those who on the other hand hold, as G. K. Chesterton has 
said, that it "has been found difficult and not tried." These latter, who, 
with Matthew Arnold's Scholar-Gypsy, are "Still nursing the uncon- 
querable hope," are then inevitably led to the decision that if we are to 
witness a world Kingdom of God, men everywhere must take the whole 
message of that Kingdom to the whole world, and incorporate its funda- 
mental verities of spiritual reality and moral principle in the individual, 
social, national, commercial, international, and indeed interracial life of 
all humanity. The horizon, as President Wilson has said, is now "ulti- 
mate." That Kingdom can admit no frontiers, because it cannot cease its 
campaigns till it has brought into its dominion the whole life of all men 
everywhere. 

As a war is carried to its victorious end by the cooperation of all 
arms — on sea and land and in the air — so this new world order will be 
triumphantly achieved only through the free enlistment of this genera- 
tion of young men and women for the common service of the civil 
servant, the teacher, and the missionary; the artist, the doctor, and the 
nurse ; the soldier and sailor, the social worker, the lawyer, the engineer, 
the planter, the priest and the prophet, the member of Parliament, the 
parent, and the merchant. 



SOLUTION OF FAR EASTERN PROBLEM? 167 

In the sustained labor of such a manifold moral leadership, rooted in 
spiritual reality and issuing in the service of humanity, lies the authentic 
hope of a human scene in which the confused and bitter rivalries of 
nations will be changed to an enduring world-fraternity. And ultimately 
such a leadership reposes on the will-to-service of the individual men and 
women who can say now in their young strength— 

"I can devote myself; 
I have a life to give." 

—Basil Mathews, in "Essays on Vocation," pp. 10-14. 



MOST USEFUL BOOKS AND PERIODICALS 

Bashford^ James Whitford 

China; an Interpretation. Rev. and Enlarged Ed. $2.50. New York, 
Abingdon Press, 1919. 668p. 

♦Brown^ Arthur Judson 

The Mastery of the Far East ; the story of Korea's transformation and 
Japan's rise to supremacy in the Orient. $6.00. New York, Scrib- 
ner, 1919. 671P. 

Chung^ Henry 
The Oriental Policy of the United States; with introductory note by 
Jeremiah W. Jenks. $2.00. New York, Revell, 1919. 3o6p. 

GuLicK, Sidney L. 
America and the Orient: outline of a constructive policy. 25c. New 
York, Missionary Education Movement, 1916. loop. 

♦HoRNBECK, Stanley Kuhl 

Contemporary Politics in the Far East. $3.00. New York, Appleton, 
1916. 466p. 

*Kawakami, Kiyoshi Karl 
Japan and World Peace. $1.50. New York, Macmillan, 1919. I96p. 

Kawakami, Kiyoshi Karl 
Japan in World Politics. $1.50. New York, Macmillan, 1917. 230P. 

McKenzie^ Frederick Arthur 

Korea's Fight for Freedom. $2.00. New York, Revell, 1920. 320p. 

*Millard^ Thomas Franklin Fairfax 

Democracy and the Eastern Question; the Problem of the Far East 
as Demonstrated by the Great War, and Its Relation to the United 
States of America. $3.00. New York, Century, 19 19. 446p. 

♦Powers^ Harry Huntington 
America among the Nations, $1.50. New York, Macmillan, 1917. 
373P- 
Speer, Robert Elliott 
The Gospel and the New World. $2.00. New York, Revell, 1919. 
3i3p. 

The current periodicals carry much material on the Far East. The 
more important of these magazines are indexed in the Readers' Guide 

*The five books starred are perhaps most useful, if the inclusive list can- 
not be made available. 

169 



I70 AMERICA'S STAKE IN" THE FAR EAST 

to Periodical Literature and the Readers' Guide Supplement, appearing 
monthly. These can be consulted in almost any library of size. See 
under headings China, Chinese, Japan, Japanese, Korea, Korean, Far 
East, etc. The most useful single magazine is doubtless Asia, "the 
American magazine on the Orient," 627 Lexington Avenue, New York 
City, $3.00 a year. The magazine is prevailingly sympathetic with China, 
but gives from time to time a vigorous presentation of Japan's point of 
view by Japanese writers. The magazine deals, of course, with all of 
Asia, Millard's Review and the Far Eastern Review, both published at 
Shanghai, and the Trans-Pacific, published at Tokyo, are also useful. 

For the pro- Japanese point of view, secure the East and West News, 
issued weekly by the East and West News Bureau, Woolworth Building, 
New York City. For the pro-Chinese point of view, secure the weekly 
Bulletin from the Far Eastern Bureau, 13 Astor Place, New York City. 
For the point of view of the American Protestant Churches, write for the 
publications of the Committee on Relations with the Orient of the Federal 
Council of the Churches of Christ in America, 105 East 22d Street, New 
York City. For articles on Christian progress in the nations of the 
Orient see the monthly numbers of the Missionary Review of the World, 
and of World Outlook, New York City. The outstanding Christian peri- 
odicals published in the Far East are the Chinese Recorder, Shanghai, 
and the Japan Evangelist, Tokyo. 



